Photo: Wikimedia

*

Strait of Hormuz—Wellington (on the photo): 6,700 nautical miles, or about 12,000 kilometres. Could the geographical distance between the hotbed of war at the gate of the Persian Gulf, and the capital of New Zealand, be a factor of importance for the organization of the future management of the strategic strait, which is widely discussed by both its “blockaders”: Iran and America?

In other words: what is “Hormuz” for Tehran, Washington and, say, Wellington?

According to the latest, in Tehran, they are starting to see the Strait of Hormuz as an “atomic bomb” considering the importance that one decision can have for the entire world economy – in this case, the blockade of that strait (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/9/on-level-of-atomic-bomb-iran-highlights-hormuz-importance-amid-us-talks).

From that perspective, Mohammad Reza Aref, Iran’s first vice president—on the occasion of the future post-war administration of the Strait of Hormuz—announces that Iran’s “administration will ensure the security of this waterway and benefit all countries in the region.” To what extent Iran sees a role at least for Oman, directly on the opposite coast of Hormuz, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, in an elastic series of moves regarding Hormuz, on April 28^th , Washington launched the “Maritime Freedom Construct” (MFC) action – presented as a “critical” stage of establishing a new Middle East security architecture (https://www.reuters.com/world/us-seeks-new-coalition-get-ships-moving-again-hormuz-wsj-reports-2026-04-30/).

The US diplomatic invitation to join the future MFC coalition states, among other things: “We welcome all levels of engagement and do not expect your country to divert naval assets and resources away from existing regional naval structures and organizations.”

Wellington’s first official response was restrained. “”We are not close to the point where the New Zealand government would make any decisions on this. Consideration of New Zealand’s participation in any mission related to the Strait of Hormuz would depend on the existence of a sustainable ceasefire agreement,” the New Zealand Foreign Ministry said in a statement. (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-01/new-zealand-says-strait-of-hormuz-coalition-requires-middle-east-ceasefire-first?sref=gvca1UZO).

The government in Wellington then announced a plan to replace its two “ageing ” frigates in due course, as well that in that process they compare  Japanese Mogami-class warships and British Type-31s . (https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2026050801150/).

On May 4^th , Washington launched—and then—suspended Project Freedom, its next initiative to unblock Hormuz, which included solo—action by the U.S. Navy (with unconfirmed participation from allies in the Persian Gulf.

Wellington is there, quite far away.

Whether the 33-meter-long “Lyme Bay” will embark on a ten-day voyage from its current base in Gibraltar to the port of Duqm (about 600 kilometres from the Strait of Hormuz) in order to begin the mission of detecting and destroying mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz is a question whose answer does not depend only on the calculations of British strategists.

As things stand now, an end to the current US-Iranian military operations in the Strait of Hormuz and the waters of the nearby Sea of ​​Oman is not yet in sight. As of today (April 22), the Iranian National Guard acted against foreign commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, after Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire with Iran (at the suggestion of Pakistan), at least until April 26. https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042026-iran-seizes-two-ships-in-strait-of-hormuz/. At the same time, the Americans are not abandoning the blockade of Iranian ports.

Aside from whether US President Donald Trump is once again signalling the possibility of continuing negotiations with Tehran. (https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/909801/white-house-says-trump-has-not-set-deadline-for-iran-peace-proposal).

The Iranians still seem to be restrained on that occasion. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/22/iran-blames-trumps-blockade-for-diplomatic-impasse-as-fragile-truce-holds).

Perhaps, among other things, because there is already concern in the West that the Iranians have placed an unknown number of “model” Maham 3 and Maham 5 mines, as well as a dozen “midget” submarines of the Ghadir class, capable of acting against various shipping, among them, for example, tankers loaded with oil and liquid gas (LNG). In addition to this, there is also speculation about where exactly the maps of all the locations of the mines laid in the Strait of Hormuz from February 28 to today are. (https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/4/13/what-do-we-know-about-sea-mines-in-and-around-the-strait-of-hormuz).

Of these delicate uncertainties for military strategists from various parts of the world, an even bigger nightmare for the world’s merchant navy is a possible “close encounter” with underwater mines in the Strait of Hormuz and its surroundings.

Really, how many underwater mines have been placed inside the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the US-Israel conflict against Iran?

That question is certainly important for the US President Donald Trump, who still considers free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz to be one of the key goals of the “military operation” against Iran.

To that end, the Pentagon has begun “deploying unmanned and autonomous surface platforms capable of towing an advanced sonar mine detection system to detect those laid by Iranian naval forces” (https://www.zerohedge.com/technology/us-navy-deploys-sea-robots-sweep-hormuz-chokepoint-mines). The action also mentions battery-powered underwater drones, called the MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish and Knielfish, which can be launched from a small boat and then scanned for mines…

As of today, the “Washington Post” reported that the Pentagon has informed Congress that demining the Hormuz Pass would take at least six months, and that such an operation is unlikely until the US-Iran war ends (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/04/22/iran-hormuz-mines/).

It seems from everything that is current, that the season of possible laying of mines in the Hormuz Straits may not be close to the end? In that case, prepositioning of various underwater drones and robots… capable of detecting mines is to be expected there. Crowding on the surface of the waters of the Hormuz Straits , but also below them, as if in the coming period, could be increasing.

The amphibious “Lyme Bay” will hardly remain the sideliner.

*

Kamal Kharazi, a foreign policy adviser of the Iran’s supreme leader of the supreme leader of Iran, has a vision of ending the ongoing war between Israel and the US against Iran (since February 28), which does not include diplomacy, but violent economic pressure on “other countries”.

“I don’t see any more room for diplomacy… There is no room unless the economic pressure increases to the point that other countries would intervene to guarantee an end to the American and Israeli aggression against Iran,” Kharazi said this week in an exclusive interview with CNN (https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/09/middleeast/iran-long-war-kamal-kharazi-interview-intl).

US television company states that Kharazi suggested that the countries of the Persian Gulf and other countries must put pressure on the US to end the war.

In the meantime, Iran came out with an expanded list of “legitimate targets”, among which Tehran now includes the offices and installations of “Microsoft”, “Google”, “Palantir”, “Nvidia”, “Oracle”, international banks, cloud-infrastructure in Israel…(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/11/iran-declares-us-israeli-economic-banking-interests-in-region-as-targets).

This is likely to upset the hosts of foreign mega-businesses in the Arabian Peninsula. But, apart from the energy importers directly affected by the suspension of exports through the Strait of Hormuz, who else could be among the “other countries” mentioned by Kharazi in the CNN interview?

Perhaps the answer should be sought on the south-western edges of the Arabian Peninsula, from where the first news about the significant manoeuvres of the pro-Iranian rebel movement Ansar Allah in the northwest of Yemen comes (https://jewishrhody.com/stories/iran-war-leaves-yemens-houthis-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-analysis,145058).

In line with the possible development of the situation, the National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority of the United Arab Emirates (NCEMA) denied the claims of the Yemeni Houthis that they had fired a cruise missile in the direction of the UAE airspace, more precisely towards the “Barakah” nuclear power plant, which otherwise provides 25 percent of the country’s electricity needs (https://www.sabanew.net/story/en/25788).

On the other hand, the Houthis have already issued a threat that with the new war situation over the Persian Gulf, they could close the narrow sea passage of Bab-el Mandeb, in the south of the Red Sea, between Arabian peninsula and the Horn of Africa (on the map). Normally 10-12 percent of global maritime trade (measured by cargo weight and cargo value) on the East-West maritime route, passes through Bab el-Mandeb (https://isdo.ch/analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-the-red-sea-factor/).

It is uncertain whether the Houthis are capable of implementing a  “blockade” of Bab el-Mandeb, joining that way with Iranian “ramp” over the Hormuz Pass.

The global economic consequences of a such “double red traffic light” already seem unimaginable.

The arena of war threats in the Near and Middle East, and the escalation of military “sparks” along the Baltic and North Sea, cross each other  days in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar (on the photo, satellite photo) and its Atlantic-Mediterranean surroundings, signalling  potential new dynamics in that region.

An example of a possible “close encounter” scenario occurred last week, when the USS aircraft carrier “Gerald R. Ford” approached Gibraltar from the Atlantic with an accompanying strike group of ships, accompanied by at least one ship of the Spanish Navy (frigate Santa Maria). “Gerald R. Ford” by the way was on the move from the Atlantic — where until recently participated in the US mission in the “case of Venezuela”, in the direction of the Eastern Mediterranean or Suez, it has not yet been specified. (https://www.twz.com/news-features/supercarrier-uss-gerald-r-ford-has-crossed-into-the-mediterranean).

In the meantime, in the waters of the Central and Western Mediterranean from the beginning of February until recently,  the Russian military cargo ship “Sparta IV” (known for the transport of particularly fragile cargo, including weapons systems and ammunition)- was moving quite mysteriously (https://www.unionesarda.it/en/sardinia/the-russian-ship39-s-strange-route-off-the-coast-of-sardinia-nato-monitors-its-movements-uarw2dh7).

As recently as January, “Sparta IV” sailed in the Mediterranean Sea together with another Russian ship “Mys Zheaniya” and the tanker “Kama” accompanied by the destroyer “Severnomorsk” of the Russian Navy, and since then it has been under NATO monitoring. There was also speculation that a Russian Kilo-class submarine was in the vicinity during the same period (https://maritime-executive.com/article/russian-military-cargo-ship-continues-mysterious-maneuvers).

Be that as it may, the “group” split up at some point. Then, in the middle of the month, “Sparta IV“, traveling in the direction of Gibraltar (according to announcements for Kaliningrad in the Baltic), suddenly changed course, “oscillating” for five days along the eastern coast of Sardinia. Then, “Sparta IV” turned off the transponder, and after a few days, surfaced not far from the territorial waters of Spain.

All this time, the Italian, French, Spanish and British Navies kept “Sparta IV” close look on it, since the movement of Russian Navy ships in the Mediterranean Sea has been quite frequent of lately (https://www.itamilradar.com/2026/02/14/sparta-iv-reappears-off-spain-after-ais-blackout/).

Then, “Sparta IV” again “oscillated” there, remaining always in international waters, but not far from the territorial waters of Spain. Technical failure? Bad weather? Something else?

Vigilant observers have not found out even to this day – when that ship has already passed through Gibraltar. After crossing on Atlantic, “Sparta IV” continued to “oscillate”, this time not far from the territorial waters of Portugal, at the height of the city of Nazare.

Military—naval congestion around Gibraltar becomes noticeable.

It is hard to imagine what future direction the relations between Washington and Pretoria could take when Leo Brent Bozell, the newly appointed US ambassador to South Africa starts working in the country of the Cape of Good Hope.

Namely, in the middle of January, the official Washington and Pretoria brought, the already strained relations since last year, to a new “ice”, after the joint military and naval manoeuvres of several members of “BRICS plus”, and under the leadership of China, held in the territorial waters of the Republic of South Africa (January 10-16). Who all from the “BRICS plus” composition sent (only) officers—observers, and who sent warships to Simons Town (on the photo)—the leading military base of the South Africa , whose corvettes (and some other very advanced naval vessels) then remained anchored there until January 16, and whose sailed to the Atlantic for gunnery exercises… was carefully monitored in those days, all over the world https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260108-chinese-iranian-warships-in-south-africa-for-exercises

A big mystery even today is how exactly it happened that three warships of Iran found themselves in Simons Town those days?

More precisely, what did Cyril Ramaphosa, the President of the Republic of South Africa, thought about the arrival of Iranian warships and what did he do about it? Vincent Magwenya, President Rampoza’s spokesman insists that the South African leader demanded (without specifying, from whom?) that Iran’s participation in naval drills be cancelled (China seems to have sent invitations), in order to protect “our national interests”. Meanwhile, the US embassy in Pretoria lashed out, accusing the government of Cyril Ramaphosa—aka the leader of the African National Congress, South Africa’s leading party—of “choosing to support a regime that brutally represses its people and engages in terrorism.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/28/world/africa/south-africa-iran-navy-drills-trump.html

Be that as it may, Iranian warships were sighted in the military harbour at Simons Town in those days. After a great storm arose, Ramapoza ordered an investigation into the circumstances under which the Iranian ships found themselves in Simons Town, but it is not yet clear how far that review has gone.

In that fog, the South African government ordered on Friday, January 30, Ariel Seidman, the chargé d’affaires of the Israeli embassy, ​​to leave the Cape of Good Hope country within the next 72 hours, stating that “the decisive action follows a series of unacceptable violations of diplomatic norms and practices that represent a direct threat to the sovereignty of South Africa…” (https://www.intellinews.com/south-africa-expels-israeli-charg-d-affaires-prompting-retaliation-against-ambassador-in-ramallah-423290/

On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Saar decided – that “after South Africa’s false attacks against Israel on the international stage and the unilateral, baseless step taken against Israel’s Chargé d’Affaires in South Africa – that South Africa’s high diplomatic representative, Minister Sean Edward Bienevelt, is persona non grata”. Beinvelt was too given 72 hours to leave—from … from Ramallah – where he was by the way the South African envoy to Palestine—Israel

https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/853412-south-africa-israel-continue-diplomatic-row-expel-each-others-envoys.html

Now that these days—as expected, Leo Brent Bozell, the new US ambassador, will officially arrive in Pretoria, relations between Washington and Pretoria could become even more “dynamic”.

By the way, Bozell was always an opponent of any negotiations with the African National Congress, which at that time – in the eighties of the last century, was led by the legendary Nelson Mandela, convinced that it was a “pro-communist, pro-terrorist organization” headed by a “mythologized figure”. (https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260110-leo-brent-bozell-iii-new-us-ambassador-to-south-africa)…

By the way, after the December decision of the USA to – during the one-year presidency The G20 excludes the Republic of South Africa from the work of that group, the official Pretoria first announced that it will fight for its place and role in the G20. These days, the official Pretoria temporarily suspended the membership of the Cape of Good Hope country in the G20 for 12 months. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260127-south-africa-confirms-temporary-withdrawal-from-the-g20-as-us-takes-the-helm-1.

“Will for Peace 2026”, the first joint military and naval manoeuvres of the BRICS plus countries, under the leadership of China and with the conspicuous absence of India, took place these days (January 10-16) in the territorial waters of the Republic of South Africa (JAR), not far from Cape Town. More precisely, on the Atlantic, near Simon’s Town (on the photo), where the country’s largest military base is located.

“Will for Peace 2026” represents a “strategic evolution of the previous iterations,” a Chinese navy official announced during the opening ceremony of the exercises in Simon’s Town. (https://defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/brics-plus-navies-commence-exercise-off-south-african-coast-amid-controversy).

As a reminder, “Mossi III”, a joint naval exercise between China, Russia and the Republic of South Africa, earlier announced for November last year, was cancelled at the beginning of last fall, so as not to “collide” with the G20 leaders’ summit in Johannesburg. (https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2025-09-04-sandf-backs-off-from-contentious-joint-military-exercise-with-russia-and-china).

As is well known, the US boycotted that meeting—due to Washington’s harsh criticism of the government of South African leader Cyril Ramaphosa. Taking over the presidency of the G20, US President Donald Trump announced, at the beginning of last December, that the Republic of South Africa will be excluded from the group’s work for the next 12 months—until the G20 leaders’ summit in Miami. (https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/26/politics/trump-administration-not-planning-invite-south-africa-g20).

Soon after, the Republic of South Africa,  one of the founders of both the G20 and BRICS, announced that it will host the “Will for Peace 2026” naval manoeuvres, starting just three days after US Navy warships—with the support of Great Britain’s army forces—seized the empty Russian-flagged Marinera tanker in the North Atlantic, about 325 kilometres from Iceland. (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-seizing-venezuela-linked-oil-tanker-after-weeks-long-pursuit-2026-01-07/).

Little later, a series of warships from the navies of the Republic of South Africa, China, Russia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates gathered in Simon’s Town (Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia and Brazil joined “Will for Peace 2026” as observers). And while the UAE corvette remained anchored in Simon’s Town, most of the active participants in the manoeuvres sailed on January 13 – after a series of joint sports and other events in Simon’s Town port – not far from the elevation where the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic meet, for elaborated joint exercises. (The status of Iran’s naval participation is a subject of ongoing controversy).( https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-01-12-iran-pulls-out-of-sas-joint-naval-exercise-amid-political-tensions/).

“In an increasingly complex maritime environment, this kind of cooperation is not an option, but a necessity. It is a demonstration of our collective resolve to work together,” announced Captain Nndwakulu Thomas Thamaha, Commander of the South African Joint Task Force. According to Captain Thamaha, the goal of “Will for Peace 2026” is to “ensure the security of shipping routes and maritime economic activities.”

In this case, the “sea route” around the Cape of Good Hope became – during the two-year armed actions of the Yemeni rebel movement Ansar Allah on the approaches to the Red Sea – a forced alternative for the significant number of ships of the world merchant navy.

Official Pretoria did not specify from whom merchant ships should be protected in the passage around the extreme south of Africa.

“We hope that this joint exercise will become more and more powerful and more prosperous… developing and advancing in a more pragmatic and thorough direction that better suits the needs of the times,” announced a representative of the Chinese navy during the opening ceremony of “Will for Peace 2026”.

By the way, for the role of leading the first BRICS plus naval manoeuvres in the Atlantic, from the Gulf of Aden (Yemen) zone, China sent the type 052DL missile destroyer Tangshan (122) and the type 903A supply ship Taihu (889) to the territorial waters of the Republic of South Africa.

American military-political focus in the arena of the Atlantic Ocean: at the moment, on Venezuela and Greenland,  are drawing the international public’s full attention, among other things, due to the still unfathomable consequences of actions undertaken and possible further moves by Washington.

However, maybe some other actors too, not only Washington?

Namely, when it comes to the recent, current and future moves of others on the World Sea, more precisely on the Atlantic Ocean, one can also observe the recent military-naval activity of Great Britain in the South Atlantic region, close to the Falklands and Asuncion Islands and South Carolina, under the code name “Southern Sovereignty” (https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-stages-show-of-force-to-argentina-in-south-atlantic/).

That British military-naval action along the strategically important South Atlantic sea lanes (far from the Caribbean and Venezuela) could indicate the ever-present importance of the global naval power projections of the engaged actors. And that, from the North Sea, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Aegean, the Red Sea… to the Indian Ocean and further to the Pacific or the Atlantic…

Some of these projections of “naval power” have rather unconventional forms, and sometimes they go unnoticed.

From such a perspective, the announced “landing” of Iranian fishermen in the territorial waters of Mauritius and Madagascar (on the photo)—on the key direction of movement of the global merchant navy in the event of a new war drama in Yemen—acts as an example of potential new advances.

Namely, as things stand now, about 168,000 fishermen are active in Iran, who board about 20,300 vessels (among which are 16,500 small boats, 3,000 traditional wooden boats (lazy), 132 fishing boats…) recently stated Ataollah Raeisi, deputy director of the Iranian Fisheries Organization. (https://irannewsdaily.com/2025/12/iranian-fishermen-to-gain-access-to-mauritius-and-madagascar-waters/).

 “Our fishermen and fishing boats also act as border guards. When we say that we have 168,000 fishermen, it means that we have 168,000 unpaid border guards, who make money, create jobs and help secure the national maritime borders,” Raeisi points out.

Meanwhile, Iranian fishermen caught about 778,000 tons of fish in the 2024-25 season. year. At the same time, fishermen from the southern provinces of Sistan-Baluchestan and eastern Hormozgan, closer to the Strait of Hormuz, are increasingly heading to the Indian Ocean to the south for lucrative catches, after the unhappy experiences of Iranian fishermen in the waters of Somalia (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/illegal-fishing-somalia-piracy-9.7018340).

Officials of the Iranian Fisheries Organization announce now “for the first time” cooperation with the official Port Louis and the official Antananarivo. “The two countries have very good fishing areas, we intend to organize Iranian fishing boats in remote waters there, as we did in Somalia, so that they can focus on industrial fishing there,” Raeisi announces.

The Russian frigate “Marshal Shaposhnikov” sailed into the Red Sea on Friday, December 5^th , from the direction of Vladivostok through the strategic passage of Bab el Mandeb on the way to Suez. Before entering the Red Sea, “Marshal Shaposhnikov “, this time escorting the tanker “Boris Butoma”, performed a “mission in the Gulf of Aden… simulating a response to enemy action” (https://www.azernews.az/region/251248.html).

The sailing of that Russian frigate towards Suez will probably be the subject of interest of many observers, especially after the recent news that the regime of Sudanese general Abdel Fattah al—Burhan has offered Moscow to set up its first naval base in Africa in the port of Port Sudan (on the photo) (https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/sudan-offers-russia-its-first-naval-base-in-africa-0748e810?mod=Searchresults&pos=1&page=1).

Talks between Moscow and Khartoum about possible Russian naval installations in Port Sudan have been ongoing since 2017, with both sides variably approaching towards to that goal. Meanwhile, Western strategists are considering in detail the possible geostrategic consequences of such a, still uncertain agreement. (https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/12/04/russias-naval-base-in-sudan-a-strategic-foothold-on-the-red-sea-limiting-u-s-operational-freedom-near-the-suez-canal/).

In such uncertainty, the question is whether “Marshal Shaposhnikov” while sailing this time through the Red Sea, let’s say, “pause” nearby Port Sudan? The answer is still uncertain. This dilemma, could meanwhile, open up space for a different view of Russia’s new-century ambitions to be more present in maritime areas far beyond the former “global Soviet geopolitical amphitheatre”.

The far-reaching agreements between the head of the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, and his host, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at the end of last week in New Delhi, could offer some guidelines.

Namely, both Putin and Modi expressed this time an expressed interest in new connection potentials along the multimodal 7,200 kilometre long International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which could  effectively connect Mumbai with Saint Petersburg.

( https://www.moneycontrol.com/europe/?url=https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/why-russia-is-pushing-new-north-south-transport-corridors-and-what-it-means-for-india-article-13713028.html).

In a pivot from the markets of Europe and the West, refocused on strengthening business primarily with Asia and then Africa, Russia is more than interested in marking stable export routes.

Along that path, the Russian military-naval radar is likely on the look out far from the Red Sea too.

The conflict of interest is obvious.

So… while the US aircraft carrier “Gerald R. Ford“—according to the description of the US Navy “”the most capable, adaptable and deadliest combat platform in the world”” in mid-November from the direction of Gibraltar sailed the South Atlantic route towards Venezuela, (to join the US fight with local drug traffickers), official Beijing signed an agreement on free, duty-free trade with the government in Caracas (https://www.the-express.com/news/world-news/190477/china-throws-venezuela-maduro-economic-lifeline).

 “Bullying and hegemony will only lead to self-isolation,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping warned this spring during the Sino-Latin American-Caribbean Forum in Beijing, without specifying who he had in mind. (https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2025/05/13/chinas-xi-slams-bullying-as-beijing-hosts-latam-leaders).

Meanwhile, who and how secures the Chinese petro-installations in Venezuela (in the Lago di Maracaibo area) is a puzzle.

On the other hand, as of Friday, November 21, the Venezuelan parliament approved a 15-year extension of the cooperation of joint ventures for oil production with Russian companies, until 2041, the vice president of Venezuela, Delsy Rodríguez, announced on Telegram, “No illegitimate blockade can overcome our energy forces,” Rodríguez said on the occasion (https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Venezuela-Doubles-Down-on-Energy-Alliance-with-Russia.html).

Meanwhile, last weekend, the American destroyer USS Stockdale “positioned itself on the navigation route” of the petro-tanker “Seahorse“, which has been under EU and Great Britain sanctions since this summer. The ship in question (built in 2004 sailing under the flag of as many as eight countries), with a load of Russian petro-distillates for Venezuela, after intercepting the USS Stockdale, made a “u—turn” heading in the direction of Cuba. In the waters of the Caribbean Sea, there seem to be some other old tankers with Russian petro cargo for Venezuela idle now for days (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-21/russian-tanker-idles-near-venezuela-after-us-warship-enters-path).

In that fog, the Latin American drug cartel “Cartel de los Soles” is as of today a “foreign terrorist organization” –according to Washington’s nomenclature. US secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth points out that “new options” of action are now open to the US in the case of Venezuela.

How will the triangle: USA—China—Russia continue in the case of “Venezuela”?

The upcoming “wrestling”, in whatever style, will test not only the specific weight of BRICS plus in the face of a direct challenge from US , but also Washington’s intention to defend numerous US interests throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The first global ring of confrontation between BRICS plus and the USA is currently being offered in Venezuela. The outcome of the eventual “match” could have ripple effects far beyond Latin America.

It is a big question what the “Ansar Allah” rebel movement of the Yemeni Houthis think about the free navigation of the Red Sea, but also numerous international actors keen to see the stop to the ongoing armed threats from the direction of Sana’a, Sa’ada, Amran, Hodeidah….

According to the annual Report of the UN Panel of Experts published in mid-October, the Houthis, who control a third of Yemen’s territory, fired 101 ballistic missiles at Israel from September 2024 to July 2025 (57 were intercepted by the IDF, 38 missed, while four reached Israel). In the same period, the Houthis “Ansar Allah” acted against 25 ships (nine merchant ships), near the Gulf of Aden and the strategic Bab el Mandeb passage (on the photo) on the southern approach to the Red Sea, with a series of human casualties, kidnappings and sinking of vessels. (https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/650).

As things stand now, the global merchant marine – whose business my friend the Commodore has in mind – does not seem to be returning “full sail” any time soon to the shortest East-West sea route (and vice versa), one between Bab el Mandeb and Suez.

Moreover, the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, “is on the verge of getting worse”, anxiously assesses Dr Konstantinos Kombos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus (https://maritime-executive.com/article/cyprus-red-sea-security-situation-may-be-about-to-get-worse ).

There are a number of reasons for concern.

“Shippers and insurance companies will now be watching closely to see if the militant group will scale back operations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as previous conditional breaks were linked to earlier ceasefires in Gaza. There have been no Houthi attacks on ships so far this month (November), but Israel has continued attacks in Gaza.”

https://speedlogisticsmarine.com/2025/10/31/shipping-tests-the-red-sea-again/.

Earlier this week, Abdel Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Yemeni rebels, announced that another round of conflict with Israel was “inevitable”, promising continued preparations for the “next phase of resistance”.

(https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251105-yemens-houthi-leader-says-renewed-confrontation-with-israel-inevitable/ ).

What should the other side say and then do? Geography could be the key here: on the southern approaches to the turbulent Red Sea, in the Bab el-Mandeb passage and a little to the north of there, there are a handful of small islands where there is space for runways…

The ring could start to tighten from there.