Novak Djokovic, the world’s best tennis player of all time, Meg O’Neill, the CEO of Shell, and Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, will not meet in Riyadh (on the photo) these days. The capital of Saudi Arabia seems to be becoming a “dangerous” place, the target of almost day and night rocket attacks by the Yemeni Houthis, without the prospect of an end to a ongoing barrage of actions by the “Ansar Allah” rebel movement. (https://www.telegraf.rs/english/4415121-novak-djokovic-will-not-travel-to-riyadh-six-kings-tournament-postponed); https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/bp-withdraws-riyadh-energy-conference-after-airport-attack-2026-10-11/); https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-911792).

Namely, the prestigious exhibition tournament “Six Kings” was postponed. Just like the Gulf Countries-EU summit, while the World Petroleum Congress was held without the presence of representatives of the mega-world oil companies, although the host, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, assured the invited and those gathered that “the word ‘fear’ does not exist in the Saudi vocabulary” (https://www.upstreamonline.com/energy-security/-fear-does-not-exist-in-the-saudi-dictionary-says-saudi-energy-minister/2-1-2057319).

If not fear, then “anxiety” is certainly present among many travellers – those intending to visit Riyadh these days, or to return to work at the company’s headquarters for the Middle East (https://vision2030.ai/analysis/riyadh-mandate/).

The global uneasiness regarding eventual rip to Riyadh is especially spreading, after the announcement by Yahya Sari, the military spokesman of the Yemeni rebel movement “Ansar Allah”, that for the Houthis Saudi Arabia is still their new “battlefield”… (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5m2dn7zz4nyo).

As things stand now, foreigners are beginning to bypass the desert capital of the leading Sunni monarchy, a key member of OPEC, the richest country on the Arabian Peninsula, until recently the world’s third largest customer of foreign weapons (in the period 2020-2025, 77 percent of which is from the USA). https://www.visualcapitalist.com/where-the-worlds-biggest-arms-exporters-send-their-weapons/.

Whether the Houthis will succeed in cutting off Saudi Arabia from the world is uncertain.

What is certain is that the official Riyadh, at this moment, is in the windstorm of war.

Namely, reluctant to accept Moscow’s invitation for BRICS membership, as well as Washington’s subsequent invitation to join the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia is now facing an offensive by the Yemeni Houthis, still without directly engaged external allies, on the battlefield from Riyadh to Bab el Mandeb…

“Either they will sign a very fair agreement, or they will cease to exist.” With these words, at the end of last week, US President Donald Trump described the potential fate of Iran, in the event that Tehran refuses to accept the agreement with the US, according to Washington (https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/trump-cabinet-holds-secret-camp-141137726.html).

It is uncertain whether the above: “… they will not exist”, means the same as when Trump says that Iran could be annihilated”. (https://www.modernghana.com/videonews/bbc/1/727313).

Aside from the question, when and under what conditions “that” could happen—(President Trump mentions a possible continuation of “strikes” on Iran after the November mid-term elections…), the dilemma could be too, by what method could such a goal be achieved?

The answer seems uncertain.

On the other hand, it is certain that Washington puts the end of Iran’s nuclear program at the forefront of any agreement with Tehran, i.e. that after the end of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Republic will never have nuclear weapons (https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Mf_oCzcJ4VQ).

Washington and Tehran’s negotiators probably know how much is there between “nuclear program” and “nuclear weapons”.

Meanwhile, for Tehran, at the moment, the “opening of the Strait of Hormuz” is the first topic for negotiations on ending the conflict with Washington. (https://en.yenisafak.com/world/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-main-focus-of-talks-to-end-us-war-3724101).

And also, until the US fulfils all seven conditions set by Iran, that “opening of Hormuz” apparently cannot happen.

In this tense moment, Washington is currently sending about 7,000 sailors and 2,000 marines to the Persian Gulf region, as well as the third war destroyer USS “Theodore Roosevelt” (https://apnews.com/article/iran-war-trump-ships-deployment-middle-east-42c23e9af0333f4bc3b4f419cc3a603e).

Iran works on several looms at the same time.

On the one hand, the head of Iranian diplomacy, Abbas Aragchi, announces “even more decisive action” by Iran in the event of a possible new aggression (https://www.tabnak.ir/en/news/7752/iran-to-give-crushing-response-to-any-aggression).

At the same time, Tehran announces diverse and fairly long-term cooperation with certain foreign partners.

With Pakistan, for example, the five-year plan to expand cooperation in the field of culture and tourism (https://www.tabnak.ir/en/news/7747/iran-pakistan-to-expand-tourism-cooperation)!

And, with the Russian “Rosatom”, the construction of a number of new “larger and smaller” nuclear power plants (https://www.saba.ye/en/news3798917.htm).

Reportedly, evaluation of “several new sites in Iran” for the construction of these new nuclear power plants is underway.

The two scenarios: that Iran “may not exist”, and that new “big and small nuclear reactors” will appear there, seem incompatible.

Somewhere, in Islamabad, Moscow… there is a belief that Iran would not be “annihilated ” after all.  

Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman, has been a “thorn in Washington’s side” for some time. Perhaps, starting with al-Busaidi’s decision to fly to the US capital without prior notice, immediately after the US-Iran round of negotiations at the Sultanate ambassador’s residence in Switzerland on February 27^th  to meet with JD Vance, the US vice president. (https://wanaen.com/oman-fms-unannounced-washington-visit-focuses-on-iran-talks/).

By the way, it was the day before the start of the armed conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran.

“A peace deal is within reach… if we just give diplomacy the space it needs to get there. If the ultimate goal is to make sure Iran can’t have a nuclear bomb forever, I think we’ve solved that problem through these negotiations by agreeing to a very important breakthrough that has never been made before,” Al Busaidi said in an interview with CBS News in Washington. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/peace-within-reach-as-iran-agrees-no-nuclear-material-stockpile-oman-fm)

Shortly after the conflict in the Persian Gulf began, Al Busaidi believed that the US “has lost control of its foreign policy, entering a war that is not its own” (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260319-oman-fm-us-has-lost-control-of-foreign-policy-entered-war-that-is-not-its-own/).

Then, at the end of June, al-Busaidi lamented that Oman and its neighbours in the Gulf had engaged in “a war that should never have happened”. (https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/06/29/ormuz-oman-et-ses-voisins-du-golfe-emergent-d-une-guerre-qui-n-aurait-jamais-du-avoir-lieu_6716898_3210.html?).

These days, the head of Oman’s diplomacy called on all the countries on the shores of the Persian Gulf to shift their diplomatic focus towards the future.

(https://tribune.com.pk/story/2618221/oman-fm-calls-iran-war-a-catastrophe-says-exposes-flaws-in-gulf-security-doctrine.)

But how do you get to the future, in a region where these days there is more and more shooting, and where the other day the Iranians also targeted the military stations of Oman – neighbour on the opposite side of the Strait of Hormuz? (https://iranwire.com/en/news/155076-irgc-strikes-targets-in-oman-blasting-key-mediators-territory/).

Here too, Oman adheres to the legendary diplomatic neutrality established by Sultan Qaboos ibn Said el Said (1940-2020).

(https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/sultan-qaboos-and-modern-oman-19702020/friend-to-all-enemy-to-none-omans-quiet-diplomacy-since-1970/C97F3F52B1FCA66CB0C1).

“A friend to all, an enemy to none”—was the axiom of Sultan Qaboos.

From that angle, one could understand today’s announcement by “Oman Air”—that from September, it is introducing a twice-weekly direct airline—Moscow—Salalah (on the photo) , a mega-port in the south of Oman, otherwise the birthplace of Sultan Qaboos, and the address of one of the active US military bases in the Sultanate. (https://www.muscatdaily.com/2026/07/18/salalah-to-welcome-new-flights-from-russia-kazakhstan/).

*

The US military-naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is “largely still in place,” US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said in Singapore on Saturday, without specifying exactly what that “largely” covers. (https://thehill.com/policy/international/5902453-pete-hegseth-iran-war-naval-blockade-strait-of-hormuz/).

As things stand on the ground, the US military-naval blockade of Iranian ports, imposed on April 13^th , these days does not seem to be focused on the port of Jask on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. By the way, the port of Jask, about 95 miles east of Hormuz, is Iran’s only port on the Indian Ocean. Since mid-April, news has been appearing that Iran is delivering barrels through the Golestan-Jask oil pipeline (on the map) to that strategic port in Hormozghan province, for export to customers in Asia. (https://iranwire.com/en/news/152621-oil-loading-begins-at-jask-to-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/).

Iranian oil, the Iranian oil pipeline, the Iranian port of Jask… until yesterday (May 31^st ) it seemed like a solo action by a rather isolated actor in the Persian Gulf region.

And then, on Sunday, two ferries each loaded with eight imported cars arrived in the port of Jusk from the direction of Oman. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/insight/iran-opens-jask-port-to-vehicle-imports-despite-us-blockade/gm-GM8D706D9E?gemSnapshotKey=GM8D706D9E-snapshot-1&uxmode=ruby.

The test—shipping in front of the eyes of the US Navy?! Some observers assessed that “Iran is defying the US blockade with the first shipment of vehicles through the port of Jask”.

The viewing angle can be different.

For example, that official Muscat, when it comes to cooperation with Tehran, has a different opinion in the Persian Gulf region. By the way Tehran and Muscat these days conduct frequent consultations on issues of importance for the regulation of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which does not meet Washington’s excessive understanding. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/27/donald-trump-oman-threat-strait-hormuz

It is not known to many that as early as in 1968.  Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Sutan Qaboos, ruler of Oman, jointly proposed the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Strait of Hormuz (TSS). (https://houseofsaud.com/oman-never-signed-that-was-the-point/).

That joint Pahlavi-Qaboos initiative was accepted in the same year by the UN agency IMO (International Maritime Organization based in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia). The long-ago agreement between the two former rulers of Iran and Oman—TSS has been officially in force since 1975 until today.

From there, it may be understandable why Oman, the other day, refused to join the proposal of the five remaining members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to condemn Iran at the International Maritime Agency for “unilaterally assuming the authority of sovereign administration”.

“Whatever your opinion is about Iran, this war is not their making ,” said Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi (https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-not-their-making-omani-foreign-minister-says-iran).

Hence probably the” car-ferry” to Jusk.

*

Coast of Somaliland?

Eight hundred and fifty kilometres of coastline in the middle of the Gulf of Ade on the southern approach to the Red Sea n in the extreme northwest of the Indian Ocean. That is, the coast 300 kilometres “across” Yemen, and the strongholds of the rebel movement “Ansar Allah” there, which in November 2023,  started targeting ships “connected to Israel”  near Bab el Mandeb, and also launching missiles towards Israel.

The official Tel Aviv’s diplomatic interest in establishing and strengthening broad cooperation with the official Hargeisa seems quite understandable. As well as the joy of the official Hargeisa (on the photo) that 35 years since that region (6.2 million inhabitants, 177,000 square kilometres) declared secession from Somalia, Israel last December became the first UN member state to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Somaliland.

In terms of diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and Somaliland, things moved quickly this spring with the opening of embassies in Hargeisa and Jerusalem. With the decision of the official Hargeisa, Somaliland joined the group of seven countries that recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (after such a decision by US President Donald Trump in 2017).

Be that as it may, Yitzhak Herzog, the President of Israel, while recently receiving the credentials of Dr. Mohamed Hagi, the ambassador of Somaliland based in Jerusalem, pointed out: “This new and important partnership between our countries will lead to future cooperation in various fields, for the benefit of our people and the entire region” (https://x.com/zerohedge/status/2059078341466960081). That same evening, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi spoke by phone with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-growing-israel-somaliland-ties-deepen-red-sea-rivalries ).

What formats the upcoming cooperation between Israel and Somaliland could take in the Middle East region, only time will tell.

In the meantime, the Arab-Islamic world: from Mauritania to Indonesia, as if overnight, sees a “black sheep” in its ranks. And that, in the form of Somaliland , where Islam is otherwise the state religion. The trigger this time is “the embassy in Jerusalem”. On that occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen warned Somaliland that Al-Quds (that is, Jerusalem) is an “occupied Arab and Islamic city” (https://www.saba.ye/en/news3712115.htm). Nineteen countries of the Arab-Islamic world issued a strong joint statement regarding the Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem, and further rapprochement with Israel (https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somaliland-jerusalem-embassy-condemned/).

Hargeisa in this period, it seems, is not excessively haunted.

With Israel’s recognition, Somaliland is no longer “alone in the world.” After all, Somaliland has not hidden that it has such a desire for a long time. As early as the middle of last year, Somaliland President Abdullahi wrote to the leaders of 193 countries offering them strategic access to the country in exchange for recognition of independence. “Israel was the only one to respond positively and we are grateful,” Abdullahi told the cabinet in Hargeisa in January.

Hargeisa’s next move in the Near and Middle East belongs to the future order of that region.

*

The Houthis, but also Somalia?!

These days, the global merchant navy is facing the apparent threat that, despite the ongoing war drama around the Strait of Hormuz, it could  very soon encounter a new, double “ramp” on the southern approach to the Red Sea.

Namely, from the far southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni rebel movement “Ansar Allah” has been widely announcing its readiness since mid-April not only to resume operations against certain shipping that is headed through the globally strategic sea passage Bab el-Mandeb (“Gate of Tears” in Arabic), but also to start collecting “tolls”, similar to the Iranians in the case of the Hormuz Passage. (https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156996/Houthis-have-discussed-implementing-Red-Sea-tolls-says-UK-security-firm).

How important the Bab el Mandeb (about 100 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide, separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the Horn of Africa) is for the world economy is evidenced by the fact that in 2023, about 26,000 ships passed through the Suez Canal according to the report of the Suez Canal Authority. (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260326-bab-al-mandeb-strait-another-key-shipping-route-under-threat).

Alas, that number was almost halved last year to around 12,700, due to the armed actions of the Houthis. Meanwhile, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that 12 percent of the world’s petro-cargo passed through Bab el-Mandeb in the first half of 2023, before the Houthis launched attacks that fall (in solidarity with the Palestinians).

Opportunities along the Bab el Mandeb have recently become more complicated from the shores of the Horn of Africa. Namely, Abdullah Warfa , Somalia’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union (AU), announced on April 19^th  the readiness of the official Mogadishu to prohibit the passage of Bab el-Mandeb to “ships connected to Israel”, and that was due to the decision of the official Tel Aviv to recognize Somaliland (in December last year), and exchange ambassadors with that territory. (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/243907/Somalia-closes-Bab-al-Mandab-Strait-to-Israeli-shipping).

Otherwise, Somaliland is not internationally recognized as a sovereign state, despite the declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991 (Israel was the first country to recognize the sovereignty of Somaliland). Under international law, Somaliland remains part of Somalia and has no place in the United Nations.

“External interference could lead to countermeasures, such as restricting access to the key Bab el-Mandeb sea route,” Somalia’s ambassador, Warfa , added in a letter to Ethiopia and the AU.

Now, how many vessels and trained officers the Somali Navy has at its disposal to possibly start, and from what altitudes, to enforce the ban on navigation of “vessels connected to Israel” is uncertain. Somalia signed a defence agreement with Turkey in 2024. As of mid-2025, about 500 Turkish soldiers have been deployed in Somalia, as well as a certain amount of army arsenal (https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/somalia-gets-t-129-attack-helicopters/)

If the war arena from the Persian Gulf spills over to the open sea between the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, then the ongoing Iranian-American blockade of the Hormuz Pass will get a dangerous “companion” at the height of Bab el-Mandeb.

The world’s merchant marine has a new, big problem, this time on the western rims of the Indian Ocean?

Dr. Abbas Araghchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran set out yesterday—over Strait of Ormuz, to Muscat. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iranian-foreign-minister-heads-to-oman-for-nuclear-talks-with-us/3821850).

Witkoff and Araghchi will lead a historic round of indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran on the “nuclear issue” according to earlier announcements by the official Tehran. And this time, despite earlier announcements by Washington that this time there should be other topics on the agenda, at least that’s what the “Jerusalem Post” states.

The first step? A concession? The outcome will still be widely evaluated on both sides, in the region, but also around the world.

In the meantime, US President Donald Trump has previously emphasized that in the case of Iran, he can give priority to diplomacy, even among other options. (https://www.ynetnews.com/article/q3hoxgv6t).

On the other hand, Tehran now seems very interested in the upcoming dialogue (regardless of the still unspecified form of “indirect” exchange of opinions).

“This diplomatic dialogue is conducted responsibly and with the aim of achieving a fair, acceptable and respectful understanding regarding the nuclear issue,” Ismael Baghei, spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced yesterday. (https://www.saba.ye/en/news3641668.htm).

According to Baghei: “At the same time, we bear the responsibility not to miss any opportunity to use diplomacy to protect the interests of the Iranian people and maintain peace and stability in the region.”

How much room there is for optimism, that the high emissaries of Washington and Tehran will reach a mutually acceptable agreement this time, is uncertain.

Be that as it may, Muscat once again showed that it has been a kind of “diplomatic magnet” for Americans, Iranians, and a number of other influential actors for some time.

For example, Oman, in the arena of highly divided parties, once publicly supported Egypt’s peace talks with Israel in 1977 and the negotiations at Camp David in 1978. As far back as 1980, Muscat was the first Arab capital to enter into a delicate military agreement with America.

Former CIA director William Burns, in his book “Back Channel”, revealed how much role Oman’s mediation played in the signing of the West’s nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. According to Burns, Iranian officials sent a message through Oman back in 2012 to suggest the first meeting in Muscat to the US.

How much the skills of the diplomats of the “Switzerland of the Middle East”—as Oman is seen by many, will be able to bring Witkoff and Araghchi closer this coming weekend, looks like the “million dollar question.”

Ansar Allah, the rebel movement of the Yemeni Houthis, the initiator of armed attacks on a certain shipping since November 2023, carried out the last attack on a civilian ship (Minervagracht) on September 29 last year near the Gulf of Aden. Then, 43 days later, Ansar Allah declared an end to hostilities. (https://maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-announce-end-of-red-sea-shipping-attacks).

However, at the beginning of 2026, between Suez and the far northwest Indian Ocean, 60 percent fewer ships moved than in the same period in 2023 (https://splash247.com/suez-traffic-still-60-down-100-days-after-last-houthi-attack/.

What is still holding back the mega-merchant carriers to massively return shipping to the shortest sea transport route between the markets of the East and West?

Behind this conspicuous reluctance, it seems, are numerous geopolitical concerns (https://channel16.dryadglobal.com/maritime-security-outlook-gulf-of-aden-escalations-gps-interference-in-the-gulf-and-piracy-risk).

One of them, certainly, is the further development of the mosaic of geopolitical challenges along the two coasts of the Red Sea, and beyond, to the Horn of Africa. Geographically, on the west coast, from the port of Port Sudan (Sudan), and Massawa (Eritrea) to Berbera (Somaliland), to Mogadishu (Somalia) and Djibouti.

At the same time, on the eastern shores of the Red Sea, from the port of Eilat (Israel), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and Hodeidah (Yemen), in the south, perhaps even to Port Louis (Mauritius)…

In that arena, two seemingly unrelated sets of events could in the long run contribute to new assessments of the “calm sea” in that region.

Namely, the sudden incursions of southern separatists in Yemen towards the strategic port of Mukalla, and on that matter, sharp confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the end of ,could be entering a new dangerous phase… https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/05/middleeast/uae-saudi-power-struggle-yemen-intl

On the opposite shore of the Gulf of Aden, the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar on January 6 to Hargeisa (on the photo)—the capital of Somaliland, and at the invitation of the President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is a new confirmation of the readiness of certain global actors to continue measuring the geopolitical status quo by their own national interests. By the way, on December 22, Israel became the first UN member state to recognize Somaliland (it separated from Somalia in 1991). Saar announced in Hargeisa that Israel and Somaliland have agreed on the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies. “We will do it quickly,” Saar announced, adding that the two countries want to build a lasting and warm friendship not only between the two governments, but also between the people of Somaliland and the people of Israel (https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/01/first-israels-foreign-minister-visits-somaliland-what-know).

How many friends there are in the neighbourhood, is a puzzle.

Namely, the strategic, trade, and tourism cooperation of the two petro-states, which recently celebrated 40 years of diplomatic relations, has been growing significantly since the beginning of this decade, it was announced during the recent meetings of high-ranking representatives of the official Muscat and Moscow. (https://timesofoman.com/article/164962-oman-russia-hold-strategic-dialogue-session-in-muscat).

What topics of common interest were discussed by Major General Idrees Abdulrahman al-Kindi, Secretary General of the National Security Council of Oman and Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, in mid-November during the Second Strategic Dialogue between Oman and Russia, was not disclosed.

Soon after, the sultanate in the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula, in joint control of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, with refined relations with the USA and Great Britain, as well as with China (it buys seven percent of oil from Oman), a legendary international diplomatic negotiator, agreed to hold an annual Business Forum with Russia. (https://forumspb.com/en/news/news/rossija-i-oman-ukrepljaut-ekonomicheskoe-sotrudnichestvo-itogi-biznes-foruma-v-maskate/)

At the same time, during a working visit to Oman, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reminded the Forum, that the trade exchange between the two countries, in the period 2020-2024. increased by 62.3 percent (expected to reach 340 million US dollars). And that was especially encouraged by new Russian investments in Oman. (http://government.ru/en/news/56924/).

By comparison, Oman’s trade with the US last year was $3.2 billion (https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS21534).

Be that as it may, on the list of the world’s leading oil producers, Oman is currently in 21st place, with estimates that the country’s petro-reserves with a coastline of more than 1,900 kilometres could be exhausted within a decade.

With that, new explorations of potential oil deposits (also on the territory of the Northern Al Batinah Governorate on the Arabian Sea (on the photo), “just” below the Strait of Hormuz), ports modernization, infrastructure projects, production of halal food, tourism… are some of the fields of investment cooperation that were discussed during the recent Business Forum of Russia and Oman in Muscat. Among the numerous participants of that gathering was Saeed Ali Al Abri, president of the North Al Batinah branch of the Oman Chamber of Commerce.

For example, the Port of Khasab on the Musandam peninsula—an exclave of the Sultanate of Oman—recently hosted the mega-cruiser Mein Schiff with about 2,500 tourists and almost 1,000 crew members, all with traditional music, dance, and handicraft offerings from the hilly Governorate with about 50,000 inhabitants. Officials Muscat in the 2025-2026 tourist season expect as many as 43 mega-tourist ships to dock in the Port of Khasab!

Tourism is otherwise a hot topic on the two shores of the Persian Gulf. The eventual continuation of the June “twelve-day war” between Israel and Iran, is another.

Thus, on the one hand, it happens that at the beginning of November (during the World Tourism Exchange in London), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Bahrain agreed to jointly develop the regional cruise industry. (https://www.muscatdaily.com/2025/11/11/gcc-expands-cruise-arabia-alliance-to-boost-regional-cruise-tourism/).

That, just weeks after Saudi Arabia and China wrapped up their third joint naval exercise (“Blue Sword”) in the Persian Gulf. “This joint exercise, as the third version of the Blue Sword series between the two navies, marked the first joint exercise organized by the PLA Navy of China and Special Operations Group 1 of the Royal Saudi Navy’s Eastern Fleet. The move from the western to the eastern part of Saudi Arabia further emphasized the orientation of the joint training towards actual combat operations,” the Chinese Ministry of Defence said in a statement . (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/2025xb/N/JE/16421463.html).

At the same time, on the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf, the media from Tehran this week draw attention to the development potential of tourism on the Iranian island around the Strait of Hormuz. (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/238553/Best-season-to-explore-Iran-s-Persian-Gulf-Islands).

“As autumn arrives with its mild weather and calm waters, the Persian Gulf transforms into one of the region’s most attractive tourist destinations. From the bustling souks of Kish and Qeshm to the unspoiled natural beauty of Hengam, Lavan and Hormuz (on the photo ), the southern Iranian islands offer the perfect blend of culture, commerce and coastal charm. This is the best time year to explore these jewels of the Persian Gulf — where turquoise waters meet colourful local traditions and growing opportunities for ecotourism and trade,” Mehrnews reported.

All this, at the time of the latest visit by senior Iranian military officials to four Iranian islands, not far from the Strait of Hormuz. “Readiness on the Iranian islands has increased compared to before, and we are fully prepared to face any threat in the defence of our land and sea borders,” he said. Major General Gholam-Ali Abdolahi, commander of the Central Headquarters of Khatam al-Anbiya, country’s top war command centre, during a tour of the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Bu Musa and Siri. (https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/520283/Iran-s-war-room-chief-visits-Persian-Gulf-islands-as-threats).

Whether tourism will soon flourish near the Strait of Hormuz, remains uncertain.