When US President Donald Trump declares the Strait of Hormuz “New US territory” (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/aug/21/trump-strait-of-hormuz-american-territory) at the end of August, and after that,  Iranians call California a “new territory” of the Islamic Republic (https://caspianpost.com/politics/iran-labels-california-new-territory-following-trump-s-hormuz-post), what do the two countries at war in  Persian Gulf actually do with the current geographical map of the world?

Herald a new world? Provoke each other?…

Various other answers are probably possible.

For example, if the winner is establishing itself in a new territory after the successful conclusion of a certain conflict, then the geographical map valid until before that, is likely to undergo adaptation to the new reality. However, in the case of the Hormuz Strait “victory” does not seem to be in sight yet, for either of the involved parties.

On the other hand, when a participant in a still uncertainly long conflict—this time in a replica—calls a part of the opponent’s territory “his own “, how does he choose exactly that part of the territory, and not some other?

In this “cartographic case” it is known that “California hosts the largest concentration of people of Iranian descent outside of Iran, with approximately 141,000 Iranian Americans living in Los Angeles County, according to the Centre for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (on the first photo). The community expanded significantly after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, establishing Westwood – better known as ‘Tehrangeles’ – as a major centre of diaspora life”…

Now, when the other day, US President Donald Trump, during the campaign for the November mid-term elections, in the context of increased fuel prices, mentioned in a series of sentences: Iran, “strikes”, Los Angeles, San Diego, the nuclear threat… there was quite a bit of confusion about what the 47th President of US actually meant and said. (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/06/trump-suggests-let-iran-take-out-los-angeles-san-diego).

Trump later said : “Do you want to see the trauma? Want to see the issues? Let them hit San Diego, let them hit Los Angeles…We won’t let that happen. We protect our cities. We are protecting our country.”( https://www.kktv.com/2026/10/08/trump-tries-smooth-over-controversial-remarks-about-iran-striking-san-diego-los-angeles/).

Be that as it may.

It is certain that the key players in the conflict in the Persian Gulf sometimes associate the geopolitical map of their conflicts with California, and, Los Angeles…

Meanwhile, Tehran (pictured) and Los Angeles are separated by about 6,600 nautical miles (about 12,185 kilometers) by waterways, which the US president is considering renaming the “Ocean of Trump” or the “Ocean of America.” https://time.com/article/2026/10/12/trump-atlantic-pacific-ocean-americas-renaming-gulf-mexico-lake-ontario/.

Whatever.

The listing of these locations is not accidental. Namely, it comes after today’s threat by US President Donald Trump that the US could bomb Oman if  it “gets in the way” regarding the Hormuz case.

“If Oman gets in the way ( regarding controlling the Strait of Hormuz), we will bomb the shit out of them ,” President Trump said. (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260817-trump-threatens-to-bomb-oman-if-it-gets-in-the-way-of-us-iran-negotiations/).

Trump’s first military threat to a country on the Arabian Peninsula, since the outbreak of the conflict between the USA and Israel against Iran at the end of February, followed the news that official Tehran and Muscat, after three months of negotiations, reached a mutual agreement on the “zoning” of the waterway of the Strait of Hormuz (https://en.yenisafak.com/world/iran-oman-reach-deal-on-hormuz-shipping-route-map-3721945).

As recently as last Friday, the US president announced that he would declare the Strait of Hormuz US territory when “we soon defeat Iran” (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/aug/14/trump-threat-strait-hormuz-us-territory).

A sharp reaction from Tehran followed (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-rejects-delusions-trump-strait-hormuz-us-territory-rcna592666), but the official Muscat did not comment on the matter. It remains unclear whether the Strait of Hormuz as American territory would include both shores of that strait, or only the Iranian one?

Meanwhile, after Trump’s threat to bomb Oman, one question could be asked.

Which locations within Oman, otherwise the only country besides Iran, on the shores of the Strait of Hormuz, could be targeted by a possible US bombing, and which would be spared? Official Muscat has not yet reacted regarding Trump’s latest threat to the sultanate. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant threatened Oman with sanctions in April if it cooperates with Tehran on the arrangement of the Hormuz Strait. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/28/us-treasury-threatens-oman-with-sanctions-over-hormuz-strait)

If Muscat takes the “bomb threat” seriously, US’ entry into the naval-diplomatic arena of Hormuz, may be further hampered.

While Washington and Tehran show signs of readiness to resume peace talks, it is uncertain whether Yemen’s Houthis and Riyadh are interested in mutual dialogue

Whether the US military can simultaneously act against Iran in the Persian Gulf. and the Yemeni Houthis near Bab el Mandeb on the southern approach to the Red Sea, and with what results, time will tell.

As things stand now, US President Donald Trump announced this week a new series of armed strikes on bridges and power plants in Iran in retaliation for any ship that the Iranian National Guard continues to target in the area of ​​the Strait of Hormuz. https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/donald-trump-says-us-will-destroy-bridge-or-power-plant-for-each-iranian-attack-in-strait-of-hormuz/cid/2171284

At the same time, US leader announced readiness to “take care” in the event that the Yemeni Houthis from the extreme southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, implement their recent decision to blockade ports of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea.

“In case something like that happens, we will take care of it. We have already done that with the Houthis before.” https://www.ft.com/content/90facd68-4df7-40c2-9383-e989a02fbe51?syn-25a6b1a6=1

In the meantime, without a single Houthi missile being fired, the world oil market and key maritime carriers of barrels yesterday already “blinked” to the warning of the Yemeni rebel movement “Ansar Allah that all ships that dock at Saudi ports on the Red Sea will henceforth be considered a “direct target”.

As of yesterday, the price of a “Brent” barrel jumped above 95 US dollars (the highest since June 11), mostly because of the Houthi threat. Already today, the same barrel of  brent  goes today for 98 US dollars…

At the same time, at least three mega-tankers loaded with Saudi oil in the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, for customers in Asia, suddenly changed their direction of movement: instead of heading south towards Bab el Mandeb and the Indian Ocean, they sailed yesterday towards Suez and the Mediterranean Sea via Asia (at least 30 days longer journey). https://en.yenisafak.com/world/oil-tankers-change-course-in-red-sea-after-houthi-blockade-threats-3721152.

As of today, the Houthis targeted and hit two Saudi tankers, while a large fire broke out on one of them. https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/saudi-tanker-on-fire-after-being-hit-by-projectile-as-houthis-strike-in-red-sea/2-1-2019914

The global petro market braces new challenges, with the latest Houthi threat in the face of a possible deadlock in the supply of barrels from the Saudi Arabia.

Namely, due to the tense blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (Iranians) and the blockade of Iranian ports (Americans), the leading Gulf oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, significantly redirected its export of barrels through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu port on the Red Sea. The latest Houthi threat to civilian shipping directed to Saudi petro-anchorages on the Red Sea, and possibly the leading Sunni monarchy’s petro-installation, opens new dilemmas on the oil market, that are not only related to supply risks.

For example, if US President Donald Trump’s signals about the progress of peace negotiations with the Iranians, since the outbreak of the conflict on February 28 until now, have had a noticeable effect on the fluctuations of barrel prices on the world market, what needs to happen to eliminate the new “geopolitical trigger” of oil price growth, this time around Bab el Mandeb?

Peaceful diplomatic dialogue between Riyadh and the Houthis, or something else?

The new militarization of the Horn of Africa, Bab el Mandeb, a state along the shores of the Red Sea seems inevitable…

In the complicated, currently—seemingly stalled, negotiations between the US and Iran, the two fabulous sums of money (US$250-300 billion) seem close.

Namely, at the end of May and seemingly out of nowhere, in compiling the list of potential actions that could take place between the US and Iran, after the end of the conflict, a sum of 300 billion US dollars appeared (https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/artc-new-details-negotiations-300-billion-fund-for-iran-and-a-halt-to-fighting-in-lebanon-report).

Washington was very careful to connect that money with the future “international investment fund” under the leadership of the Americans. The Iranian side called the talks about 300 billion dollars a talks about the  “reconstruction program” .(https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-us-agreement-plan.html).

It is not yet known what the priorities of that “international investment fund for Iran” could  be.  Nor did the Iranians come out with a list of preferred priorities in the case of the mentioned 300 billion dollars.

Although, the direction of possible action of the “Fund”, that is, the “Program” could perhaps already be guessed.

Namely, as early as 2023, Khojasteh Mehr, the head of the National Oil Company of Iran (NIOC), estimated at the Hongqiao International Economic Forum in Shanghai that Iran is considering attracting around 250 billion US dollars of investment in the development of the domestic petro-industry by 2031 (https://ana.ir/en/news/4190/official-iran-ready-for-attracting-250-billion-dollars-investment-in-oil-sector).

As recently as February 19 of this year (nine days before the outbreak of the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf), Hamid Ghanbari, the deputy director of economic diplomacy at Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the US and Iran could jointly invest in oil and gas projects as part of the ongoing nuclear deal under negotiation, signaling Tehran’s willingness to reach an agreement and avoid military conflict. https://caspianpost.com/iran/iran-proposes-joint-oil-investment-with-u-s-ahead-of-nuclear-negotiations).

“For the sake of the durability of the agreement, it is necessary for the US to benefit in areas with high and fast economic returns,” Ganbar assessed. “The country must be ready for all scenarios,” Ganbari added, “and at the same time seriously conduct negotiations.” Among the potential areas of cooperation, in addition to oil and gas, Ganbari mentioned mining, urban development and the purchase of aircraft.

Here, perhaps the direction in which, seemingly unimaginable today, relations between Washington and Tehran could develop in the future.

It was probably not a coincidence that US President Donald Trump said the other day that a peace agreement with Iran could be even better than a military victory. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/trump-expects-us-iran-deal-to-extend-ceasefire-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-over-the-next-week-report/3953666).

*

Who has a better watch: American “Chevron” or US President Donald Trump? At least, when the looming global time crunch that the world oil market—and everyone associated with the petro business—is facing in the “Hormuz case.” (in the picture: a view of the strategic strait from the Musandam Peninsula in Oman).

Just yesterday, the 47^th president of the USA told his negotiating team not to “rush” in shaping a peace agreement with Iran: “time is on our side”, said Trump. (https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260524-time-is-on-our-side-trump-tempers-expectations-of-a-peace-deal-with-Iran)

On what grounds Donald Trump currently believes that “time is on our side” is not specified. Meanwhile, according to the announcement of the US leader; “The (US) blockade (of Iranian ports) remains in full force until a deal is reached, ratified and signed.”

Now, on whose side is “time” in the conflict between the USA and Israel against Iran, the understandings are different, sometimes even opposite to  Trump’s. Thus, Gideon Rahman, the chief foreign policy columnist of the London “Financial Times” was convinced in mid-April that “time is on Iran’s side” in the conflict in the Persian Gulf (https://www.ft.com/content/2f1cbc7d-eeab-40e4-b940-61bf8b1e7959?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

In a widely commented op-ed titled “Why Time Is on Iran’s Side,” Rahman points out that “The longer the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the more economic and political pressure will increase on the US and its allies. As a result, Iran’s negotiating side is likely to be stronger — if and when peace talks resume.”

It may be that the current phase of negotiations between the USA and Iran denies Rahman’s assessment, which could be inferred from today’s reactions of the world’s petro-exchanges. Namely, the price of a barrel of “Brent” and light Texas oil (WTI) was reduced today by about five percent, due to the expressed optimism of the stock exchanges that this time Washington and Tehran are close to the “deal” (https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2026/05/25/oil-slips-us5-as-us-iran-seen-moving-closer-to-peace-deal#goog_rewarded).

But what “deal”?

As long as it is not completely clear, the fate of the oil price, the normalization of global petro-supply (as well as gas, helium, fertilizers…), and the further development profile of numerous economic branches are becoming hostages of the escalation of the key actors of the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

On this occasion, it is worth reminding that the US mega-oil company “Chevron” warned in the middle of May of possible dramatic global oil shortages…More precisely, Mike Wirth, CEO of “Chevron”—at the Milken’s Institute Global Conference in Los Angeles, warned that “the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, together with the resulting impact on global crude oil supplies and similar strategic reserves, indicates a high probability of oil shortages, oil supply shocks in the 1970s” (https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/energy/articles/chevrons-ceo-warning-1970s-style-152000898.html).

Wirth did not specify how long it would take for this “high probability” to eventually materialize. Meanwhile, some oil traders estimate that “petro-Armageddon 1970” could occur already in June (https://www.ft.com/content/b26ba4ce-4324-4ea9-926d-caf036f20832?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

In that case, the time for a US-Iran deal on the global petro market is running out pretty fast, so a Washington-Tehran deal is becoming increasingly desirable there.

In the meantime, “We are like pirates…some kind of pirates, but we don’t play games…” Trump, on one occasion in early May, described the actions of the US Navy in seizing ships in the blockade of Iranian ports. (https://time.com/article/2026/05/02/trump-pirates-US-navy-iran-blockade/.

How long the “pirates” will stay in the Persian Gulf is an open question.

The uncertain location of the next round of negotiations between Washington and Tehran: will today’s meeting between Vladimir Putin and Abbas Arghchi give rise to a new address?

Pretty bluntly, German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz assessed today that the Iranians—when it comes to the faltering negotiations between Washington and Tehran, have “humiliated” US President Donald Trump. (https://www.newsmax.com/globaltalk/iran-trump-ceasefire/2026/04/27/id/1254309/).

“The Iranians are obviously very good at negotiating, or rather, very good at not negotiating, allowing the Americans to travel to Islamabad and then leave again without any result,” Mertz said during a talk with students in Marsberg.

Mertz may have had in mind the first round of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, which took place on April 11^th  in Islamabad (on the photo) when JD Vance, US Vice President, after 21 hours of exchange of views through mediators, announced that the negotiations had ended “without results”.

Or maybe Mertz had in mind, that unsuspecting “round” last weekend, when at first glance it was not entirely clear who rejected first the possibility of American-Iranian talks in the capital of Pakistan: Washington or Tehran?

Namely, as of last Friday, official Tehran announced the weekend visit of the head of Iranian diplomacy, Abbas Araghchi, to Islamabad (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iranian-foreign-minister-returns-to-islamabad-after-oman-trip-sources/3918604).

Then on Saturday, news came from Washington that President Trump’s envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, were preparing to travel to Islamabad. (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8103xklreo).

Somehow, it was reported from Tehran on Saturday that Araghchi does not plan to meet with Kushner and Witkoff during his stay in Islamabad (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-894077).

And then US President Donald Trump decided that Kushner and Witkoff will not travel to Islamabad. “Why should they spend 15-16 hours on a plane to meet some people that no one has ever heard of?”, remarked Trump, without specifying who he had in mind. (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/25/world/middleeast/trump-witkoff-kushner-pakistan-trip-cancelled.html).

“There are phones, we have good, secure lines: if (the Iranians) want to talk, they can come to us, or call us,” Trump added on the same occasion.

If so, how to understand the statement of the Iranian head of diplomacy, Abbas Araghchi, today from Saint Petersburg, that “the Americans requested that the negotiations continue”? (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-894337).

How and where, probably the whole world would be interested. Is it in America, or on the phone, or somewhere else?

As things stand now, it seems that Islamabad is no longer an option for the Iranians. “Pakistan is a good friend and neighbour, but it is not a suitable mediator,” Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesman for Iran’s National Committee for Security and Foreign Policy, said last weekend. (https://indianexpress.com/article/world/us-news/pakistan-not-a-suitable-intermediary-says-iranian-mp-amid-stalled-talks-10657622/).

Will the dialogue between Vladimir Putin and Abbas Araghchi perhaps lead to a new address for the continuation of negotiations between  Washington and Tehran?

The US President is oscillating between war and peace with Iran, because he also knows some legal deadlines

*

US President Donald Trump knows that the agreement with Iran will be signed “tonight” in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. At the same time, US leader is not sure that Tehran will participate today in the offered second round of negotiations between the USA and Iran! “They (the Iranians) are supposed to be there (in Islamabad). We agreed to be there…if they’re not there, that’s fine too” (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/trump-says-iran-deal-to-be-signed-tonight-in-islamabad/3912353).

So, if the Iranians are not “there”, how could possibly an agreement between Washington and Tehran be signed (aside from the dilemma, what could be on the paper of that agreement)?

Now one could ask: what does  indicate the inference example where key premise is not verified. For example : who participates in the negotiations, before signing an agreement? There are many possible interpretations. There is certainly one explanation: a strong desire of the announcer for something to happen “today”…

Such a desire, that yesterday (Sunday, April 19^th ) Trump again threatened that – in the absence of an agreement this time in Islamabad, he could order the destruction of all power plants and bridges throughout Iran. (https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-warns-iran-no-more-mr-nice-guy-ship-attacks-power-plants-bridges-11850572).

But, why “today” anyway?

Especially, if it is known that the other side (the Iranians), last weekend as well as today, signalled their unwillingness to continue the dialogue with America soon. Esmail Bagaei, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, for example, said today that there are “no plans for the next round of negotiations” and stressed that Iran will “prioritize national interests and benefits” as it considers its next steps. (https://time.com/article/2026/04/20/iran-us-peace-talks-stalemate-strait-of-hormuz-trump-threats/).

So, do Iranian negotiators arrive in Islamabad today and sign the agreement with America, or do they not arrive and don’t sign it? And what happens if they don’t come and sign…? Trump has already announced that the chances of extending the current two-week ceasefire with the Iranians are pretty slim (expires on  “Wednesday (April 22th) evening in the Washington time zone”). (https://english.news.cn/20260421/08fd6822d6ed41b99cf2f25c3c54043b/c.html).

And, now what happens in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and perhaps beyond, if “today” is not “today”, and than if on April 22 there is no extension of the ceasefire agreement between the USA and Iran?

The answer is uncertain. But it seems obvious that ongoing US “military operation” against Iran—as President Trump often calls it,  will technically count 60 days of duration on April 28^th (a formal notification to Congress from the White House was sent on March 2).

So next week, US President Donald Trump will have the option to either write to the US Congress with a request to continue military operations for another 30 days (in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, from 1973), withdraw US troops from the Persian Gulf, or refer to another US legal act (Authorization for Use of Military Force, from 2011, post “September 11”), which allows US military engagement against appropriate opponents, without time limits…

The White House seems to be these days, under considerable time pressure in the Persian Gulf.

At this moment, the world public can only hope for the imminent end of the conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran: one of the reasons for this anxious belief is the fact that some actors vow to achieve their ultimate goals by fighting to the “last drop of blood”. (https://iranpress.com/content/315830/iran-army-chief-vows-defend-honor-until-last-drop-blood).

Who would declare “the end”, and what the “megdan field” over the Persian Gulf (on the map) would look like after that, seems completely uncertain for now to many, not only the increasingly nervous energy traders, or the first neighbours on the already shaken Arabian Peninsula.

As things stand now, US President Donald Trump’s assessment on Monday that the war is “very complete” seems unclear if, for example, one takes into account the scope of US military operations the very next day in the area of ​​the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.theguardian.com/news/2026/mar/11/us-iran-strait-of-hormuz-mine-boat-attacks).

As well as Israeli army’s actions today (Wednesday March 11^th ) in western Iran (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889553). But also  with simultaneous Iranian missile strikes on Dubai International Airport and targets across the Persian Gulf (https://www.ttnews.com/articles/iran-targets-oil-facilities).

Could a “little excursion” – as the US president described the attack on Iran at the beginning of the week (https://fortune.com/2026/03/10/trump-says-iran-war-end-soon/) ,  turn into a historic test of the endurance of the participants?

And if so, then what profiles of “endurance”?

At least two signals indicate at this moment that the conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran could last for a while.

On the one hand, there is the “disappointment” of US President Donald Trump with the election of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme religious leader of Iran (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/9/trump-slams-mojtaba-khameneis-appointment-as-iran-projects-defiance).

By the way, Mojtaba Khamenei was elected as the supreme leader of Shiite Iran, after the assassination of his father, the supreme leader and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the Israeli-US attack on Iran on February 28. It seems that Mojtaba Khamenei was at that time, also wounded in the legs (https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/new-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-injured-in-war-but-safe-says-iran-presidents-son-2880277-2026-03-11).

For the sake of understanding the war amphitheatre, Shi’ism is “one of two, or three main directions (currents), denominations in Islam” (Rade Božović, Vojislav Simić, Rečnik Islama, st.191, 2010). In that Islamic community, “Ayatollah” is: “‘God’s sign’, in Shia Islam, a high spiritual title that is awarded to one of the 12 chosen believers of Allah or mujdehid, authoritative experts of the faith… The title of Ayatollah has been awarded since the last century by authorities-jurists … who are connected to the famous Shia schools in Qom, Tabriz or Mashhad…” (ibid, p. 31).

A question could be asked here: how to understand last week’s statement of US President Donald Trump that he “must be involved in the selection process” of the next Iranian leader (after the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)? (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-he-needs-be-involved-selecting-irans-next-leader-axios-reports-2026-03-05/).

Whether Donald Trump understands the enemy in the current conflict with Iran is the subject of a series of analyses these days (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-03-10/iran-war-trump-doesn-t-know-his-enemy-that-gives-iran-an-edge; https://www.indrastra.com/2026/03/trump-sees-short-war-in-iran-tehran-is.html).

Trying to resolve that dilemma, the focus is mainly on insights into the profiles of military arsenals, strategies and tactics… Looking at those other differences between the actors of this war over the Persian Gulf, may just bring a part of the solutions to the puzzle about the possible length of the current war over the Persian Gulf.

If, in the meantime, a generally acceptable “diplomatic messiah”—a conciliator—does not appear.

That missing, could be a signal that the war “time bomb” over Persian Gulf , could continue to be ticking…

“Greece will become an energy hub,” emphasized Ambassador Guilfoyle in the fall. “We want to show that Greece can become an energy hub that will help us oppose Russian and Chinese interests. What we are looking for is energy independence, which will strengthen national defence and national security,” Guilfoyle added on that occasion. As a reminder, Guilfoyle mentioned the Greek port of Alexandroupolis (on the photo), about 300 kilometres east of Thessaloniki, last July in her presentation before the US Senate (https://greekherald.com.au/news/kimberly-guilfoyle-vows-to-deepen-us-greece-ties-in-defense-energy-and-trade/).

The strategic importance of the port of Alexandroupolis—the last city in Europe on the way to the Orient, in the new phase of development of energy cooperation between the USA, Greece and Europe, was exclusively confirmed to the Belgrade “Politics” at the beginning of January by Konstantinos Sifnaios, vice president and CEO of “Gastrade” S.A., a Greek company for natural gas and construction-technical business founded in 2010, with the vision that the wider region cannot and should not depend on one source of energy or one energy route. (https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/722149/srbija-ce-transportovati-tecni-gas-preko-aleksandrupolisa).

It is not surprising, therefore, that these days in Alexandroupolis, Ambassador Gilfoyle  started an extensive tour of getting to know Greece on the ground (https://www.voria.gr/article/periodeies-ana-tin-ellada-xekina-i-gkilfoil-thessaloniki-kai-alexandroypoli-oi-protes).

Alexandroupolis was chosen as the starting point of the US Ambassador’s tour of Greece by no chance, since near the capital of the border area of ​​Evros, there is a floating FSRU unit “Gastrade” from where the export of US LNG to markets in Ukraine and Bulgaria has already started via the “Vertical Corridor”.

In the meantime, a meeting regarding the Vertical Corridor expansion plans is scheduled at the headquarters of the US Department of Energy on February 24, which, according to announcements, will bring together regulators, network operators, companies from the private sector and, for the first time, representatives of the European Commission.

Launch is optional. As well as the disembarkation of troops. At first, a credible threat is sufficient, such as: “Right now we have a lot of very large, very powerful ships sailing toward Iran, and it would be great if we didn’t have to use them” (https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hegseth-tells-trump-pentagon-is-prepared-iran-2026-01-29/)

World petro-exchanges react to such a message from US President Donald Trump by lightning-fast raising the value of the risk-premium (7$-10$), almost at the same pace as they did earlier this month, first regarding the “Venezuela case” and then the “Greenland case”.

At an almost similar pace, today (January 30^th ) the petro-exchanges sharply reduced the values ​​of barrels (which otherwise rose to record highs the day before, primarily due to geopolitical reasons): “Brent” to around 70.03 US dollars, and light Texas oil WTI to around $64.70 (https://www.threads.com/@channelnewsasia/post/DUIcmBijts4/oil-slides-as-trump-signals-dialogue-with-iran-over-nuclear-programme-utm)

This time, primarily due to the announcement of the 47th president of the USA that, despite all the manoeuvres of the US naval “armada” in the direction of the Strait of Hormuz, he is still taking into account a certain possibility of … dialogue with Iran.

According to the Times of Israel, when asked if he had held talks with Iran in the past few days or if he planned to do so, Trump replied: “I have and I plan to.” (https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-confirms-talks-with-tehran-is-reportedly-mulling-raids-by-troops-on-iranian-facilities/)

Talks between the USA and Iran are already taking place somehow, somewhere…?!

How much can the world’s oil traders relax on this occasion? (In addition to all the other complicated factors that affect the price of a barrel at the moment: from Kazakhstan to Oklahoma…).

The answer is uncertain, after this month, a barrel of Brent—defying the expectations of Wall Street experts—achieved its biggest monthly jump since January 2022, and  WTI its record high since July 2023 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-30/oil-s-year-of-the-glut-begins-with-an-unexpected-price-surge)

 On Wall Street, many expected the price of a barrel of “Brent” to hover around $50 in 2026, now the bet is already widely open that the barrel will reach prices above $90.

What could prevent such a jump in the price of a barrel?

One of the encouraging signals of “missile descent” is the already mentioned indication by the US president Trump about …a dialogue with Iran.

The second, perhaps, is the restrained announcement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi today in Istanbul about the road to … talks between Tehran and Washington. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/irans-top-diplomat-plans-talks-us-129701337

“We are ready for fair and equal negotiations,” he said. “For such negotiations, arrangements must first be made, both regarding the form of the conversation and the venue, as well as regarding the topic of the conversation,” said Araghçhi.

Muscat? Istanbul? Ankara?… The world’s oil traders will have to set up new observatories for the movement of the “Persian rocket”…