At this moment, the world public can only hope for the imminent end of the conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran: one of the reasons for this anxious belief is the fact that some actors vow to achieve their ultimate goals by fighting to the “last drop of blood”. (https://iranpress.com/content/315830/iran-army-chief-vows-defend-honor-until-last-drop-blood).

Who would declare “the end”, and what the “megdan field” over the Persian Gulf (on the map) would look like after that, seems completely uncertain for now to many, not only the increasingly nervous energy traders, or the first neighbours on the already shaken Arabian Peninsula.

As things stand now, US President Donald Trump’s assessment on Monday that the war is “very complete” seems unclear if, for example, one takes into account the scope of US military operations the very next day in the area of ​​the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.theguardian.com/news/2026/mar/11/us-iran-strait-of-hormuz-mine-boat-attacks).

As well as Israeli army’s actions today (Wednesday March 11^th ) in western Iran (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889553). But also  with simultaneous Iranian missile strikes on Dubai International Airport and targets across the Persian Gulf (https://www.ttnews.com/articles/iran-targets-oil-facilities).

Could a “little excursion” – as the US president described the attack on Iran at the beginning of the week (https://fortune.com/2026/03/10/trump-says-iran-war-end-soon/) ,  turn into a historic test of the endurance of the participants?

And if so, then what profiles of “endurance”?

At least two signals indicate at this moment that the conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran could last for a while.

On the one hand, there is the “disappointment” of US President Donald Trump with the election of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme religious leader of Iran (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/9/trump-slams-mojtaba-khameneis-appointment-as-iran-projects-defiance).

By the way, Mojtaba Khamenei was elected as the supreme leader of Shiite Iran, after the assassination of his father, the supreme leader and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the Israeli-US attack on Iran on February 28. It seems that Mojtaba Khamenei was at that time, also wounded in the legs (https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/new-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-injured-in-war-but-safe-says-iran-presidents-son-2880277-2026-03-11).

For the sake of understanding the war amphitheatre, Shi’ism is “one of two, or three main directions (currents), denominations in Islam” (Rade Božović, Vojislav Simić, Rečnik Islama, st.191, 2010). In that Islamic community, “Ayatollah” is: “‘God’s sign’, in Shia Islam, a high spiritual title that is awarded to one of the 12 chosen believers of Allah or mujdehid, authoritative experts of the faith… The title of Ayatollah has been awarded since the last century by authorities-jurists … who are connected to the famous Shia schools in Qom, Tabriz or Mashhad…” (ibid, p. 31).

A question could be asked here: how to understand last week’s statement of US President Donald Trump that he “must be involved in the selection process” of the next Iranian leader (after the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)? (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-he-needs-be-involved-selecting-irans-next-leader-axios-reports-2026-03-05/).

Whether Donald Trump understands the enemy in the current conflict with Iran is the subject of a series of analyses these days (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-03-10/iran-war-trump-doesn-t-know-his-enemy-that-gives-iran-an-edge; https://www.indrastra.com/2026/03/trump-sees-short-war-in-iran-tehran-is.html).

Trying to resolve that dilemma, the focus is mainly on insights into the profiles of military arsenals, strategies and tactics… Looking at those other differences between the actors of this war over the Persian Gulf, may just bring a part of the solutions to the puzzle about the possible length of the current war over the Persian Gulf.

If, in the meantime, a generally acceptable “diplomatic messiah”—a conciliator—does not appear.

That missing, could be a signal that the war “time bomb” over Persian Gulf , could continue to be ticking…

“Greece will become an energy hub,” emphasized Ambassador Guilfoyle in the fall. “We want to show that Greece can become an energy hub that will help us oppose Russian and Chinese interests. What we are looking for is energy independence, which will strengthen national defence and national security,” Guilfoyle added on that occasion. As a reminder, Guilfoyle mentioned the Greek port of Alexandroupolis (on the photo), about 300 kilometres east of Thessaloniki, last July in her presentation before the US Senate (https://greekherald.com.au/news/kimberly-guilfoyle-vows-to-deepen-us-greece-ties-in-defense-energy-and-trade/).

The strategic importance of the port of Alexandroupolis—the last city in Europe on the way to the Orient, in the new phase of development of energy cooperation between the USA, Greece and Europe, was exclusively confirmed to the Belgrade “Politics” at the beginning of January by Konstantinos Sifnaios, vice president and CEO of “Gastrade” S.A., a Greek company for natural gas and construction-technical business founded in 2010, with the vision that the wider region cannot and should not depend on one source of energy or one energy route. (https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/722149/srbija-ce-transportovati-tecni-gas-preko-aleksandrupolisa).

It is not surprising, therefore, that these days in Alexandroupolis, Ambassador Gilfoyle  started an extensive tour of getting to know Greece on the ground (https://www.voria.gr/article/periodeies-ana-tin-ellada-xekina-i-gkilfoil-thessaloniki-kai-alexandroypoli-oi-protes).

Alexandroupolis was chosen as the starting point of the US Ambassador’s tour of Greece by no chance, since near the capital of the border area of ​​Evros, there is a floating FSRU unit “Gastrade” from where the export of US LNG to markets in Ukraine and Bulgaria has already started via the “Vertical Corridor”.

In the meantime, a meeting regarding the Vertical Corridor expansion plans is scheduled at the headquarters of the US Department of Energy on February 24, which, according to announcements, will bring together regulators, network operators, companies from the private sector and, for the first time, representatives of the European Commission.

Launch is optional. As well as the disembarkation of troops. At first, a credible threat is sufficient, such as: “Right now we have a lot of very large, very powerful ships sailing toward Iran, and it would be great if we didn’t have to use them” (https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hegseth-tells-trump-pentagon-is-prepared-iran-2026-01-29/)

World petro-exchanges react to such a message from US President Donald Trump by lightning-fast raising the value of the risk-premium (7$-10$), almost at the same pace as they did earlier this month, first regarding the “Venezuela case” and then the “Greenland case”.

At an almost similar pace, today (January 30^th ) the petro-exchanges sharply reduced the values ​​of barrels (which otherwise rose to record highs the day before, primarily due to geopolitical reasons): “Brent” to around 70.03 US dollars, and light Texas oil WTI to around $64.70 (https://www.threads.com/@channelnewsasia/post/DUIcmBijts4/oil-slides-as-trump-signals-dialogue-with-iran-over-nuclear-programme-utm)

This time, primarily due to the announcement of the 47th president of the USA that, despite all the manoeuvres of the US naval “armada” in the direction of the Strait of Hormuz, he is still taking into account a certain possibility of … dialogue with Iran.

According to the Times of Israel, when asked if he had held talks with Iran in the past few days or if he planned to do so, Trump replied: “I have and I plan to.” (https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-confirms-talks-with-tehran-is-reportedly-mulling-raids-by-troops-on-iranian-facilities/)

Talks between the USA and Iran are already taking place somehow, somewhere…?!

How much can the world’s oil traders relax on this occasion? (In addition to all the other complicated factors that affect the price of a barrel at the moment: from Kazakhstan to Oklahoma…).

The answer is uncertain, after this month, a barrel of Brent—defying the expectations of Wall Street experts—achieved its biggest monthly jump since January 2022, and  WTI its record high since July 2023 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-30/oil-s-year-of-the-glut-begins-with-an-unexpected-price-surge)

 On Wall Street, many expected the price of a barrel of “Brent” to hover around $50 in 2026, now the bet is already widely open that the barrel will reach prices above $90.

What could prevent such a jump in the price of a barrel?

One of the encouraging signals of “missile descent” is the already mentioned indication by the US president Trump about …a dialogue with Iran.

The second, perhaps, is the restrained announcement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi today in Istanbul about the road to … talks between Tehran and Washington. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/irans-top-diplomat-plans-talks-us-129701337

“We are ready for fair and equal negotiations,” he said. “For such negotiations, arrangements must first be made, both regarding the form of the conversation and the venue, as well as regarding the topic of the conversation,” said Araghçhi.

Muscat? Istanbul? Ankara?… The world’s oil traders will have to set up new observatories for the movement of the “Persian rocket”…

It’s no wonder that US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin these days, each in his own way, harshly judge the European Union, especially Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission.

“I think that the European leaders are weak (perhaps even weaklings?), they don’t know what to do now” – the 47th President of the USA, Donald Trump, said recently, having in mind not only the “Ukraine” case. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/09/trump-dasha-burns-interview-europe-immigration-ukraine-00682016 .”European “piglets” quickly teamed up with the previous American administration (in the case of “Ukraine”), hoping for the collapse of our country…it is likely that they will lose power,” the head of the Kremlin said today. https://www.ft.com/content/52c0b594-d299-4473-a35e-9a9235267d92

There are plenty of reasons for the harsh rhetoric of Washington and Moscow towards Brussels on both sides, but the issue of fresh money for Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s Ukraine is a possible “Waterloo” for Brussels, on which Trump and Putin probably agree.

Especially, if you consider how contradictory the plans of Washington and Brussels are with those 210 billion euros of Russian money “frozen” on EU soil.

The plot now begins with a question.

Namely, if the fateful promise is unfulfillable, what happens to the supplier of “false hope”? Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission (EC), could face exactly such a question tomorrow, December 18.

Namely, the day before this year’s final summit of EU leaders (December 18^th ), the decisive announcement by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EC, that the EU will support Kiev in the war with Russia “for as long as it takes” https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220915-eu-s-von-der-leyen-vows-unfaltering-support-for-ukraine-on-kyiv-visit

–stands on glass legs.

On the one hand, it is quite clear that at the moment the EU does not have its own money to further finance the war and civilian needs of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s Ukraine. This can also be seen from the unusual recognition of German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz: “Using frozen Russian assets is the only credible way for Europe to maintain the solvency of Ukraine next year” https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-kaja-kallas-using-russian-assets-fund-ukraine-looks-increasingly-difficult/.

At least two questions require an answer here.

In whose name did Ursula von der Leyen actually promise Ukraine help—support—money “for as long as it takes”? (The answer could include certain responsibilities)

And.

How many EU member states support Chancellor Mertz’s belief about the necessary “use” of Russian sovereign funds “frozen” (by a political decision of Brussels) on EU territory?

While the precise answer to the first question is still a matter of the future, the answer to the second will most likely come as early as tomorrow at the summit of EU leaders, where the Europeans would have to agree on where and how they will continue to financially support Zelensky’s Ukraine.

What is the next move of Ursula von der Leyen, if the leaders of the EU member states tomorrow reject the proposal from the top of the European Commission, to permanently seize around 210 billion euros of Russian sovereign money deposited and “frozen” on EU soil?

For Trump and Putin, that “Brussels” is no longer in their geopolitical repertoire.

Sorry: in the following 12 months, gatherings of the original 19 founding countries of the G20 will be limited to eighteen participants (plus special guests) by a decision of Washington. That with Trump’s public announcement that South Africa (the previous G20 chairman) would not be invited to the summit of leaders of that forum in mid-December 2026 in Miami. https://fortune.com/2025/11/27/trump-south-africa-not-welcome-g20-summit-miami-stop-all-payments-subsidies-effective-immediately/

This “non-invitation” is the first case of its kind in the history of the G20.

In a continuation of the trend, the presentation of the recent G20 forum in Johannesburg was removed from the G20 website overnight. Washington seems determined to drop Republic of South Africa at least for the next 12 months, from the G20 horizon. Namely, invitations for the first meeting of the G20 Sherpas (December 15-16 this year) have already been sent to members, but not to South Africa ( https://www.news24.com/politics/sa-not-invited-to-first-meeting-of-g20-20251202-1021 ).

“South Africa has shown the world that it is not a country worthy of membership anywhere,” US President Donald Trump said in late November after official Pretoria twice turned a deaf ear to Washington’s direct demands related to the G20. (Previous disagreements between the Trump administration and the government in Pretoria are mostly well-known.)

This time, Pretoria secured the unanimous adoption of the G20 final declaration despite the US boycott of the meeting, and Washington’s warning not to formulate a “conclusion” since the US was not attending. Then, Pretoria rejected Washington’s proposal (arrived at the very end of the meeting) that South African President Cyril Ramaphosa hand over the G20 “baton” to a senior US embassy official. The handover took place without much fanfare, a few days later at the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now, what happens when the US president judges that a country—in this case, South Africa—is “not worthy of membership anywhere” …?

Beyond Pretoria, does anyone react? And then how?

One scenario seems possible.

Namely, in early autumn, the official Pretoria postponed the joint military-naval exercise “Mosi III” with China and Russia (previously announced for November 2025) so that it would not coincide with the G20 Forum. The third joint military-naval manoeuvres of these three BRICS members are planned this time not far from Cape Town and the Cape of Good Hope, in the Atlantic waters of the South African region of the Western Cape. Incidentally, the first “Mosi” was held in 2019 with the participation of the founding members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and the Republic of South Africa). The second “Mosi” was held at the end of February 2023 off the coast of the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal (somewhat around the time of the anniversary of the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine).

According to the announcement of Roman Abramov, the Russian Ambassador to South Africa, the Mosi III naval exercises will now be held in early January 2026. (https://afrinz.ru/en/2025/11/russian-ambassador-south-africa-russia-and-chinas-naval-exercises-scheduled-for-january-2026/. And again around the Cape of Good Hope.

Here is an example of “membership”, perhaps also of a new border.

Namely, despite the decisive messages that Trump personally will not step foot on the first summit of G20 leaders on African soil, and Washington’s earlier warnings to Pretoria not to approach the drafting of the final declaration, things in Johannesburg, even before the start of the meeting, started moving in the opposite direction from what was desired in the centre of power of the world’s largest economy.

This is because the delegates of the G20 participating countries have already adopted the draft of the final declaration and included the fight against “climate change” in the text of that preparatory document—a topic about which Trump and his administration do not have many nice words. (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20251122/g20-envoys-agree-draft-declaration-despite-us-boycott).

If the draft turns into an official declaration, does the formation that represents almost two-thirds of the world’s population, generates 85 percent of global GDP and performs 70 percent of international trade defy America? The answer is many times uncertain. First of all, because the question is what can happen with the “draft”, the upcoming weekend in Johannesburg?

Aside at the same time, what could be the operational weight of the G20 final declaration, which is politically strongly desired in Pretoria, and “inadmissible” according to Washington. Inadmissible, because according to the structure of the G20, such documents are adopted by consensus, which cannot be this time, according to Washington, because of the “empty chair” of the USA.

As things stand now, Washington insists on two things. One is that representatives of the US embassy in Pretoria will come to the G20 only for the formal handing over of the chairman’s role, since America takes over that role from December 1. The other, that Washington will not participate in the official talks at the gathering, the theme of which is “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability”.

How then could Washington evaluate the upcoming debates of the participants at the G20 leaders’ summit in Johannesburg? With indifference, or with some other criterion of evaluation in bilateral and international relations? The G20 boycott represents a serious new precedent in American foreign policy, which the Trump administration did not apply to some other international organizations, forums and institutions.

It will therefore be interesting to see how the US comes up with the key theme of the G20 leaders’ summit in Miami next year. Equally, as well as who will be the desired guests on that occasion.

“We will find and eliminate every ship that intends to transport drugs to America in order to poison our fellow citizens,” said Hegseth on the same occasion.

If, as the 47th US President Donald Trump says, America is in a “war conflict” with drug cartels, how far south of the US Gulf could Washington deploy its military?

The answer for now seems uncertain.

As things stand now, Washington announced the possible action of US military forces in Mexico (https://militarnyi.com/en/news/us-may-launch-military-strikes-against-drug-labs-in-mexico); with the already strengthened presence of US troops in Panama (https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/us-troops-train-panama-jungle-210531677.html); the reactivation of the former air base in Puerto Rico (https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/11/03/us-deploys-f-35-fighters-cold-war-era-puerto-rico-base-venezuela-tensions-escalate.html), and the largest military concentration in the Eastern Caribbean since the Cold War—targeted toward Venezuela.

By the way, in that “military-anti-narco” movement of Washington to the south of the Western Hemisphere, Bloomberg these days publishes a lengthy text about the extensive drug trade along the Amazon, especially in the Solimoes area in Brazil (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-10-30/cocaine-smuggled-on-oil-barges-threatens-to-draw-trump-anger-to-brazil ).

In the meantime, numerous political actors in Latin America and observers, question Washington’s announcement that the fight against drug cartels is the key motive for the impressive deployment of the US Navy to the waters of the South Atlantic (https://www.intellinews.com/is-venezuela-s-resource-wealth-trump-s-real-target-409446/?source=venezuela).

How much truth there is in such speculations about Washington’s motives is uncertain.

Be that as it may, US President Donald Trump this week sounds convinced that the “days” of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in power are “numbered”, while he points out that a final decision has not yet been made on the profile of US action in relation to Venezuela—the country with the largest proven oil and gas reserves in the world.

On that occasion, there are hints that one of Washington’s options in this case could be “taking steps to take control of oil fields” (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/04/us/politics/trump-weighs-attacks-venezuela.html).

In the meantime, global oil market is already worried that a possible American invasion of Venezuela (even if only up to the key petro-terminal of Jose in the northeast of that country) could immediately  cause uncomfortable chain of consequences for the operations of refineries in the American Gulf and in Asia, the price of diesel…..(https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/What-a-US-Invasion-of-Venezuela-Would-Mean-for-Global-Oil-Prices.html).

Thus, one could assume that the decision on Washington’s next step in the “Venezuela case” will be made after the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford in the Caribbean Sea. What happens there after that, remains to be seen.

In the meantime, further geographical expansion of the American fight against drug traffickers in that part of the world could be foreseen. “From Argentina to Mexico, the same pattern repeats itself: (there operate) loose networks of traders, brokers and local groups that are fluid, adaptable and far from the ‘cartel’ structures of the past” (https://insightcrime.org/news/why-is-us-attacking-cartels-that-dont-exist/).

If so, Tierra del Fuego( on the photo) doesn’t seem far off either.

If, for example, there had been that caution on Friday, October 10, would over two trillion US dollars have “evaporated” from the world’s stock markets in one day? In other words, would there be a “financial carom” of such magnitude, similar only to the one after April 2, when US President Donald Trump announced the start of America’s “global tariff salvo”. “Carom” was garnished on Sunday, October 12, by the warning of the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing that “China does not want a trade war with America, but it is not afraid of it.”

Between two Fridays, October 10 and 17, the American administration – after Beijing’s previous announcement that it was further tightening the conditions for the export of rare earth materials (REM) – came out with a series of confronting messages, first one, with fabulous financial consequences. About others, another time.

“We will introduce a 100 percent tariff on ‘everything from China’ on November 1^st”, in this Friday-to—Friday time sequence, president Donald Trump first announced. “Everything will be OK with China. We want to help China, not hurt it,” said after the 47th President of the USA, Donald Trump, on Monday. “China will deliberately not import soybeans from America, and we consider that a hostile move,” US President Donald Trump continued on Wednesday. “Further, more tariffs against China are not sustainable. They provoked me (to the strong reaction on October 10),” US President Donald Trump concluded on Friday 17^th.

In the same Friday—to—Friday period, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that Washington is in continuous contact with Beijing, and that dialogue relations are very satisfactory, as well as that preparations for the next round of trade-customs negotiations with China continue this week. Then, on Monday, Bessent warned that China is trying” to drag the whole world down with it”, with its bizarre approach to the export of REM, where it otherwise dominates globally. Then on Friday, October 17, Bessent assessed that Li Chenggang, one of the key Chinese trade negotiators, recently (at the end of August) “uninvited” visited the USA, where he behaved “unbalanced”, that is, “disrespectful”. “Maybe he thinks he’s a wolf—a warrior,” Bessent added.

Beijing than looked in its own mirror : Li Chenggang was  subsequently dismissed from the position on country’s representative to the World Trade Organisation.

In this tariffs game of high stakes between Washington and Bejing, it seems like every word counts.  

But what happened in less than 48 hours, for the American President Donald Trump to fundamentally change his assessment of China, and the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, as for example happened last weekend? As recently as last Friday, the head of the White House warned that Beijing’s latest tariff measures (directed towards increasingly careful domestic and international trade in rare earth materials) are an “extremely aggressive stance in trade” by a country that aims to “hold the whole world captive” because of (its) rare earth materials.

Not only did the Chinese, in Trump’s words, “surprise him (with new restrictive measures), but, as he announced, “Other countries are also very angry because of Trade hostility, which came out of nowhere”. Reserving the right to retaliate, Donald Trump announced on the same occasion a plus 100 percent tariff on “everything coming from China” as early as November 1, “and maybe even earlier”.

“China simply took us by surprise. I have a very good relationship with President Xi, and they did it,” the 47th US President boasted on Friday.

At the same time, Trump hinted that he doesn’t really see the point of – no matter how much he mentioned it since January inauguration in the second presidential term—meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. “I will be there anyway (at the ASEAN summit at the end of October in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia), so I guess it could happen (meeting with Xi). We’ll see what happens,” Trump hinted on October 10.

A little later—perhaps after the latter, and a record-breaking collapse on Wall Street on Friday (the most brutal since April 2, when on the self-proclaimed “American Liberation Day”, Trump launched a global “tariff barrage”), the head of the White House sounded very different on Sunday. That is, more conciliatory.

“The highly respected President of China, Xi Jinping, had a bad moment. He certainly does not want a Depression for his country, and neither do I. America wants to help China, not hurt it,” said the head of the White House, without further clarification.

What happened about this matter during the weekend in Washington is unclear. Just like what could have been “Xi Jinping’s bad moment”.

On the one hand, Jamison Greer, the US trade representative, pointed out that due to the announcement of the latest Chinese tariff measures, Washington contacted Beijing for a suitable telephone conversation, but that “hello-hello” did not happen, reported Reuters. On the other hand, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant revealed today that Washington was in constant contact with Beijing last weekend, and that the Trump-Xi meeting is still “in play” at the end of the month.

Meanwhile, Beijing has not yet uttered a word regarding Trump’s announcements that he would meet with Xi in two weeks.

What happens to the announced fifth round of customs negotiations between the USA and China (the current “tariff truce” expires on November 9th) seems like a question from a far.

The “Madrid round” of negotiations was preceded by a week of harsh warnings from Washington to its partners in the West, that it is time to build a “tariff wall” towards China (and India).

“China has strong control, even grip over Russia: these powerful tariffs will break that grip ” wrote US President Donald Trump on Saturday, in a letter addressed to NATO members and “the world”. In that letter to the 32-nation military alliance, Trump suggested they unite in imposing “50 to 100 percent” tariffs on China (and Russia). Mainly because of the trade of Siberian oil, a lucrative business that – according to both sides of the Atlantic – allows Moscow to finance the ongoing war in Ukraine.

“In any case, I’m ready to ‘go’, when you are. Just say: when,” announced Trump, doubly conditioning American joining with “major sanctions” against Moscow. First of all, by demanding that all NATO members stop buying Russian oil, and at the same time collectively introduce “50-100 percent” tariffs on China and India.

China reacted swiftly on Saturday.

Namely, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said during his visit to Slovenia on Saturday: “War cannot solve problems, and sanctions will only complicate them. China does not participate in wars or plan wars, what it does is to encourage peace negotiations and promote political resolution of hot spots through dialogue,” Wang said after a conversation with Tanja Fajon, head of Slovenia’s diplomacy.

It is unknown in what depth the American-Chinese trade negotiations will proceed at the Santa Cruz Palace (on the photo, headquarters of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in Madrid.

It seems obvious that Washington is trying to close the ranks of the West rapidly.

Namely, on September 10, Trump proposed to the EU that they first introduce “100 percent tariffs on India and China” (due to the purchase of Russian oil), so America will follow them. Then on September 12, Scott Bessent, US Treasury Secretary, suggested to the G7 membership that they “immediately impose 50-100 percent tariffs on China and India (due to the purchase of Russian oil)” and other measures.

How should the EU, G7 and NATO position themselves towards  Washington’s latest tariffs proposals against China? Unanimity seems to be uncertain in advance.

“Slovenian President Nataša Pirc Musar on Saturday praised China, as a responsible big country, for adhering to multilateralism and setting an example for the international community,” reported China’s CGTN.

Be that as it may, the puzzle is not only whether and when the members of the EU, G7 and NATO will position themselves regarding the latest US tariffs initiatives. It is also: what is Washington’s next move, when those answers arrive?