*

Who has a better watch: American “Chevron” or US President Donald Trump? At least, when the looming global time crunch that the world oil market—and everyone associated with the petro business—is facing in the “Hormuz case.” (in the picture: a view of the strategic strait from the Musandam Peninsula in Oman).

Just yesterday, the 47^th president of the USA told his negotiating team not to “rush” in shaping a peace agreement with Iran: “time is on our side”, said Trump. (https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260524-time-is-on-our-side-trump-tempers-expectations-of-a-peace-deal-with-Iran)

On what grounds Donald Trump currently believes that “time is on our side” is not specified. Meanwhile, according to the announcement of the US leader; “The (US) blockade (of Iranian ports) remains in full force until a deal is reached, ratified and signed.”

Now, on whose side is “time” in the conflict between the USA and Israel against Iran, the understandings are different, sometimes even opposite to  Trump’s. Thus, Gideon Rahman, the chief foreign policy columnist of the London “Financial Times” was convinced in mid-April that “time is on Iran’s side” in the conflict in the Persian Gulf (https://www.ft.com/content/2f1cbc7d-eeab-40e4-b940-61bf8b1e7959?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

In a widely commented op-ed titled “Why Time Is on Iran’s Side,” Rahman points out that “The longer the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the more economic and political pressure will increase on the US and its allies. As a result, Iran’s negotiating side is likely to be stronger — if and when peace talks resume.”

It may be that the current phase of negotiations between the USA and Iran denies Rahman’s assessment, which could be inferred from today’s reactions of the world’s petro-exchanges. Namely, the price of a barrel of “Brent” and light Texas oil (WTI) was reduced today by about five percent, due to the expressed optimism of the stock exchanges that this time Washington and Tehran are close to the “deal” (https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2026/05/25/oil-slips-us5-as-us-iran-seen-moving-closer-to-peace-deal#goog_rewarded).

But what “deal”?

As long as it is not completely clear, the fate of the oil price, the normalization of global petro-supply (as well as gas, helium, fertilizers…), and the further development profile of numerous economic branches are becoming hostages of the escalation of the key actors of the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

On this occasion, it is worth reminding that the US mega-oil company “Chevron” warned in the middle of May of possible dramatic global oil shortages…More precisely, Mike Wirth, CEO of “Chevron”—at the Milken’s Institute Global Conference in Los Angeles, warned that “the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, together with the resulting impact on global crude oil supplies and similar strategic reserves, indicates a high probability of oil shortages, oil supply shocks in the 1970s” (https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/energy/articles/chevrons-ceo-warning-1970s-style-152000898.html).

Wirth did not specify how long it would take for this “high probability” to eventually materialize. Meanwhile, some oil traders estimate that “petro-Armageddon 1970” could occur already in June (https://www.ft.com/content/b26ba4ce-4324-4ea9-926d-caf036f20832?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

In that case, the time for a US-Iran deal on the global petro market is running out pretty fast, so a Washington-Tehran deal is becoming increasingly desirable there.

In the meantime, “We are like pirates…some kind of pirates, but we don’t play games…” Trump, on one occasion in early May, described the actions of the US Navy in seizing ships in the blockade of Iranian ports. (https://time.com/article/2026/05/02/trump-pirates-US-navy-iran-blockade/.

How long the “pirates” will stay in the Persian Gulf is an open question.

The uncertain location of the next round of negotiations between Washington and Tehran: will today’s meeting between Vladimir Putin and Abbas Arghchi give rise to a new address?

Pretty bluntly, German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz assessed today that the Iranians—when it comes to the faltering negotiations between Washington and Tehran, have “humiliated” US President Donald Trump. (https://www.newsmax.com/globaltalk/iran-trump-ceasefire/2026/04/27/id/1254309/).

“The Iranians are obviously very good at negotiating, or rather, very good at not negotiating, allowing the Americans to travel to Islamabad and then leave again without any result,” Mertz said during a talk with students in Marsberg.

Mertz may have had in mind the first round of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, which took place on April 11^th  in Islamabad (on the photo) when JD Vance, US Vice President, after 21 hours of exchange of views through mediators, announced that the negotiations had ended “without results”.

Or maybe Mertz had in mind, that unsuspecting “round” last weekend, when at first glance it was not entirely clear who rejected first the possibility of American-Iranian talks in the capital of Pakistan: Washington or Tehran?

Namely, as of last Friday, official Tehran announced the weekend visit of the head of Iranian diplomacy, Abbas Araghchi, to Islamabad (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iranian-foreign-minister-returns-to-islamabad-after-oman-trip-sources/3918604).

Then on Saturday, news came from Washington that President Trump’s envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, were preparing to travel to Islamabad. (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8103xklreo).

Somehow, it was reported from Tehran on Saturday that Araghchi does not plan to meet with Kushner and Witkoff during his stay in Islamabad (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-894077).

And then US President Donald Trump decided that Kushner and Witkoff will not travel to Islamabad. “Why should they spend 15-16 hours on a plane to meet some people that no one has ever heard of?”, remarked Trump, without specifying who he had in mind. (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/25/world/middleeast/trump-witkoff-kushner-pakistan-trip-cancelled.html).

“There are phones, we have good, secure lines: if (the Iranians) want to talk, they can come to us, or call us,” Trump added on the same occasion.

If so, how to understand the statement of the Iranian head of diplomacy, Abbas Araghchi, today from Saint Petersburg, that “the Americans requested that the negotiations continue”? (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-894337).

How and where, probably the whole world would be interested. Is it in America, or on the phone, or somewhere else?

As things stand now, it seems that Islamabad is no longer an option for the Iranians. “Pakistan is a good friend and neighbour, but it is not a suitable mediator,” Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesman for Iran’s National Committee for Security and Foreign Policy, said last weekend. (https://indianexpress.com/article/world/us-news/pakistan-not-a-suitable-intermediary-says-iranian-mp-amid-stalled-talks-10657622/).

Will the dialogue between Vladimir Putin and Abbas Araghchi perhaps lead to a new address for the continuation of negotiations between  Washington and Tehran?

The US President is oscillating between war and peace with Iran, because he also knows some legal deadlines

*

US President Donald Trump knows that the agreement with Iran will be signed “tonight” in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. At the same time, US leader is not sure that Tehran will participate today in the offered second round of negotiations between the USA and Iran! “They (the Iranians) are supposed to be there (in Islamabad). We agreed to be there…if they’re not there, that’s fine too” (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/trump-says-iran-deal-to-be-signed-tonight-in-islamabad/3912353).

So, if the Iranians are not “there”, how could possibly an agreement between Washington and Tehran be signed (aside from the dilemma, what could be on the paper of that agreement)?

Now one could ask: what does  indicate the inference example where key premise is not verified. For example : who participates in the negotiations, before signing an agreement? There are many possible interpretations. There is certainly one explanation: a strong desire of the announcer for something to happen “today”…

Such a desire, that yesterday (Sunday, April 19^th ) Trump again threatened that – in the absence of an agreement this time in Islamabad, he could order the destruction of all power plants and bridges throughout Iran. (https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-warns-iran-no-more-mr-nice-guy-ship-attacks-power-plants-bridges-11850572).

But, why “today” anyway?

Especially, if it is known that the other side (the Iranians), last weekend as well as today, signalled their unwillingness to continue the dialogue with America soon. Esmail Bagaei, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, for example, said today that there are “no plans for the next round of negotiations” and stressed that Iran will “prioritize national interests and benefits” as it considers its next steps. (https://time.com/article/2026/04/20/iran-us-peace-talks-stalemate-strait-of-hormuz-trump-threats/).

So, do Iranian negotiators arrive in Islamabad today and sign the agreement with America, or do they not arrive and don’t sign it? And what happens if they don’t come and sign…? Trump has already announced that the chances of extending the current two-week ceasefire with the Iranians are pretty slim (expires on  “Wednesday (April 22th) evening in the Washington time zone”). (https://english.news.cn/20260421/08fd6822d6ed41b99cf2f25c3c54043b/c.html).

And, now what happens in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and perhaps beyond, if “today” is not “today”, and than if on April 22 there is no extension of the ceasefire agreement between the USA and Iran?

The answer is uncertain. But it seems obvious that ongoing US “military operation” against Iran—as President Trump often calls it,  will technically count 60 days of duration on April 28^th (a formal notification to Congress from the White House was sent on March 2).

So next week, US President Donald Trump will have the option to either write to the US Congress with a request to continue military operations for another 30 days (in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, from 1973), withdraw US troops from the Persian Gulf, or refer to another US legal act (Authorization for Use of Military Force, from 2011, post “September 11”), which allows US military engagement against appropriate opponents, without time limits…

The White House seems to be these days, under considerable time pressure in the Persian Gulf.

At this moment, the world public can only hope for the imminent end of the conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran: one of the reasons for this anxious belief is the fact that some actors vow to achieve their ultimate goals by fighting to the “last drop of blood”. (https://iranpress.com/content/315830/iran-army-chief-vows-defend-honor-until-last-drop-blood).

Who would declare “the end”, and what the “megdan field” over the Persian Gulf (on the map) would look like after that, seems completely uncertain for now to many, not only the increasingly nervous energy traders, or the first neighbours on the already shaken Arabian Peninsula.

As things stand now, US President Donald Trump’s assessment on Monday that the war is “very complete” seems unclear if, for example, one takes into account the scope of US military operations the very next day in the area of ​​the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.theguardian.com/news/2026/mar/11/us-iran-strait-of-hormuz-mine-boat-attacks).

As well as Israeli army’s actions today (Wednesday March 11^th ) in western Iran (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889553). But also  with simultaneous Iranian missile strikes on Dubai International Airport and targets across the Persian Gulf (https://www.ttnews.com/articles/iran-targets-oil-facilities).

Could a “little excursion” – as the US president described the attack on Iran at the beginning of the week (https://fortune.com/2026/03/10/trump-says-iran-war-end-soon/) ,  turn into a historic test of the endurance of the participants?

And if so, then what profiles of “endurance”?

At least two signals indicate at this moment that the conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran could last for a while.

On the one hand, there is the “disappointment” of US President Donald Trump with the election of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme religious leader of Iran (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/9/trump-slams-mojtaba-khameneis-appointment-as-iran-projects-defiance).

By the way, Mojtaba Khamenei was elected as the supreme leader of Shiite Iran, after the assassination of his father, the supreme leader and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the Israeli-US attack on Iran on February 28. It seems that Mojtaba Khamenei was at that time, also wounded in the legs (https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/new-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-injured-in-war-but-safe-says-iran-presidents-son-2880277-2026-03-11).

For the sake of understanding the war amphitheatre, Shi’ism is “one of two, or three main directions (currents), denominations in Islam” (Rade Božović, Vojislav Simić, Rečnik Islama, st.191, 2010). In that Islamic community, “Ayatollah” is: “‘God’s sign’, in Shia Islam, a high spiritual title that is awarded to one of the 12 chosen believers of Allah or mujdehid, authoritative experts of the faith… The title of Ayatollah has been awarded since the last century by authorities-jurists … who are connected to the famous Shia schools in Qom, Tabriz or Mashhad…” (ibid, p. 31).

A question could be asked here: how to understand last week’s statement of US President Donald Trump that he “must be involved in the selection process” of the next Iranian leader (after the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)? (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-he-needs-be-involved-selecting-irans-next-leader-axios-reports-2026-03-05/).

Whether Donald Trump understands the enemy in the current conflict with Iran is the subject of a series of analyses these days (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-03-10/iran-war-trump-doesn-t-know-his-enemy-that-gives-iran-an-edge; https://www.indrastra.com/2026/03/trump-sees-short-war-in-iran-tehran-is.html).

Trying to resolve that dilemma, the focus is mainly on insights into the profiles of military arsenals, strategies and tactics… Looking at those other differences between the actors of this war over the Persian Gulf, may just bring a part of the solutions to the puzzle about the possible length of the current war over the Persian Gulf.

If, in the meantime, a generally acceptable “diplomatic messiah”—a conciliator—does not appear.

That missing, could be a signal that the war “time bomb” over Persian Gulf , could continue to be ticking…

“Greece will become an energy hub,” emphasized Ambassador Guilfoyle in the fall. “We want to show that Greece can become an energy hub that will help us oppose Russian and Chinese interests. What we are looking for is energy independence, which will strengthen national defence and national security,” Guilfoyle added on that occasion. As a reminder, Guilfoyle mentioned the Greek port of Alexandroupolis (on the photo), about 300 kilometres east of Thessaloniki, last July in her presentation before the US Senate (https://greekherald.com.au/news/kimberly-guilfoyle-vows-to-deepen-us-greece-ties-in-defense-energy-and-trade/).

The strategic importance of the port of Alexandroupolis—the last city in Europe on the way to the Orient, in the new phase of development of energy cooperation between the USA, Greece and Europe, was exclusively confirmed to the Belgrade “Politics” at the beginning of January by Konstantinos Sifnaios, vice president and CEO of “Gastrade” S.A., a Greek company for natural gas and construction-technical business founded in 2010, with the vision that the wider region cannot and should not depend on one source of energy or one energy route. (https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/722149/srbija-ce-transportovati-tecni-gas-preko-aleksandrupolisa).

It is not surprising, therefore, that these days in Alexandroupolis, Ambassador Gilfoyle  started an extensive tour of getting to know Greece on the ground (https://www.voria.gr/article/periodeies-ana-tin-ellada-xekina-i-gkilfoil-thessaloniki-kai-alexandroypoli-oi-protes).

Alexandroupolis was chosen as the starting point of the US Ambassador’s tour of Greece by no chance, since near the capital of the border area of ​​Evros, there is a floating FSRU unit “Gastrade” from where the export of US LNG to markets in Ukraine and Bulgaria has already started via the “Vertical Corridor”.

In the meantime, a meeting regarding the Vertical Corridor expansion plans is scheduled at the headquarters of the US Department of Energy on February 24, which, according to announcements, will bring together regulators, network operators, companies from the private sector and, for the first time, representatives of the European Commission.

Launch is optional. As well as the disembarkation of troops. At first, a credible threat is sufficient, such as: “Right now we have a lot of very large, very powerful ships sailing toward Iran, and it would be great if we didn’t have to use them” (https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hegseth-tells-trump-pentagon-is-prepared-iran-2026-01-29/)

World petro-exchanges react to such a message from US President Donald Trump by lightning-fast raising the value of the risk-premium (7$-10$), almost at the same pace as they did earlier this month, first regarding the “Venezuela case” and then the “Greenland case”.

At an almost similar pace, today (January 30^th ) the petro-exchanges sharply reduced the values ​​of barrels (which otherwise rose to record highs the day before, primarily due to geopolitical reasons): “Brent” to around 70.03 US dollars, and light Texas oil WTI to around $64.70 (https://www.threads.com/@channelnewsasia/post/DUIcmBijts4/oil-slides-as-trump-signals-dialogue-with-iran-over-nuclear-programme-utm)

This time, primarily due to the announcement of the 47th president of the USA that, despite all the manoeuvres of the US naval “armada” in the direction of the Strait of Hormuz, he is still taking into account a certain possibility of … dialogue with Iran.

According to the Times of Israel, when asked if he had held talks with Iran in the past few days or if he planned to do so, Trump replied: “I have and I plan to.” (https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-confirms-talks-with-tehran-is-reportedly-mulling-raids-by-troops-on-iranian-facilities/)

Talks between the USA and Iran are already taking place somehow, somewhere…?!

How much can the world’s oil traders relax on this occasion? (In addition to all the other complicated factors that affect the price of a barrel at the moment: from Kazakhstan to Oklahoma…).

The answer is uncertain, after this month, a barrel of Brent—defying the expectations of Wall Street experts—achieved its biggest monthly jump since January 2022, and  WTI its record high since July 2023 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-30/oil-s-year-of-the-glut-begins-with-an-unexpected-price-surge)

 On Wall Street, many expected the price of a barrel of “Brent” to hover around $50 in 2026, now the bet is already widely open that the barrel will reach prices above $90.

What could prevent such a jump in the price of a barrel?

One of the encouraging signals of “missile descent” is the already mentioned indication by the US president Trump about …a dialogue with Iran.

The second, perhaps, is the restrained announcement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi today in Istanbul about the road to … talks between Tehran and Washington. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/irans-top-diplomat-plans-talks-us-129701337

“We are ready for fair and equal negotiations,” he said. “For such negotiations, arrangements must first be made, both regarding the form of the conversation and the venue, as well as regarding the topic of the conversation,” said Araghçhi.

Muscat? Istanbul? Ankara?… The world’s oil traders will have to set up new observatories for the movement of the “Persian rocket”…

It’s no wonder that US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin these days, each in his own way, harshly judge the European Union, especially Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission.

“I think that the European leaders are weak (perhaps even weaklings?), they don’t know what to do now” – the 47th President of the USA, Donald Trump, said recently, having in mind not only the “Ukraine” case. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/09/trump-dasha-burns-interview-europe-immigration-ukraine-00682016 .”European “piglets” quickly teamed up with the previous American administration (in the case of “Ukraine”), hoping for the collapse of our country…it is likely that they will lose power,” the head of the Kremlin said today. https://www.ft.com/content/52c0b594-d299-4473-a35e-9a9235267d92

There are plenty of reasons for the harsh rhetoric of Washington and Moscow towards Brussels on both sides, but the issue of fresh money for Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s Ukraine is a possible “Waterloo” for Brussels, on which Trump and Putin probably agree.

Especially, if you consider how contradictory the plans of Washington and Brussels are with those 210 billion euros of Russian money “frozen” on EU soil.

The plot now begins with a question.

Namely, if the fateful promise is unfulfillable, what happens to the supplier of “false hope”? Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission (EC), could face exactly such a question tomorrow, December 18.

Namely, the day before this year’s final summit of EU leaders (December 18^th ), the decisive announcement by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EC, that the EU will support Kiev in the war with Russia “for as long as it takes” https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220915-eu-s-von-der-leyen-vows-unfaltering-support-for-ukraine-on-kyiv-visit

–stands on glass legs.

On the one hand, it is quite clear that at the moment the EU does not have its own money to further finance the war and civilian needs of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s Ukraine. This can also be seen from the unusual recognition of German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz: “Using frozen Russian assets is the only credible way for Europe to maintain the solvency of Ukraine next year” https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-kaja-kallas-using-russian-assets-fund-ukraine-looks-increasingly-difficult/.

At least two questions require an answer here.

In whose name did Ursula von der Leyen actually promise Ukraine help—support—money “for as long as it takes”? (The answer could include certain responsibilities)

And.

How many EU member states support Chancellor Mertz’s belief about the necessary “use” of Russian sovereign funds “frozen” (by a political decision of Brussels) on EU territory?

While the precise answer to the first question is still a matter of the future, the answer to the second will most likely come as early as tomorrow at the summit of EU leaders, where the Europeans would have to agree on where and how they will continue to financially support Zelensky’s Ukraine.

What is the next move of Ursula von der Leyen, if the leaders of the EU member states tomorrow reject the proposal from the top of the European Commission, to permanently seize around 210 billion euros of Russian sovereign money deposited and “frozen” on EU soil?

For Trump and Putin, that “Brussels” is no longer in their geopolitical repertoire.

Sorry: in the following 12 months, gatherings of the original 19 founding countries of the G20 will be limited to eighteen participants (plus special guests) by a decision of Washington. That with Trump’s public announcement that South Africa (the previous G20 chairman) would not be invited to the summit of leaders of that forum in mid-December 2026 in Miami. https://fortune.com/2025/11/27/trump-south-africa-not-welcome-g20-summit-miami-stop-all-payments-subsidies-effective-immediately/

This “non-invitation” is the first case of its kind in the history of the G20.

In a continuation of the trend, the presentation of the recent G20 forum in Johannesburg was removed from the G20 website overnight. Washington seems determined to drop Republic of South Africa at least for the next 12 months, from the G20 horizon. Namely, invitations for the first meeting of the G20 Sherpas (December 15-16 this year) have already been sent to members, but not to South Africa ( https://www.news24.com/politics/sa-not-invited-to-first-meeting-of-g20-20251202-1021 ).

“South Africa has shown the world that it is not a country worthy of membership anywhere,” US President Donald Trump said in late November after official Pretoria twice turned a deaf ear to Washington’s direct demands related to the G20. (Previous disagreements between the Trump administration and the government in Pretoria are mostly well-known.)

This time, Pretoria secured the unanimous adoption of the G20 final declaration despite the US boycott of the meeting, and Washington’s warning not to formulate a “conclusion” since the US was not attending. Then, Pretoria rejected Washington’s proposal (arrived at the very end of the meeting) that South African President Cyril Ramaphosa hand over the G20 “baton” to a senior US embassy official. The handover took place without much fanfare, a few days later at the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now, what happens when the US president judges that a country—in this case, South Africa—is “not worthy of membership anywhere” …?

Beyond Pretoria, does anyone react? And then how?

One scenario seems possible.

Namely, in early autumn, the official Pretoria postponed the joint military-naval exercise “Mosi III” with China and Russia (previously announced for November 2025) so that it would not coincide with the G20 Forum. The third joint military-naval manoeuvres of these three BRICS members are planned this time not far from Cape Town and the Cape of Good Hope, in the Atlantic waters of the South African region of the Western Cape. Incidentally, the first “Mosi” was held in 2019 with the participation of the founding members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and the Republic of South Africa). The second “Mosi” was held at the end of February 2023 off the coast of the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal (somewhat around the time of the anniversary of the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine).

According to the announcement of Roman Abramov, the Russian Ambassador to South Africa, the Mosi III naval exercises will now be held in early January 2026. (https://afrinz.ru/en/2025/11/russian-ambassador-south-africa-russia-and-chinas-naval-exercises-scheduled-for-january-2026/. And again around the Cape of Good Hope.

Here is an example of “membership”, perhaps also of a new border.

Namely, despite the decisive messages that Trump personally will not step foot on the first summit of G20 leaders on African soil, and Washington’s earlier warnings to Pretoria not to approach the drafting of the final declaration, things in Johannesburg, even before the start of the meeting, started moving in the opposite direction from what was desired in the centre of power of the world’s largest economy.

This is because the delegates of the G20 participating countries have already adopted the draft of the final declaration and included the fight against “climate change” in the text of that preparatory document—a topic about which Trump and his administration do not have many nice words. (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20251122/g20-envoys-agree-draft-declaration-despite-us-boycott).

If the draft turns into an official declaration, does the formation that represents almost two-thirds of the world’s population, generates 85 percent of global GDP and performs 70 percent of international trade defy America? The answer is many times uncertain. First of all, because the question is what can happen with the “draft”, the upcoming weekend in Johannesburg?

Aside at the same time, what could be the operational weight of the G20 final declaration, which is politically strongly desired in Pretoria, and “inadmissible” according to Washington. Inadmissible, because according to the structure of the G20, such documents are adopted by consensus, which cannot be this time, according to Washington, because of the “empty chair” of the USA.

As things stand now, Washington insists on two things. One is that representatives of the US embassy in Pretoria will come to the G20 only for the formal handing over of the chairman’s role, since America takes over that role from December 1. The other, that Washington will not participate in the official talks at the gathering, the theme of which is “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability”.

How then could Washington evaluate the upcoming debates of the participants at the G20 leaders’ summit in Johannesburg? With indifference, or with some other criterion of evaluation in bilateral and international relations? The G20 boycott represents a serious new precedent in American foreign policy, which the Trump administration did not apply to some other international organizations, forums and institutions.

It will therefore be interesting to see how the US comes up with the key theme of the G20 leaders’ summit in Miami next year. Equally, as well as who will be the desired guests on that occasion.

“We will find and eliminate every ship that intends to transport drugs to America in order to poison our fellow citizens,” said Hegseth on the same occasion.

If, as the 47th US President Donald Trump says, America is in a “war conflict” with drug cartels, how far south of the US Gulf could Washington deploy its military?

The answer for now seems uncertain.

As things stand now, Washington announced the possible action of US military forces in Mexico (https://militarnyi.com/en/news/us-may-launch-military-strikes-against-drug-labs-in-mexico); with the already strengthened presence of US troops in Panama (https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/us-troops-train-panama-jungle-210531677.html); the reactivation of the former air base in Puerto Rico (https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/11/03/us-deploys-f-35-fighters-cold-war-era-puerto-rico-base-venezuela-tensions-escalate.html), and the largest military concentration in the Eastern Caribbean since the Cold War—targeted toward Venezuela.

By the way, in that “military-anti-narco” movement of Washington to the south of the Western Hemisphere, Bloomberg these days publishes a lengthy text about the extensive drug trade along the Amazon, especially in the Solimoes area in Brazil (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-10-30/cocaine-smuggled-on-oil-barges-threatens-to-draw-trump-anger-to-brazil ).

In the meantime, numerous political actors in Latin America and observers, question Washington’s announcement that the fight against drug cartels is the key motive for the impressive deployment of the US Navy to the waters of the South Atlantic (https://www.intellinews.com/is-venezuela-s-resource-wealth-trump-s-real-target-409446/?source=venezuela).

How much truth there is in such speculations about Washington’s motives is uncertain.

Be that as it may, US President Donald Trump this week sounds convinced that the “days” of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in power are “numbered”, while he points out that a final decision has not yet been made on the profile of US action in relation to Venezuela—the country with the largest proven oil and gas reserves in the world.

On that occasion, there are hints that one of Washington’s options in this case could be “taking steps to take control of oil fields” (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/04/us/politics/trump-weighs-attacks-venezuela.html).

In the meantime, global oil market is already worried that a possible American invasion of Venezuela (even if only up to the key petro-terminal of Jose in the northeast of that country) could immediately  cause uncomfortable chain of consequences for the operations of refineries in the American Gulf and in Asia, the price of diesel…..(https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/What-a-US-Invasion-of-Venezuela-Would-Mean-for-Global-Oil-Prices.html).

Thus, one could assume that the decision on Washington’s next step in the “Venezuela case” will be made after the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford in the Caribbean Sea. What happens there after that, remains to be seen.

In the meantime, further geographical expansion of the American fight against drug traffickers in that part of the world could be foreseen. “From Argentina to Mexico, the same pattern repeats itself: (there operate) loose networks of traders, brokers and local groups that are fluid, adaptable and far from the ‘cartel’ structures of the past” (https://insightcrime.org/news/why-is-us-attacking-cartels-that-dont-exist/).

If so, Tierra del Fuego( on the photo) doesn’t seem far off either.