*

The US military-naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is “largely still in place,” US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said in Singapore on Saturday, without specifying exactly what that “largely” covers. (https://thehill.com/policy/international/5902453-pete-hegseth-iran-war-naval-blockade-strait-of-hormuz/).

As things stand on the ground, the US military-naval blockade of Iranian ports, imposed on April 13^th , these days does not seem to be focused on the port of Jask on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. By the way, the port of Jask, about 95 miles east of Hormuz, is Iran’s only port on the Indian Ocean. Since mid-April, news has been appearing that Iran is delivering barrels through the Golestan-Jask oil pipeline (on the map) to that strategic port in Hormozghan province, for export to customers in Asia. (https://iranwire.com/en/news/152621-oil-loading-begins-at-jask-to-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/).

Iranian oil, the Iranian oil pipeline, the Iranian port of Jask… until yesterday (May 31^st ) it seemed like a solo action by a rather isolated actor in the Persian Gulf region.

And then, on Sunday, two ferries each loaded with eight imported cars arrived in the port of Jusk from the direction of Oman. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/insight/iran-opens-jask-port-to-vehicle-imports-despite-us-blockade/gm-GM8D706D9E?gemSnapshotKey=GM8D706D9E-snapshot-1&uxmode=ruby.

The test—shipping in front of the eyes of the US Navy?! Some observers assessed that “Iran is defying the US blockade with the first shipment of vehicles through the port of Jask”.

The viewing angle can be different.

For example, that official Muscat, when it comes to cooperation with Tehran, has a different opinion in the Persian Gulf region. By the way Tehran and Muscat these days conduct frequent consultations on issues of importance for the regulation of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which does not meet Washington’s excessive understanding. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/27/donald-trump-oman-threat-strait-hormuz

It is not known to many that as early as in 1968.  Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Sutan Qaboos, ruler of Oman, jointly proposed the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Strait of Hormuz (TSS). (https://houseofsaud.com/oman-never-signed-that-was-the-point/).

That joint Pahlavi-Qaboos initiative was accepted in the same year by the UN agency IMO (International Maritime Organization based in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia). The long-ago agreement between the two former rulers of Iran and Oman—TSS has been officially in force since 1975 until today.

From there, it may be understandable why Oman, the other day, refused to join the proposal of the five remaining members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to condemn Iran at the International Maritime Agency for “unilaterally assuming the authority of sovereign administration”.

“Whatever your opinion is about Iran, this war is not their making ,” said Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi (https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-not-their-making-omani-foreign-minister-says-iran).

Hence probably the” car-ferry” to Jusk.

*

Coast of Somaliland?

Eight hundred and fifty kilometres of coastline in the middle of the Gulf of Ade on the southern approach to the Red Sea n in the extreme northwest of the Indian Ocean. That is, the coast 300 kilometres “across” Yemen, and the strongholds of the rebel movement “Ansar Allah” there, which in November 2023,  started targeting ships “connected to Israel”  near Bab el Mandeb, and also launching missiles towards Israel.

The official Tel Aviv’s diplomatic interest in establishing and strengthening broad cooperation with the official Hargeisa seems quite understandable. As well as the joy of the official Hargeisa (on the photo) that 35 years since that region (6.2 million inhabitants, 177,000 square kilometres) declared secession from Somalia, Israel last December became the first UN member state to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Somaliland.

In terms of diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and Somaliland, things moved quickly this spring with the opening of embassies in Hargeisa and Jerusalem. With the decision of the official Hargeisa, Somaliland joined the group of seven countries that recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (after such a decision by US President Donald Trump in 2017).

Be that as it may, Yitzhak Herzog, the President of Israel, while recently receiving the credentials of Dr. Mohamed Hagi, the ambassador of Somaliland based in Jerusalem, pointed out: “This new and important partnership between our countries will lead to future cooperation in various fields, for the benefit of our people and the entire region” (https://x.com/zerohedge/status/2059078341466960081). That same evening, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi spoke by phone with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-growing-israel-somaliland-ties-deepen-red-sea-rivalries ).

What formats the upcoming cooperation between Israel and Somaliland could take in the Middle East region, only time will tell.

In the meantime, the Arab-Islamic world: from Mauritania to Indonesia, as if overnight, sees a “black sheep” in its ranks. And that, in the form of Somaliland , where Islam is otherwise the state religion. The trigger this time is “the embassy in Jerusalem”. On that occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen warned Somaliland that Al-Quds (that is, Jerusalem) is an “occupied Arab and Islamic city” (https://www.saba.ye/en/news3712115.htm). Nineteen countries of the Arab-Islamic world issued a strong joint statement regarding the Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem, and further rapprochement with Israel (https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somaliland-jerusalem-embassy-condemned/).

Hargeisa in this period, it seems, is not excessively haunted.

With Israel’s recognition, Somaliland is no longer “alone in the world.” After all, Somaliland has not hidden that it has such a desire for a long time. As early as the middle of last year, Somaliland President Abdullahi wrote to the leaders of 193 countries offering them strategic access to the country in exchange for recognition of independence. “Israel was the only one to respond positively and we are grateful,” Abdullahi told the cabinet in Hargeisa in January.

Hargeisa’s next move in the Near and Middle East belongs to the future order of that region.

*

The Houthis, but also Somalia?!

These days, the global merchant navy is facing the apparent threat that, despite the ongoing war drama around the Strait of Hormuz, it could  very soon encounter a new, double “ramp” on the southern approach to the Red Sea.

Namely, from the far southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni rebel movement “Ansar Allah” has been widely announcing its readiness since mid-April not only to resume operations against certain shipping that is headed through the globally strategic sea passage Bab el-Mandeb (“Gate of Tears” in Arabic), but also to start collecting “tolls”, similar to the Iranians in the case of the Hormuz Passage. (https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156996/Houthis-have-discussed-implementing-Red-Sea-tolls-says-UK-security-firm).

How important the Bab el Mandeb (about 100 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide, separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the Horn of Africa) is for the world economy is evidenced by the fact that in 2023, about 26,000 ships passed through the Suez Canal according to the report of the Suez Canal Authority. (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260326-bab-al-mandeb-strait-another-key-shipping-route-under-threat).

Alas, that number was almost halved last year to around 12,700, due to the armed actions of the Houthis. Meanwhile, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that 12 percent of the world’s petro-cargo passed through Bab el-Mandeb in the first half of 2023, before the Houthis launched attacks that fall (in solidarity with the Palestinians).

Opportunities along the Bab el Mandeb have recently become more complicated from the shores of the Horn of Africa. Namely, Abdullah Warfa , Somalia’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union (AU), announced on April 19^th  the readiness of the official Mogadishu to prohibit the passage of Bab el-Mandeb to “ships connected to Israel”, and that was due to the decision of the official Tel Aviv to recognize Somaliland (in December last year), and exchange ambassadors with that territory. (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/243907/Somalia-closes-Bab-al-Mandab-Strait-to-Israeli-shipping).

Otherwise, Somaliland is not internationally recognized as a sovereign state, despite the declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991 (Israel was the first country to recognize the sovereignty of Somaliland). Under international law, Somaliland remains part of Somalia and has no place in the United Nations.

“External interference could lead to countermeasures, such as restricting access to the key Bab el-Mandeb sea route,” Somalia’s ambassador, Warfa , added in a letter to Ethiopia and the AU.

Now, how many vessels and trained officers the Somali Navy has at its disposal to possibly start, and from what altitudes, to enforce the ban on navigation of “vessels connected to Israel” is uncertain. Somalia signed a defence agreement with Turkey in 2024. As of mid-2025, about 500 Turkish soldiers have been deployed in Somalia, as well as a certain amount of army arsenal (https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/somalia-gets-t-129-attack-helicopters/)

If the war arena from the Persian Gulf spills over to the open sea between the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, then the ongoing Iranian-American blockade of the Hormuz Pass will get a dangerous “companion” at the height of Bab el-Mandeb.

The world’s merchant marine has a new, big problem, this time on the western rims of the Indian Ocean?

Dr. Abbas Araghchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran set out yesterday—over Strait of Ormuz, to Muscat. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iranian-foreign-minister-heads-to-oman-for-nuclear-talks-with-us/3821850).

Witkoff and Araghchi will lead a historic round of indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran on the “nuclear issue” according to earlier announcements by the official Tehran. And this time, despite earlier announcements by Washington that this time there should be other topics on the agenda, at least that’s what the “Jerusalem Post” states.

The first step? A concession? The outcome will still be widely evaluated on both sides, in the region, but also around the world.

In the meantime, US President Donald Trump has previously emphasized that in the case of Iran, he can give priority to diplomacy, even among other options. (https://www.ynetnews.com/article/q3hoxgv6t).

On the other hand, Tehran now seems very interested in the upcoming dialogue (regardless of the still unspecified form of “indirect” exchange of opinions).

“This diplomatic dialogue is conducted responsibly and with the aim of achieving a fair, acceptable and respectful understanding regarding the nuclear issue,” Ismael Baghei, spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced yesterday. (https://www.saba.ye/en/news3641668.htm).

According to Baghei: “At the same time, we bear the responsibility not to miss any opportunity to use diplomacy to protect the interests of the Iranian people and maintain peace and stability in the region.”

How much room there is for optimism, that the high emissaries of Washington and Tehran will reach a mutually acceptable agreement this time, is uncertain.

Be that as it may, Muscat once again showed that it has been a kind of “diplomatic magnet” for Americans, Iranians, and a number of other influential actors for some time.

For example, Oman, in the arena of highly divided parties, once publicly supported Egypt’s peace talks with Israel in 1977 and the negotiations at Camp David in 1978. As far back as 1980, Muscat was the first Arab capital to enter into a delicate military agreement with America.

Former CIA director William Burns, in his book “Back Channel”, revealed how much role Oman’s mediation played in the signing of the West’s nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. According to Burns, Iranian officials sent a message through Oman back in 2012 to suggest the first meeting in Muscat to the US.

How much the skills of the diplomats of the “Switzerland of the Middle East”—as Oman is seen by many, will be able to bring Witkoff and Araghchi closer this coming weekend, looks like the “million dollar question.”

Ansar Allah, the rebel movement of the Yemeni Houthis, the initiator of armed attacks on a certain shipping since November 2023, carried out the last attack on a civilian ship (Minervagracht) on September 29 last year near the Gulf of Aden. Then, 43 days later, Ansar Allah declared an end to hostilities. (https://maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-announce-end-of-red-sea-shipping-attacks).

However, at the beginning of 2026, between Suez and the far northwest Indian Ocean, 60 percent fewer ships moved than in the same period in 2023 (https://splash247.com/suez-traffic-still-60-down-100-days-after-last-houthi-attack/.

What is still holding back the mega-merchant carriers to massively return shipping to the shortest sea transport route between the markets of the East and West?

Behind this conspicuous reluctance, it seems, are numerous geopolitical concerns (https://channel16.dryadglobal.com/maritime-security-outlook-gulf-of-aden-escalations-gps-interference-in-the-gulf-and-piracy-risk).

One of them, certainly, is the further development of the mosaic of geopolitical challenges along the two coasts of the Red Sea, and beyond, to the Horn of Africa. Geographically, on the west coast, from the port of Port Sudan (Sudan), and Massawa (Eritrea) to Berbera (Somaliland), to Mogadishu (Somalia) and Djibouti.

At the same time, on the eastern shores of the Red Sea, from the port of Eilat (Israel), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and Hodeidah (Yemen), in the south, perhaps even to Port Louis (Mauritius)…

In that arena, two seemingly unrelated sets of events could in the long run contribute to new assessments of the “calm sea” in that region.

Namely, the sudden incursions of southern separatists in Yemen towards the strategic port of Mukalla, and on that matter, sharp confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the end of ,could be entering a new dangerous phase… https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/05/middleeast/uae-saudi-power-struggle-yemen-intl

On the opposite shore of the Gulf of Aden, the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar on January 6 to Hargeisa (on the photo)—the capital of Somaliland, and at the invitation of the President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is a new confirmation of the readiness of certain global actors to continue measuring the geopolitical status quo by their own national interests. By the way, on December 22, Israel became the first UN member state to recognize Somaliland (it separated from Somalia in 1991). Saar announced in Hargeisa that Israel and Somaliland have agreed on the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies. “We will do it quickly,” Saar announced, adding that the two countries want to build a lasting and warm friendship not only between the two governments, but also between the people of Somaliland and the people of Israel (https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/01/first-israels-foreign-minister-visits-somaliland-what-know).

How many friends there are in the neighbourhood, is a puzzle.

Namely, the strategic, trade, and tourism cooperation of the two petro-states, which recently celebrated 40 years of diplomatic relations, has been growing significantly since the beginning of this decade, it was announced during the recent meetings of high-ranking representatives of the official Muscat and Moscow. (https://timesofoman.com/article/164962-oman-russia-hold-strategic-dialogue-session-in-muscat).

What topics of common interest were discussed by Major General Idrees Abdulrahman al-Kindi, Secretary General of the National Security Council of Oman and Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, in mid-November during the Second Strategic Dialogue between Oman and Russia, was not disclosed.

Soon after, the sultanate in the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula, in joint control of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, with refined relations with the USA and Great Britain, as well as with China (it buys seven percent of oil from Oman), a legendary international diplomatic negotiator, agreed to hold an annual Business Forum with Russia. (https://forumspb.com/en/news/news/rossija-i-oman-ukrepljaut-ekonomicheskoe-sotrudnichestvo-itogi-biznes-foruma-v-maskate/)

At the same time, during a working visit to Oman, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reminded the Forum, that the trade exchange between the two countries, in the period 2020-2024. increased by 62.3 percent (expected to reach 340 million US dollars). And that was especially encouraged by new Russian investments in Oman. (http://government.ru/en/news/56924/).

By comparison, Oman’s trade with the US last year was $3.2 billion (https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS21534).

Be that as it may, on the list of the world’s leading oil producers, Oman is currently in 21st place, with estimates that the country’s petro-reserves with a coastline of more than 1,900 kilometres could be exhausted within a decade.

With that, new explorations of potential oil deposits (also on the territory of the Northern Al Batinah Governorate on the Arabian Sea (on the photo), “just” below the Strait of Hormuz), ports modernization, infrastructure projects, production of halal food, tourism… are some of the fields of investment cooperation that were discussed during the recent Business Forum of Russia and Oman in Muscat. Among the numerous participants of that gathering was Saeed Ali Al Abri, president of the North Al Batinah branch of the Oman Chamber of Commerce.

For example, the Port of Khasab on the Musandam peninsula—an exclave of the Sultanate of Oman—recently hosted the mega-cruiser Mein Schiff with about 2,500 tourists and almost 1,000 crew members, all with traditional music, dance, and handicraft offerings from the hilly Governorate with about 50,000 inhabitants. Officials Muscat in the 2025-2026 tourist season expect as many as 43 mega-tourist ships to dock in the Port of Khasab!

Tourism is otherwise a hot topic on the two shores of the Persian Gulf. The eventual continuation of the June “twelve-day war” between Israel and Iran, is another.

Thus, on the one hand, it happens that at the beginning of November (during the World Tourism Exchange in London), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Bahrain agreed to jointly develop the regional cruise industry. (https://www.muscatdaily.com/2025/11/11/gcc-expands-cruise-arabia-alliance-to-boost-regional-cruise-tourism/).

That, just weeks after Saudi Arabia and China wrapped up their third joint naval exercise (“Blue Sword”) in the Persian Gulf. “This joint exercise, as the third version of the Blue Sword series between the two navies, marked the first joint exercise organized by the PLA Navy of China and Special Operations Group 1 of the Royal Saudi Navy’s Eastern Fleet. The move from the western to the eastern part of Saudi Arabia further emphasized the orientation of the joint training towards actual combat operations,” the Chinese Ministry of Defence said in a statement . (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/2025xb/N/JE/16421463.html).

At the same time, on the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf, the media from Tehran this week draw attention to the development potential of tourism on the Iranian island around the Strait of Hormuz. (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/238553/Best-season-to-explore-Iran-s-Persian-Gulf-Islands).

“As autumn arrives with its mild weather and calm waters, the Persian Gulf transforms into one of the region’s most attractive tourist destinations. From the bustling souks of Kish and Qeshm to the unspoiled natural beauty of Hengam, Lavan and Hormuz (on the photo ), the southern Iranian islands offer the perfect blend of culture, commerce and coastal charm. This is the best time year to explore these jewels of the Persian Gulf — where turquoise waters meet colourful local traditions and growing opportunities for ecotourism and trade,” Mehrnews reported.

All this, at the time of the latest visit by senior Iranian military officials to four Iranian islands, not far from the Strait of Hormuz. “Readiness on the Iranian islands has increased compared to before, and we are fully prepared to face any threat in the defence of our land and sea borders,” he said. Major General Gholam-Ali Abdolahi, commander of the Central Headquarters of Khatam al-Anbiya, country’s top war command centre, during a tour of the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Bu Musa and Siri. (https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/520283/Iran-s-war-room-chief-visits-Persian-Gulf-islands-as-threats).

Whether tourism will soon flourish near the Strait of Hormuz, remains uncertain.

Just like Beethoven’s music that Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman (at the time Deputy Crown Prince) played on the piano in September 2015 at a Ramadan dinner at the home of then US Secretary of State John Kerry (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/world/rise-of-saudi-prince-shatters-decades-of-royal-tradition.html).

Many notes have been played since then.

Today, the Crown Prince of the largest Sunni monarchy in the world, at the same time the world’s key oil exporter, Mohammed bin Salman (40), is making an official visit to the USA on November 18, for the first time since 2018.

The question is whether there will be time for the piano this time: artificial intelligence, defence, nuclear cooperation, trade… are unofficially some of the topics in the repertoire.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is today the first Arab country to introduce the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which possesses an atomic bomb, onto the unpredictable stage of the Middle East. Thus, with the signature of Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia entered a defence alliance with Pakistan for the second time, shocking numerous actors in the region and observers around the world with this move. By the way, as far back as 1967, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan formed a defence alliance two months after Israel’s victory in the “Six-Day War”. More than half a century later, a new defence alliance between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was made official just days after Israel targeted with remarkable precision the location of a secret meeting of the Hamas leadership in Doha, the capital of Qatar, to the consternation of the hosts, many neighbours and others.

If one of the two members of that alliance is attacked, the other commits to react. This is roughly the key item of the document signed on September 17.

Did Riyadh inform Washington beforehand about this move, tickles the curiosity of many. Where is the official Islamabad in the eyes of Washington is a delicate question.

Meanwhile, some reports state that –during the recent session of the UN General Assembly, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir waited for one hour to meet with US President Donald Trump on September 26 ( https://www.wionews.com/world/pak-pm-shehbaz-sharif-s-long-wait-for-trump-dubbed-as-welcomed-on-red-carpet-in-islamabad-1758878496218).

Be that as it may, official Islamabad assessed the meeting as a “red carpet welcome”. A little later, unconfirmed media reports appeared according to which Islamabad indicated to Washington the possibility of cooperation on the construction of a strategic port on the Arabian Sea, “a step away” from Iran.

As things stand now, before his November trip to Washington, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will welcome Pakistani Prime Minister Shebhaz Sharif in Riyadh (October 27-29). One of the officially announced topics of the meeting between Mohammed bin Salman and Shebhaz Sharif is “geopolitical shifts”.

Which “shifts”, it is not specified.

In any case, the capital of Qatar, Doha, experienced a “missile shock” out of the blue in June, when Iran, during the “twelve-day war” against Israel, targeted the Al-Udeid base, west of Doha. Reports on the results of that military action by Tehran are contradictory.

Meanwhile, this week’s action by Israel’s warplanes in which ten bombs were dropped on a residential building in an elite neighbourhood of Doha—to eliminate a group of Hamas leaders gathered there with extremely precise targeting—represents the second military strike against a key US ally in the restive region of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.

In a series of subsequent reactions by Qatar, Israel, the Arab-Iranian neighbourhood, and the wider international community, several signals indicate a possible expansion of the arena of conflict in that region. Maybe still.

For his part, the Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, warned that “the State of Qatar is committed to decisive action against anything directed at its territories, reserves the right to retaliate and will take all necessary measures to retaliate.”

For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned: “I say to Qatar and all nations that harbour terrorists, either expel them or bring them to justice — because if you don’t, we will.”

It is uncertain whether the UN Security Council, at an extraordinary session scheduled at the request of Algeria and Pakistan, would be able to neutralize the aforementioned announcements by Al Thani and Netanyahu.

Meanwhile, observers are anxiously spreading geographic maps.

Hamas headquarters in Doha, the US military in Al-Udeid, Gaza peace talks, the fate of Israeli hostages, the energy partnership with Iran… is Qatar today in a position to maintain its carefully cultivated neutrality? And is that neutrality still a possible option?

From another register: if the leaders of Hamas from Doha start to move around the region of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, and maybe somewhere further, throughout Asia, who could be targeted? And who can than retain the “right to retaliate”. And then what kind of “retaliation”?

As things stand now, it seems that striking first Iran, and now Israel on the territory of sovereign Qatar, reminds of the often delicate vulnerability of the actors “in between two fires”.

Few days ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi  asserted that Tehran’s official policy is “absolutely clear” in its pursuit of peace and stability in the vital waterway of the Persian Gulf. “Iran is a producer and exporter of oil, and its economy is largely dependent on it. That’s why it wants free navigation for everyone,” said Araghchi.

Shortly before that, Hossein Shariatmadari, the representative of Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, stated that Tehran “can introduce restrictions against the USA, France, Great Britain and Germany in the Strait of Hormuz and not allow them to sail. By announcing such a restriction, the price of oil will jump to $200, and the biggest economic blow will be inflicted on the enemy,” said Shariatmadari.

Then, how important is the assessment of certain petro actors in the Gulf, that at a time when 80 percent of oil from there,  travels to the World Sea through the Strait of Hormuz, there should think about onshore oil pipelines. Perhaps towards (future) terminals in the southern ports of Oman, or to Yanbu, the port of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea? The answer is uncertain.

In the meantime, Oman is nurturing the range of relations with both China and the USA with top-notch diplomacy. A wide range includes also, the possibilities of new military relations of the official Muscat with Beijing and Washington.

As recently as May, the Pentagon offered the Omani Ministry of Defence a wide range of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. Two months later, Brigadier Wu Xinyuan, China’s Defence Attaché, assessed that the strategic partnership between Beijing and Muscat brings “fruitful results in pragmatic cooperation in all fields.” Apparently, Beijing is seriously counting on the deepening of military-security relations with Muscat. “We look forward to deepening cooperation between the two sides in the military and security fields, which will benefit both countries and contribute to regional peace and stability,” Wu added.

Meanwhile, informed observers point out that Muscat is seriously considering the Pentagon’s recent offers these days.