And, what could Portugal’s public prosecutor’s office conclude now, after today’s assessment by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Lisbon that “Suffice it to say that we have existing protocols that regulate our presence here and the way we use our bases, and we always adhere to them out of respect for the agreements we have with our NATO allies,” Rubio told reporters at a press conference. (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/rubio-says-us-follows-protocols-on-military-base-use-as-he-meets-portuguese-foreign-minister/4082437).

Since April, the Portuguese opposition party “Left Bloc” has not been convinced that the operation of American KC-46 refuelling warplanes and other elements of the military arsenal, from the Lajes base on the island of Terceira (in the Azores) this year, was completely in accordance with international laws. (https://www.dawn.com/news/2034633/portugal-probes-legality-of-us-use-of-base-in-iran-war).

On the one hand, Portugal and the USA  have a bilateral defence agreement from the time of the Cold War, more precisely since 1951, and on this basis the 65th Air Base Wing of the US Air Force is stationed at the Lajes base in the middle of the Atlantic.

The backbone of that military base is the airstrip, which has one of the largest airfield ramps of the US Air Force in Europe. In other words, far from the conflict zone in the Middle East, the Lajes base is an extremely safe location for the preparation of operations of long-range bombers and army cargo and personnel transport.

Everything seems easy in peacetime—to comply with the agreement of 75 years ago, American warplanes take off and land from the runway at Lajes base without prior authorization from official Lisbon (https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/portugal-probes-us-use-of-lajes-base-in-iran-war-after-opposition-challenges-govt-approval/cid/2182967#goog_rewarded).

But what happens when war breaks out somewhere?

The Portuguese head of diplomacy, Paulo Rangel, points out that the use of the Lajes base was fully in accordance with international laws, and that – in the event of a conflict in the Persian Gulf, Lisbon gave authorization after Washington assured that any operation from Terceira Island (area of ​​about 400 square kilometres, 55,000 inhabitants, about 1,200 kilometres west of Lisbon) would be exclusively for defensive purposes, necessary and proportionate and limited to military objectives.

It remains to be seen what will be the conclusion of the investigation by the Portuguese Public Prosecutor’s Office regarding the submission of the “Left Bloc” party.

Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently warned the Europeans that they could be “complicit in aggression” if they allow the US to use bases on their territory for attacks on the Islamic Republic… (https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/araghchi-warns-european-countries-hosting-us-bases-could-be-complicit).

Ominous questions like these are starting to make more and more sense these days in the tense arena of the Strait of Hormuz, as tankers are now being threatened and even shot at on both sides of the front. (https://splash247.com/us-goes-tanker-for-tanker-with-iran/

 ; https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-s-irgc-says-2-oil-tankers-hit-mines-in-strait-of-hormuz-warns-shipping-companies/4044966 ).

Namely, the six-month war between the USA and Israel against Iran entered a new phase at the end of August, in which Washington no longer prioritizes ensuring free navigation “for all”, nor does Tehran remind of its sovereign rights in its territorial waters above the Strait of Hormuz. At this stage, Washington and Tehran seem to be primarily interested in establishing their exclusive right to control shipping in and out of the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

On this occasion, the world’s leading insurance companies are probably already making new risk calculations, because tankers: Iranian, Saudi, South Korean, Greek… in the Strait of Hormuz are becoming a legitimate military target. (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj64rrne643o).

By the way, a new phase of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, in which civilian ships (eg mega-tankers) are being stalked by marksmen from Tehran, Washington, and other “unidentified culprits”, began in August. At that time, the Iranian National Guard published a list of 46 foreign tankers that bypassed the routes established by Tehran’s new regulations while passing through Hormuz, and announced a number of punitive measures against them. (https://mbiz.heraldcorp.com/article/10850736).

After that, “missiles of unknown origin” hit the Saudi VLCC Sidr, and shortly afterwards, on the same day, they caught up with the South Korean tanker Senegal Prosperity (under the flag of Liberia). Then two Iranian petro-tankers owned by NITC (National Iranian Tanker Company) were attacked by the US Navy. US officials described the action as part of a new retaliatory “tanker-for-tanker” attack tactic. Meanwhile, no one has yet claimed responsibility for the strikes on Sidr and Senegal Prosperity (collectively they have been loaded with about four million barrels of oil).

And, as of today, the US Navy “permanently disabled” three Iranian tankers in the Persian Gulf, after the Iranians acted against US warships in the region, according to the BBC.

In a” tanker-for-tanker” mission, Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, raised the stakes :  “Let the message to the IRGC be clear: If you shoot at two of our ships, we will impose an even greater economic cost – destroy three of yours.”

It is getting more and more dangerous nowadays in the Strait of Hormuz. 

US President Donald Trump’s announcement that “the Strait of Hormuz is US territory right now”  (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/8/22/iran-war-live-trump-says-tehran-not-ready-to-make-right-deal-to-end-war ),

and the retaliatory announcement by the Iranian consulate in Hyderabad,  that California is “Iran’s new territory” (https://www.trtworld.com/article/4b1fa88c11d2u), now offer to the international community, two new geographic maps of the world.

Trump’s map shows a US flag flying over the Strait of Hormuz. On the  Tehran’s new map, California is separated from the USA. In the background of this “mapping” is the ongoing war conflict in the Persian Gulf , initiated on February 28^th  by the Israeli-US attack on Iran with the key motive being that Tehran should never have nuclear weapons.

As things stand now, the further course of the conflict in the Persian Gulf is uncertain.

Especially after Trump’s latest decision that “the most devastating sanctions in history” will soon be imposed on Iran (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/20/trump-threatens-crush-iran-economy-war-hormuz). Also because, of the latter messages from Tehran that the introduction of such American measures is a “declaration of war” to all countries. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/8/22/iran-war-live-trump-says-tehran-not-ready-to-make-right-deal-to-end-war). On that line,  Iran signals that it will retaliate fiercely in that case. (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-war-devastating-response-us-threat-toughest-economic-hit-rcna593697).

Those plans by Washington and Tehran raise a series of dilemmas. For example: could the US soon start landing troops on its “new territory”? Or, how could than Iran continue to assess its “new territory” on the shores of the Pacific?

Something else is also a puzzle.

Namely, there are a handful of unresolved territorial disputes in the world, both on land and in the World Sea. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_territorial_disputes).

What happens if some other countries soon start thinking of declaring as “their new territory” some piece of Earth (land or islands…), or some waters (parts of rivers, seas…) that would mean a lot to them now? Who could possibly be the arbiter in such cases?

Be that as it may, in the immediate maritime hinterland of the war conflict in the Persian Gulf on the Indian Ocean, there is the strategic Chagos Archipelago and within it Diego Garcia island (on the photo) with vital US military installations.

Great Britain and Mauritius on the one hand, and the Maldives on the other, cannot agree on who is to claims sovereignty over the Chagos Islands…

Israelis in Berbera, Americans in Bosaso: control of the southern approaches to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea is on the actors’ radar even beyond the Yemeni Houthis

*

Two Saudi petro-tankers: Wafa and Daisy, were yesterday (August 5^th ) the target of ballistic strikes by the pro-Iranian Houthis at two distant locations: Rebel movement “Ansar Allah” targeted the first mega-ship in the northern part of the Red Sea, and the second in the Gulf of Aden area not far from the strategic Bab el-Mandeb sea passage, claiming that “the hits were precise”. (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/houthis-claim-they-hit-2nd-saudi-oil-tanker-in-a-day/4019517).

 General Yahya Saree, the spokesman of the Yemeni Houthis, presented these armed incidents as their “geographic expansion of the field of action”. (https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/08/05/880307.htm).

We could ask: Is there an escalation of tensions around the Red Sea, perhaps the Horn of Africa too, at a time when it seems that the drama surrounding the Pass of Hormuz seems to be subsiding? (https://www.ft.com/content/e0b10cad-3e46-4a6d-9227-eba6fe11c676?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

The answer is uncertain for now, but the number of new actors on the African coast near Bab el Mandeb is starting to grow of recently (https://www.vujic-geopolitika.com/2026/01/11/izrael-novi-akter-na-rogu-afrike/).

As for the Houthis, when they announced a naval blockade of Saudi Red Sea ports on July 20^th , the focus of their first strikes was the Saudi port Yanbu on the Red Sea. Houthi attack on the Daisy—in the extreme northwest of the Indian Ocean, far from the port of Yanbu, raises the question: What could be the motive for the Houthis to launch an armed initiative against the naval and land “Saudi targets” right now? (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/08/04/yemens-houthis-claim-drone-strike-on-saudi-target-at-najran-airport/).

In the fall of 2023, the Houthis started their armed offensive against “ships connected to Israel”, and in the name of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. At that time, Saudi blockade of Hodeidah, a key Houthi-controlled Yemeni port—which they have this time cited as the focus of their July 20 “blockade”—was also pretty impenetrable (“legacy “since the fierce clashes in the middle of the last decade).

Whatever were the Houthi motives, then and now, Bab-el-Mandeb stands nowadays as a focal point of potential confrontation between numerous regional and global interests.

In this context, news arrives that the US military delegation headed by Major General Claude Tudor signed an agreement with the local administration of the Puntland region in Somalia on Sunday, August 2^nd , on the expansion of the US military presence in the port of Bosaso (on the photo)  in the Gulf of Aden. (https://ground.news/article/us-expands-strategic-foothold-on-somalias-coast-as-yemen-conflict-simmers).

With the aim of improving operations against terrorism, as well as helping to protect maritime security in the region.

After that, the war in the Persian Gulf, initiated by the actions of Israel and the US against Iran on February 28^th , was extended to the Red Sea region, with successive strikes by Saudi Arabian aviation on the Yemeni port of Hodeida. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/24/saudis-strike-yemens-houthi-held-hodeida-rebel-media).  That was followed by Houthi missile strikes on Saudi Aramco’s oil installations near the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea and the city ofYazan.

Along the way, the “Encelia” tanker was hit by an unidentified missile 130 kilometres southwest of the city of Al Shuqaiq in the Yazan region, not far from the border with Yemen. Whether and how much the armed conflict between the official Riyadh and the Yemeni “Ansar Allah” can escalate is uncertain.

What is known is that the Ministry of Defence of Germany, on Thursday, July 23^rd , announced the “relocation” of the minesweeper “Fulda” and the supply ship “Mosel” from the Red Sea region (from the port of Djibouti) to the Eastern Mediterranean (https://www.eurasiareview.com/24072026-germany-withdraws-naval-vessels-from-red-sea-amid-rising-houthi-saudi-tensions/).

The unstable security situation, and the absence of an imminent mission in the region of the Strait of Hormuz were cited as the key reasons for Berlin’s decision to withdraw the two German warships from the tense zone near the strategic Bab el Mandeb passage (on the photo) on the southern approach to the Red Sea. In that direction moves towards Suez and the Mediterranean, an otherwise significant amount of energy supplies and other goods badly needed by the EU.  

Meanwhile, “Fulda” and “Mosel” arrived in Djibouti only a month ago to join the (now apparently) abandoned “Coalition of the Willing” to demining Hormuz—an initiative of London and Paris joined on paper by forty countries. (https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/06/18/germany-moves-two-ships-to-djibouti-eyeing-multinational-hormuz-mission-this-summer/).

According to the earlier plans of the Europeans, “Fulda” and “Mosel” were supposed to lead the task of finding mines in the Strait of Hormuz within the “Coalition” armada.

How Brussels will understand Berlin’s decision to withdraw two warships from the anchorage in Djibouti right now is very uncertain.

Namely, on July 17^th , the EU and Djibouti concluded a strategic “Agreement on the Status of Forces for Operation Aspides” – by which the Europeans gained new opportunities for further action on the high seas between Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. (https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/news/2026/07/17/countering-bab-el-mandeb-threats-eu-reinforces-red-sea-naval-mission-with-strategic-djibouti-accord/).

“The European Union hereby expresses its strategic interest in maintaining security, and acting in a security role under the auspices of the Aspides and Atalanta missions here in the northwest of the Indian Ocean,” General Sean Clancy, Chief of the EU Military Committee, during a ceremony in Djibouti on July 17. By the way, the EU anti-pirates mission “Atalanta” has been in that region of the Indian Ocean since 20008, while “Aspides” was created in February 2024.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas came out in Djibouti with a proposal that “the ships that were promised to the Coalition of the Willing (for the demining of Hormuz), could, while they are now just waiting for that mission, be deployed here (to the EU Aspides mission”), since the Coalition of the Willing is not yet functional.”

Berlin seems to have some plans for “Fulda” and “Mosel” in the eastern Mediterranean…

The first visit of the Sultan of Oman to France since 1989 secured Paris a strategic position in the treacherous arena of the Strait of Hormuz. Namely, French President Emmanuel Macron reached a “historic agreement” with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq on the upcoming demining of the Hormuz Strait  (along with a number of other agreements on the future, announced broad military-economic cooperation between Paris and Muscat). https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/europe/2026/06/29/sultan-of-oman-meets-macron-in-paris-to-support-demining-and-safe-passage-of-strait-of-hormuz/

France thus became the first Western country whose naval experts will continue to publicly dive in the Strait of Hormuz in search of mines laid… since the outbreak of the conflict between the US and Israel against Iran at the end of February this year.

What can Washington and Tehran think about this agreement between Paris and Muscat? At the end of May, US President Donald Trump warned Oman not to appear too much in the picture around Hormuz, while Washington is conducting painful negotiations with Tehran. “Oman has to behave like everyone else, otherwise we will have to blow them up,” Trump threatened Muscat at the time. (https://english.news.cn/20260528/bd6d14f1465d49d2a6317c17cd2a8fd3/c.html).

A lot of turbulent water has passed through the Strait of Hormuz since the end of May: as recently as today in Muscat, Ana Escrogima, the American ambassador to Oman, met with Sayyid Theyazin, Oman’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs, to discuss “ways to further strengthen in various domains, including economy and investments.” (https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1192045/oman/oman-us-discuss-economic-investment-cooperation).

Demining is not mentioned as a topic there.

Almost simultaneously, Tehran revealed that Iranian and Omani officials held the first meeting of the “Joint Committee for Hormuz”. https://www.azernews.az/region/260385.html.  Whether the Iranians and the Omanis discussed mines in the Hormuz Strait at that meeting (in the official news, the date was not specified) was not announced.

What is certain is that the French and the Omanis have already discussed the mines in the Strait of Hormuz.

“No country will be allowed to deal with the demining of the Hormuz Pass: it is the job of Iran alone”, Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned tonight.

Meanwhile, how many mines are there in the Hormuz Strait?

The head of the UN Maritime Agency (IOM), Arsenio Rodríguez, recently estimated that 80 mines were placed inside the – until before this conflict passable – “traffic separation zone” in the central belt of the Strait of Hormuz. https://ground.news/article/iran-strait-of-ormuz-will-have-about-80-mines

Anyone who has maps of laid mines—if they originate from one country, could be indispensable to anyone dealing with the demining of the Strait of Hormuz, and the normalization of civilian navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As things stand now, and after a masterful diplomatic manoeuvre by Paris, the French are already preparing for the public elimination of mines in the Strait of Hormuz…

Photo: Wikimedia

*

Strait of Hormuz—Wellington (on the photo): 6,700 nautical miles, or about 12,000 kilometres. Could the geographical distance between the hotbed of war at the gate of the Persian Gulf, and the capital of New Zealand, be a factor of importance for the organization of the future management of the strategic strait, which is widely discussed by both its “blockaders”: Iran and America?

In other words: what is “Hormuz” for Tehran, Washington and, say, Wellington?

According to the latest, in Tehran, they are starting to see the Strait of Hormuz as an “atomic bomb” considering the importance that one decision can have for the entire world economy – in this case, the blockade of that strait (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/9/on-level-of-atomic-bomb-iran-highlights-hormuz-importance-amid-us-talks).

From that perspective, Mohammad Reza Aref, Iran’s first vice president—on the occasion of the future post-war administration of the Strait of Hormuz—announces that Iran’s “administration will ensure the security of this waterway and benefit all countries in the region.” To what extent Iran sees a role at least for Oman, directly on the opposite coast of Hormuz, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, in an elastic series of moves regarding Hormuz, on April 28^th , Washington launched the “Maritime Freedom Construct” (MFC) action – presented as a “critical” stage of establishing a new Middle East security architecture (https://www.reuters.com/world/us-seeks-new-coalition-get-ships-moving-again-hormuz-wsj-reports-2026-04-30/).

The US diplomatic invitation to join the future MFC coalition states, among other things: “We welcome all levels of engagement and do not expect your country to divert naval assets and resources away from existing regional naval structures and organizations.”

Wellington’s first official response was restrained. “”We are not close to the point where the New Zealand government would make any decisions on this. Consideration of New Zealand’s participation in any mission related to the Strait of Hormuz would depend on the existence of a sustainable ceasefire agreement,” the New Zealand Foreign Ministry said in a statement. (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-01/new-zealand-says-strait-of-hormuz-coalition-requires-middle-east-ceasefire-first?sref=gvca1UZO).

The government in Wellington then announced a plan to replace its two “ageing ” frigates in due course, as well that in that process they compare  Japanese Mogami-class warships and British Type-31s . (https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2026050801150/).

On May 4^th , Washington launched—and then—suspended Project Freedom, its next initiative to unblock Hormuz, which included solo—action by the U.S. Navy (with unconfirmed participation from allies in the Persian Gulf.

Wellington is there, quite far away.

Whether the 33-meter-long “Lyme Bay” will embark on a ten-day voyage from its current base in Gibraltar to the port of Duqm (about 600 kilometres from the Strait of Hormuz) in order to begin the mission of detecting and destroying mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz is a question whose answer does not depend only on the calculations of British strategists.

As things stand now, an end to the current US-Iranian military operations in the Strait of Hormuz and the waters of the nearby Sea of ​​Oman is not yet in sight. As of today (April 22), the Iranian National Guard acted against foreign commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, after Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire with Iran (at the suggestion of Pakistan), at least until April 26. https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042026-iran-seizes-two-ships-in-strait-of-hormuz/. At the same time, the Americans are not abandoning the blockade of Iranian ports.

Aside from whether US President Donald Trump is once again signalling the possibility of continuing negotiations with Tehran. (https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/909801/white-house-says-trump-has-not-set-deadline-for-iran-peace-proposal).

The Iranians still seem to be restrained on that occasion. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/22/iran-blames-trumps-blockade-for-diplomatic-impasse-as-fragile-truce-holds).

Perhaps, among other things, because there is already concern in the West that the Iranians have placed an unknown number of “model” Maham 3 and Maham 5 mines, as well as a dozen “midget” submarines of the Ghadir class, capable of acting against various shipping, among them, for example, tankers loaded with oil and liquid gas (LNG). In addition to this, there is also speculation about where exactly the maps of all the locations of the mines laid in the Strait of Hormuz from February 28 to today are. (https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/4/13/what-do-we-know-about-sea-mines-in-and-around-the-strait-of-hormuz).

Of these delicate uncertainties for military strategists from various parts of the world, an even bigger nightmare for the world’s merchant navy is a possible “close encounter” with underwater mines in the Strait of Hormuz and its surroundings.

Really, how many underwater mines have been placed inside the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the US-Israel conflict against Iran?

That question is certainly important for the US President Donald Trump, who still considers free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz to be one of the key goals of the “military operation” against Iran.

To that end, the Pentagon has begun “deploying unmanned and autonomous surface platforms capable of towing an advanced sonar mine detection system to detect those laid by Iranian naval forces” (https://www.zerohedge.com/technology/us-navy-deploys-sea-robots-sweep-hormuz-chokepoint-mines). The action also mentions battery-powered underwater drones, called the MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish and Knielfish, which can be launched from a small boat and then scanned for mines…

As of today, the “Washington Post” reported that the Pentagon has informed Congress that demining the Hormuz Pass would take at least six months, and that such an operation is unlikely until the US-Iran war ends (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/04/22/iran-hormuz-mines/).

It seems from everything that is current, that the season of possible laying of mines in the Hormuz Straits may not be close to the end? In that case, prepositioning of various underwater drones and robots… capable of detecting mines is to be expected there. Crowding on the surface of the waters of the Hormuz Straits , but also below them, as if in the coming period, could be increasing.

The amphibious “Lyme Bay” will hardly remain the sideliner.

*

Kamal Kharazi, a foreign policy adviser of the Iran’s supreme leader of the supreme leader of Iran, has a vision of ending the ongoing war between Israel and the US against Iran (since February 28), which does not include diplomacy, but violent economic pressure on “other countries”.

“I don’t see any more room for diplomacy… There is no room unless the economic pressure increases to the point that other countries would intervene to guarantee an end to the American and Israeli aggression against Iran,” Kharazi said this week in an exclusive interview with CNN (https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/09/middleeast/iran-long-war-kamal-kharazi-interview-intl).

US television company states that Kharazi suggested that the countries of the Persian Gulf and other countries must put pressure on the US to end the war.

In the meantime, Iran came out with an expanded list of “legitimate targets”, among which Tehran now includes the offices and installations of “Microsoft”, “Google”, “Palantir”, “Nvidia”, “Oracle”, international banks, cloud-infrastructure in Israel…(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/11/iran-declares-us-israeli-economic-banking-interests-in-region-as-targets).

This is likely to upset the hosts of foreign mega-businesses in the Arabian Peninsula. But, apart from the energy importers directly affected by the suspension of exports through the Strait of Hormuz, who else could be among the “other countries” mentioned by Kharazi in the CNN interview?

Perhaps the answer should be sought on the south-western edges of the Arabian Peninsula, from where the first news about the significant manoeuvres of the pro-Iranian rebel movement Ansar Allah in the northwest of Yemen comes (https://jewishrhody.com/stories/iran-war-leaves-yemens-houthis-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-analysis,145058).

In line with the possible development of the situation, the National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority of the United Arab Emirates (NCEMA) denied the claims of the Yemeni Houthis that they had fired a cruise missile in the direction of the UAE airspace, more precisely towards the “Barakah” nuclear power plant, which otherwise provides 25 percent of the country’s electricity needs (https://www.sabanew.net/story/en/25788).

On the other hand, the Houthis have already issued a threat that with the new war situation over the Persian Gulf, they could close the narrow sea passage of Bab-el Mandeb, in the south of the Red Sea, between Arabian peninsula and the Horn of Africa (on the map). Normally 10-12 percent of global maritime trade (measured by cargo weight and cargo value) on the East-West maritime route, passes through Bab el-Mandeb (https://isdo.ch/analysis-of-maritime-geopolitics-on-early-2026-the-red-sea-factor/).

It is uncertain whether the Houthis are capable of implementing a  “blockade” of Bab el-Mandeb, joining that way with Iranian “ramp” over the Hormuz Pass.

The global economic consequences of a such “double red traffic light” already seem unimaginable.

The arena of war threats in the Near and Middle East, and the escalation of military “sparks” along the Baltic and North Sea, cross each other  days in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar (on the photo, satellite photo) and its Atlantic-Mediterranean surroundings, signalling  potential new dynamics in that region.

An example of a possible “close encounter” scenario occurred last week, when the USS aircraft carrier “Gerald R. Ford” approached Gibraltar from the Atlantic with an accompanying strike group of ships, accompanied by at least one ship of the Spanish Navy (frigate Santa Maria). “Gerald R. Ford” by the way was on the move from the Atlantic — where until recently participated in the US mission in the “case of Venezuela”, in the direction of the Eastern Mediterranean or Suez, it has not yet been specified. (https://www.twz.com/news-features/supercarrier-uss-gerald-r-ford-has-crossed-into-the-mediterranean).

In the meantime, in the waters of the Central and Western Mediterranean from the beginning of February until recently,  the Russian military cargo ship “Sparta IV” (known for the transport of particularly fragile cargo, including weapons systems and ammunition)- was moving quite mysteriously (https://www.unionesarda.it/en/sardinia/the-russian-ship39-s-strange-route-off-the-coast-of-sardinia-nato-monitors-its-movements-uarw2dh7).

As recently as January, “Sparta IV” sailed in the Mediterranean Sea together with another Russian ship “Mys Zheaniya” and the tanker “Kama” accompanied by the destroyer “Severnomorsk” of the Russian Navy, and since then it has been under NATO monitoring. There was also speculation that a Russian Kilo-class submarine was in the vicinity during the same period (https://maritime-executive.com/article/russian-military-cargo-ship-continues-mysterious-maneuvers).

Be that as it may, the “group” split up at some point. Then, in the middle of the month, “Sparta IV“, traveling in the direction of Gibraltar (according to announcements for Kaliningrad in the Baltic), suddenly changed course, “oscillating” for five days along the eastern coast of Sardinia. Then, “Sparta IV” turned off the transponder, and after a few days, surfaced not far from the territorial waters of Spain.

All this time, the Italian, French, Spanish and British Navies kept “Sparta IV” close look on it, since the movement of Russian Navy ships in the Mediterranean Sea has been quite frequent of lately (https://www.itamilradar.com/2026/02/14/sparta-iv-reappears-off-spain-after-ais-blackout/).

Then, “Sparta IV” again “oscillated” there, remaining always in international waters, but not far from the territorial waters of Spain. Technical failure? Bad weather? Something else?

Vigilant observers have not found out even to this day – when that ship has already passed through Gibraltar. After crossing on Atlantic, “Sparta IV” continued to “oscillate”, this time not far from the territorial waters of Portugal, at the height of the city of Nazare.

Military—naval congestion around Gibraltar becomes noticeable.