*

The US military-naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is “largely still in place,” US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said in Singapore on Saturday, without specifying exactly what that “largely” covers. (https://thehill.com/policy/international/5902453-pete-hegseth-iran-war-naval-blockade-strait-of-hormuz/).

As things stand on the ground, the US military-naval blockade of Iranian ports, imposed on April 13^th , these days does not seem to be focused on the port of Jask on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. By the way, the port of Jask, about 95 miles east of Hormuz, is Iran’s only port on the Indian Ocean. Since mid-April, news has been appearing that Iran is delivering barrels through the Golestan-Jask oil pipeline (on the map) to that strategic port in Hormozghan province, for export to customers in Asia. (https://iranwire.com/en/news/152621-oil-loading-begins-at-jask-to-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/).

Iranian oil, the Iranian oil pipeline, the Iranian port of Jask… until yesterday (May 31^st ) it seemed like a solo action by a rather isolated actor in the Persian Gulf region.

And then, on Sunday, two ferries each loaded with eight imported cars arrived in the port of Jusk from the direction of Oman. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/insight/iran-opens-jask-port-to-vehicle-imports-despite-us-blockade/gm-GM8D706D9E?gemSnapshotKey=GM8D706D9E-snapshot-1&uxmode=ruby.

The test—shipping in front of the eyes of the US Navy?! Some observers assessed that “Iran is defying the US blockade with the first shipment of vehicles through the port of Jask”.

The viewing angle can be different.

For example, that official Muscat, when it comes to cooperation with Tehran, has a different opinion in the Persian Gulf region. By the way Tehran and Muscat these days conduct frequent consultations on issues of importance for the regulation of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which does not meet Washington’s excessive understanding. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/27/donald-trump-oman-threat-strait-hormuz

It is not known to many that as early as in 1968.  Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Sutan Qaboos, ruler of Oman, jointly proposed the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Strait of Hormuz (TSS). (https://houseofsaud.com/oman-never-signed-that-was-the-point/).

That joint Pahlavi-Qaboos initiative was accepted in the same year by the UN agency IMO (International Maritime Organization based in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia). The long-ago agreement between the two former rulers of Iran and Oman—TSS has been officially in force since 1975 until today.

From there, it may be understandable why Oman, the other day, refused to join the proposal of the five remaining members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to condemn Iran at the International Maritime Agency for “unilaterally assuming the authority of sovereign administration”.

“Whatever your opinion is about Iran, this war is not their making ,” said Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi (https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-not-their-making-omani-foreign-minister-says-iran).

Hence probably the” car-ferry” to Jusk.

*

Coast of Somaliland?

Eight hundred and fifty kilometres of coastline in the middle of the Gulf of Ade on the southern approach to the Red Sea n in the extreme northwest of the Indian Ocean. That is, the coast 300 kilometres “across” Yemen, and the strongholds of the rebel movement “Ansar Allah” there, which in November 2023,  started targeting ships “connected to Israel”  near Bab el Mandeb, and also launching missiles towards Israel.

The official Tel Aviv’s diplomatic interest in establishing and strengthening broad cooperation with the official Hargeisa seems quite understandable. As well as the joy of the official Hargeisa (on the photo) that 35 years since that region (6.2 million inhabitants, 177,000 square kilometres) declared secession from Somalia, Israel last December became the first UN member state to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Somaliland.

In terms of diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and Somaliland, things moved quickly this spring with the opening of embassies in Hargeisa and Jerusalem. With the decision of the official Hargeisa, Somaliland joined the group of seven countries that recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (after such a decision by US President Donald Trump in 2017).

Be that as it may, Yitzhak Herzog, the President of Israel, while recently receiving the credentials of Dr. Mohamed Hagi, the ambassador of Somaliland based in Jerusalem, pointed out: “This new and important partnership between our countries will lead to future cooperation in various fields, for the benefit of our people and the entire region” (https://x.com/zerohedge/status/2059078341466960081). That same evening, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi spoke by phone with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-growing-israel-somaliland-ties-deepen-red-sea-rivalries ).

What formats the upcoming cooperation between Israel and Somaliland could take in the Middle East region, only time will tell.

In the meantime, the Arab-Islamic world: from Mauritania to Indonesia, as if overnight, sees a “black sheep” in its ranks. And that, in the form of Somaliland , where Islam is otherwise the state religion. The trigger this time is “the embassy in Jerusalem”. On that occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen warned Somaliland that Al-Quds (that is, Jerusalem) is an “occupied Arab and Islamic city” (https://www.saba.ye/en/news3712115.htm). Nineteen countries of the Arab-Islamic world issued a strong joint statement regarding the Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem, and further rapprochement with Israel (https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somaliland-jerusalem-embassy-condemned/).

Hargeisa in this period, it seems, is not excessively haunted.

With Israel’s recognition, Somaliland is no longer “alone in the world.” After all, Somaliland has not hidden that it has such a desire for a long time. As early as the middle of last year, Somaliland President Abdullahi wrote to the leaders of 193 countries offering them strategic access to the country in exchange for recognition of independence. “Israel was the only one to respond positively and we are grateful,” Abdullahi told the cabinet in Hargeisa in January.

Hargeisa’s next move in the Near and Middle East belongs to the future order of that region.

*

Who has a better watch: American “Chevron” or US President Donald Trump? At least, when the looming global time crunch that the world oil market—and everyone associated with the petro business—is facing in the “Hormuz case.” (in the picture: a view of the strategic strait from the Musandam Peninsula in Oman).

Just yesterday, the 47^th president of the USA told his negotiating team not to “rush” in shaping a peace agreement with Iran: “time is on our side”, said Trump. (https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260524-time-is-on-our-side-trump-tempers-expectations-of-a-peace-deal-with-Iran)

On what grounds Donald Trump currently believes that “time is on our side” is not specified. Meanwhile, according to the announcement of the US leader; “The (US) blockade (of Iranian ports) remains in full force until a deal is reached, ratified and signed.”

Now, on whose side is “time” in the conflict between the USA and Israel against Iran, the understandings are different, sometimes even opposite to  Trump’s. Thus, Gideon Rahman, the chief foreign policy columnist of the London “Financial Times” was convinced in mid-April that “time is on Iran’s side” in the conflict in the Persian Gulf (https://www.ft.com/content/2f1cbc7d-eeab-40e4-b940-61bf8b1e7959?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

In a widely commented op-ed titled “Why Time Is on Iran’s Side,” Rahman points out that “The longer the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the more economic and political pressure will increase on the US and its allies. As a result, Iran’s negotiating side is likely to be stronger — if and when peace talks resume.”

It may be that the current phase of negotiations between the USA and Iran denies Rahman’s assessment, which could be inferred from today’s reactions of the world’s petro-exchanges. Namely, the price of a barrel of “Brent” and light Texas oil (WTI) was reduced today by about five percent, due to the expressed optimism of the stock exchanges that this time Washington and Tehran are close to the “deal” (https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2026/05/25/oil-slips-us5-as-us-iran-seen-moving-closer-to-peace-deal#goog_rewarded).

But what “deal”?

As long as it is not completely clear, the fate of the oil price, the normalization of global petro-supply (as well as gas, helium, fertilizers…), and the further development profile of numerous economic branches are becoming hostages of the escalation of the key actors of the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

On this occasion, it is worth reminding that the US mega-oil company “Chevron” warned in the middle of May of possible dramatic global oil shortages…More precisely, Mike Wirth, CEO of “Chevron”—at the Milken’s Institute Global Conference in Los Angeles, warned that “the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, together with the resulting impact on global crude oil supplies and similar strategic reserves, indicates a high probability of oil shortages, oil supply shocks in the 1970s” (https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/energy/articles/chevrons-ceo-warning-1970s-style-152000898.html).

Wirth did not specify how long it would take for this “high probability” to eventually materialize. Meanwhile, some oil traders estimate that “petro-Armageddon 1970” could occur already in June (https://www.ft.com/content/b26ba4ce-4324-4ea9-926d-caf036f20832?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

In that case, the time for a US-Iran deal on the global petro market is running out pretty fast, so a Washington-Tehran deal is becoming increasingly desirable there.

In the meantime, “We are like pirates…some kind of pirates, but we don’t play games…” Trump, on one occasion in early May, described the actions of the US Navy in seizing ships in the blockade of Iranian ports. (https://time.com/article/2026/05/02/trump-pirates-US-navy-iran-blockade/.

How long the “pirates” will stay in the Persian Gulf is an open question.

*

What happens to the world price of oil at the moment when the petro-exchanges stop believing in the imminent end of the conflict between the USA and Israel against Iran (which broke out on February 28)? “Imminent end”, for example by the end of this month,  by the end of summer,  or by the end of this year?

The end of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, and especially the timing of the opening of the Strait of Hormuz (on the photo, a view of the strategic strait from the Musandam exclave, part of Oman), are of crucial importance for the price of the barrel—an extremely heterogeneous gallery of actors pointed out right from the beginning of “mini war”: From the Iranian National Guard (IRCG) to the legendary US bank “JP Morgan”.

“Get ready for (a barrel of) oil to cost $200 per barrel, because the price of oil depends on regional security, which you have destabilized,” warned Ebrahim Zolfaghari, a spokesman for Iran’s military command, in comments to Washington on March 11. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/combatants-mideast-war-trade-more-air-strikes-iran-clamps-down-dissent-2026-03-11/.

If the Strait of Hormuz is closed to civilian maritime traffic “by mid-May” (after the Iranian blockade “as a sign of retaliation”), the price of a barrel could reach the value of 150 US dollars, the bank “JP Morgan” estimated at the beginning of April). https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/irans-200-oil-threat-isnt-that-far-fetched-2026-03-17/.

Soon after, the Federal Reserves of Dallas, came out with an estimate that a barrel of oil could cost 167 US dollars, if the Strait of Hormuz remains inaccessible for energy exports from the Persian Gulf until the end of the year. https://finance.yahoo.com/economy/policy/articles/dallas-fed-extended-hormuz-closure-180620943.html

On top of that, Kristalina Georgieva, executive director of the IMF, mentioned what could happen to the price of a barrel (and the world economy) in case the “Iranian war” continues in 2027 (https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/imf-chief-georgieva-warns-much-worse-outcome-if-middle-east-war-drags-into-2027-2026-05-04/).

In that case, the barrel could cost as much as 125 dollars, Georgieva estimated.

This assessment from the top of the IMF seems to indicate that in the Bretton Woods institution there is room for a dilemma regarding the potential length of the conflict in the region of the Strait of Hormuz. So, beyond the continuous “hot-cold” narrative of the member with the largest voting rights in the IMF…

Be that as it may, now there are frequent warnings and announcements that already from June there will be significant shortages of oil and petro-derivatives around the world: Martin Wolff, the chief economic commentator of the London “Financial Times”, on this occasion points out that “the energy crisis could just begin”. https://www.ft.com/content/fb290ca1-4fa0-4309-b406-8c850d0b2449?syn-25a6b1a6=1.

If so, what is the expected price of the barrel, the very next day?

Photo: Wikimedia

*

Strait of Hormuz—Wellington (on the photo): 6,700 nautical miles, or about 12,000 kilometres. Could the geographical distance between the hotbed of war at the gate of the Persian Gulf, and the capital of New Zealand, be a factor of importance for the organization of the future management of the strategic strait, which is widely discussed by both its “blockaders”: Iran and America?

In other words: what is “Hormuz” for Tehran, Washington and, say, Wellington?

According to the latest, in Tehran, they are starting to see the Strait of Hormuz as an “atomic bomb” considering the importance that one decision can have for the entire world economy – in this case, the blockade of that strait (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/9/on-level-of-atomic-bomb-iran-highlights-hormuz-importance-amid-us-talks).

From that perspective, Mohammad Reza Aref, Iran’s first vice president—on the occasion of the future post-war administration of the Strait of Hormuz—announces that Iran’s “administration will ensure the security of this waterway and benefit all countries in the region.” To what extent Iran sees a role at least for Oman, directly on the opposite coast of Hormuz, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, in an elastic series of moves regarding Hormuz, on April 28^th , Washington launched the “Maritime Freedom Construct” (MFC) action – presented as a “critical” stage of establishing a new Middle East security architecture (https://www.reuters.com/world/us-seeks-new-coalition-get-ships-moving-again-hormuz-wsj-reports-2026-04-30/).

The US diplomatic invitation to join the future MFC coalition states, among other things: “We welcome all levels of engagement and do not expect your country to divert naval assets and resources away from existing regional naval structures and organizations.”

Wellington’s first official response was restrained. “”We are not close to the point where the New Zealand government would make any decisions on this. Consideration of New Zealand’s participation in any mission related to the Strait of Hormuz would depend on the existence of a sustainable ceasefire agreement,” the New Zealand Foreign Ministry said in a statement. (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-01/new-zealand-says-strait-of-hormuz-coalition-requires-middle-east-ceasefire-first?sref=gvca1UZO).

The government in Wellington then announced a plan to replace its two “ageing ” frigates in due course, as well that in that process they compare  Japanese Mogami-class warships and British Type-31s . (https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2026050801150/).

On May 4^th , Washington launched—and then—suspended Project Freedom, its next initiative to unblock Hormuz, which included solo—action by the U.S. Navy (with unconfirmed participation from allies in the Persian Gulf.

Wellington is there, quite far away.

The uncertain location of the next round of negotiations between Washington and Tehran: will today’s meeting between Vladimir Putin and Abbas Arghchi give rise to a new address?

Pretty bluntly, German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz assessed today that the Iranians—when it comes to the faltering negotiations between Washington and Tehran, have “humiliated” US President Donald Trump. (https://www.newsmax.com/globaltalk/iran-trump-ceasefire/2026/04/27/id/1254309/).

“The Iranians are obviously very good at negotiating, or rather, very good at not negotiating, allowing the Americans to travel to Islamabad and then leave again without any result,” Mertz said during a talk with students in Marsberg.

Mertz may have had in mind the first round of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, which took place on April 11^th  in Islamabad (on the photo) when JD Vance, US Vice President, after 21 hours of exchange of views through mediators, announced that the negotiations had ended “without results”.

Or maybe Mertz had in mind, that unsuspecting “round” last weekend, when at first glance it was not entirely clear who rejected first the possibility of American-Iranian talks in the capital of Pakistan: Washington or Tehran?

Namely, as of last Friday, official Tehran announced the weekend visit of the head of Iranian diplomacy, Abbas Araghchi, to Islamabad (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iranian-foreign-minister-returns-to-islamabad-after-oman-trip-sources/3918604).

Then on Saturday, news came from Washington that President Trump’s envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, were preparing to travel to Islamabad. (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8103xklreo).

Somehow, it was reported from Tehran on Saturday that Araghchi does not plan to meet with Kushner and Witkoff during his stay in Islamabad (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-894077).

And then US President Donald Trump decided that Kushner and Witkoff will not travel to Islamabad. “Why should they spend 15-16 hours on a plane to meet some people that no one has ever heard of?”, remarked Trump, without specifying who he had in mind. (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/25/world/middleeast/trump-witkoff-kushner-pakistan-trip-cancelled.html).

“There are phones, we have good, secure lines: if (the Iranians) want to talk, they can come to us, or call us,” Trump added on the same occasion.

If so, how to understand the statement of the Iranian head of diplomacy, Abbas Araghchi, today from Saint Petersburg, that “the Americans requested that the negotiations continue”? (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-894337).

How and where, probably the whole world would be interested. Is it in America, or on the phone, or somewhere else?

As things stand now, it seems that Islamabad is no longer an option for the Iranians. “Pakistan is a good friend and neighbour, but it is not a suitable mediator,” Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesman for Iran’s National Committee for Security and Foreign Policy, said last weekend. (https://indianexpress.com/article/world/us-news/pakistan-not-a-suitable-intermediary-says-iranian-mp-amid-stalled-talks-10657622/).

Will the dialogue between Vladimir Putin and Abbas Araghchi perhaps lead to a new address for the continuation of negotiations between  Washington and Tehran?

*

The Houthis, but also Somalia?!

These days, the global merchant navy is facing the apparent threat that, despite the ongoing war drama around the Strait of Hormuz, it could  very soon encounter a new, double “ramp” on the southern approach to the Red Sea.

Namely, from the far southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni rebel movement “Ansar Allah” has been widely announcing its readiness since mid-April not only to resume operations against certain shipping that is headed through the globally strategic sea passage Bab el-Mandeb (“Gate of Tears” in Arabic), but also to start collecting “tolls”, similar to the Iranians in the case of the Hormuz Passage. (https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156996/Houthis-have-discussed-implementing-Red-Sea-tolls-says-UK-security-firm).

How important the Bab el Mandeb (about 100 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide, separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the Horn of Africa) is for the world economy is evidenced by the fact that in 2023, about 26,000 ships passed through the Suez Canal according to the report of the Suez Canal Authority. (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260326-bab-al-mandeb-strait-another-key-shipping-route-under-threat).

Alas, that number was almost halved last year to around 12,700, due to the armed actions of the Houthis. Meanwhile, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that 12 percent of the world’s petro-cargo passed through Bab el-Mandeb in the first half of 2023, before the Houthis launched attacks that fall (in solidarity with the Palestinians).

Opportunities along the Bab el Mandeb have recently become more complicated from the shores of the Horn of Africa. Namely, Abdullah Warfa , Somalia’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union (AU), announced on April 19^th  the readiness of the official Mogadishu to prohibit the passage of Bab el-Mandeb to “ships connected to Israel”, and that was due to the decision of the official Tel Aviv to recognize Somaliland (in December last year), and exchange ambassadors with that territory. (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/243907/Somalia-closes-Bab-al-Mandab-Strait-to-Israeli-shipping).

Otherwise, Somaliland is not internationally recognized as a sovereign state, despite the declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991 (Israel was the first country to recognize the sovereignty of Somaliland). Under international law, Somaliland remains part of Somalia and has no place in the United Nations.

“External interference could lead to countermeasures, such as restricting access to the key Bab el-Mandeb sea route,” Somalia’s ambassador, Warfa , added in a letter to Ethiopia and the AU.

Now, how many vessels and trained officers the Somali Navy has at its disposal to possibly start, and from what altitudes, to enforce the ban on navigation of “vessels connected to Israel” is uncertain. Somalia signed a defence agreement with Turkey in 2024. As of mid-2025, about 500 Turkish soldiers have been deployed in Somalia, as well as a certain amount of army arsenal (https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/somalia-gets-t-129-attack-helicopters/)

If the war arena from the Persian Gulf spills over to the open sea between the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, then the ongoing Iranian-American blockade of the Hormuz Pass will get a dangerous “companion” at the height of Bab el-Mandeb.

The world’s merchant marine has a new, big problem, this time on the western rims of the Indian Ocean?

Whether the 33-meter-long “Lyme Bay” will embark on a ten-day voyage from its current base in Gibraltar to the port of Duqm (about 600 kilometres from the Strait of Hormuz) in order to begin the mission of detecting and destroying mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz is a question whose answer does not depend only on the calculations of British strategists.

As things stand now, an end to the current US-Iranian military operations in the Strait of Hormuz and the waters of the nearby Sea of ​​Oman is not yet in sight. As of today (April 22), the Iranian National Guard acted against foreign commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, after Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire with Iran (at the suggestion of Pakistan), at least until April 26. https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042026-iran-seizes-two-ships-in-strait-of-hormuz/. At the same time, the Americans are not abandoning the blockade of Iranian ports.

Aside from whether US President Donald Trump is once again signalling the possibility of continuing negotiations with Tehran. (https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/909801/white-house-says-trump-has-not-set-deadline-for-iran-peace-proposal).

The Iranians still seem to be restrained on that occasion. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/22/iran-blames-trumps-blockade-for-diplomatic-impasse-as-fragile-truce-holds).

Perhaps, among other things, because there is already concern in the West that the Iranians have placed an unknown number of “model” Maham 3 and Maham 5 mines, as well as a dozen “midget” submarines of the Ghadir class, capable of acting against various shipping, among them, for example, tankers loaded with oil and liquid gas (LNG). In addition to this, there is also speculation about where exactly the maps of all the locations of the mines laid in the Strait of Hormuz from February 28 to today are. (https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/4/13/what-do-we-know-about-sea-mines-in-and-around-the-strait-of-hormuz).

Of these delicate uncertainties for military strategists from various parts of the world, an even bigger nightmare for the world’s merchant navy is a possible “close encounter” with underwater mines in the Strait of Hormuz and its surroundings.

Really, how many underwater mines have been placed inside the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the US-Israel conflict against Iran?

That question is certainly important for the US President Donald Trump, who still considers free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz to be one of the key goals of the “military operation” against Iran.

To that end, the Pentagon has begun “deploying unmanned and autonomous surface platforms capable of towing an advanced sonar mine detection system to detect those laid by Iranian naval forces” (https://www.zerohedge.com/technology/us-navy-deploys-sea-robots-sweep-hormuz-chokepoint-mines). The action also mentions battery-powered underwater drones, called the MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish and Knielfish, which can be launched from a small boat and then scanned for mines…

As of today, the “Washington Post” reported that the Pentagon has informed Congress that demining the Hormuz Pass would take at least six months, and that such an operation is unlikely until the US-Iran war ends (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/04/22/iran-hormuz-mines/).

It seems from everything that is current, that the season of possible laying of mines in the Hormuz Straits may not be close to the end? In that case, prepositioning of various underwater drones and robots… capable of detecting mines is to be expected there. Crowding on the surface of the waters of the Hormuz Straits , but also below them, as if in the coming period, could be increasing.

The amphibious “Lyme Bay” will hardly remain the sideliner.

The US President is oscillating between war and peace with Iran, because he also knows some legal deadlines

*

US President Donald Trump knows that the agreement with Iran will be signed “tonight” in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. At the same time, US leader is not sure that Tehran will participate today in the offered second round of negotiations between the USA and Iran! “They (the Iranians) are supposed to be there (in Islamabad). We agreed to be there…if they’re not there, that’s fine too” (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/trump-says-iran-deal-to-be-signed-tonight-in-islamabad/3912353).

So, if the Iranians are not “there”, how could possibly an agreement between Washington and Tehran be signed (aside from the dilemma, what could be on the paper of that agreement)?

Now one could ask: what does  indicate the inference example where key premise is not verified. For example : who participates in the negotiations, before signing an agreement? There are many possible interpretations. There is certainly one explanation: a strong desire of the announcer for something to happen “today”…

Such a desire, that yesterday (Sunday, April 19^th ) Trump again threatened that – in the absence of an agreement this time in Islamabad, he could order the destruction of all power plants and bridges throughout Iran. (https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-warns-iran-no-more-mr-nice-guy-ship-attacks-power-plants-bridges-11850572).

But, why “today” anyway?

Especially, if it is known that the other side (the Iranians), last weekend as well as today, signalled their unwillingness to continue the dialogue with America soon. Esmail Bagaei, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, for example, said today that there are “no plans for the next round of negotiations” and stressed that Iran will “prioritize national interests and benefits” as it considers its next steps. (https://time.com/article/2026/04/20/iran-us-peace-talks-stalemate-strait-of-hormuz-trump-threats/).

So, do Iranian negotiators arrive in Islamabad today and sign the agreement with America, or do they not arrive and don’t sign it? And what happens if they don’t come and sign…? Trump has already announced that the chances of extending the current two-week ceasefire with the Iranians are pretty slim (expires on  “Wednesday (April 22th) evening in the Washington time zone”). (https://english.news.cn/20260421/08fd6822d6ed41b99cf2f25c3c54043b/c.html).

And, now what happens in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and perhaps beyond, if “today” is not “today”, and than if on April 22 there is no extension of the ceasefire agreement between the USA and Iran?

The answer is uncertain. But it seems obvious that ongoing US “military operation” against Iran—as President Trump often calls it,  will technically count 60 days of duration on April 28^th (a formal notification to Congress from the White House was sent on March 2).

So next week, US President Donald Trump will have the option to either write to the US Congress with a request to continue military operations for another 30 days (in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, from 1973), withdraw US troops from the Persian Gulf, or refer to another US legal act (Authorization for Use of Military Force, from 2011, post “September 11”), which allows US military engagement against appropriate opponents, without time limits…

The White House seems to be these days, under considerable time pressure in the Persian Gulf.

 Hello—Hello of Prince bin Farhan and Araqchi,  of unspecified time of the call and its duration, was otherwise the first publicly announced telephone contact between the two heads of diplomacy since the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and the US against Iran on February 28^th . Retaliating against American-Israeli actions, in the 40 days of the conflict, Tehran repeatedly hit targets on the Arabian Peninsula (https://www.instagram.com/reel/DW3jnspDi1d/).

As of Wednesday afternoon, the Ministry of Defence in Riyadh reported that the air defence of the Saudi Kingdom “intercepted nine drones in the previous few hours, without specifying either the locations or the targets” (https://www.ft.com/content/115eb832-9a62-424f-a893-57156ce8abf7?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

On the same day, a little earlier, the first report arrived that the key Saudi “East-West” oil pipeline (on the map, between the Abqaiq field in the east of the country and the Yanbu oil port on the Red Sea, about 1,200 kilometres long) was exposed to some kind of armed attack. Whether it was a drone strike, and eventually whose, is not stated in the carefully worded text of the London “Financial Times”’ article , which was the first to report on the incident.

By the way, in mid-March, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince bin Farhan told Iran that the attacks on its neighbours in the region had destroyed all confidence in Tehran. “Iran is no longer a strategic partner, it never was,” and it could have been “if it took a different course” (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/04/09/saudi-and-iranian-foreign-ministers-hold-first-call-since-start-of-iran-war/).

In those days, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi called on Saudi Arabia to evict US bases from its territory, remarking that Tehran only targets enemy targets, that is, that “Iran respects the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and considers it a brotherly nation.”

As of Wednesday, some kind of incident—officially unconfirmed, seems to have happened on the Saudi oil pipeline “East-West”. On the same day, ministers of foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia and Iran,  held a telephone conversation, which was not disclosed until a day later, on Thursday.

Is there something wrong about the attack on the only oil pipeline through which the Saudis can reliably deliver oil to customers in Asia at the moment?