US President Donald Trump’s announcement that “the Strait of Hormuz is US territory right now”  (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/8/22/iran-war-live-trump-says-tehran-not-ready-to-make-right-deal-to-end-war ),

and the retaliatory announcement by the Iranian consulate in Hyderabad,  that California is “Iran’s new territory” (https://www.trtworld.com/article/4b1fa88c11d2u), now offer to the international community, two new geographic maps of the world.

Trump’s map shows a US flag flying over the Strait of Hormuz. On the  Tehran’s new map, California is separated from the USA. In the background of this “mapping” is the ongoing war conflict in the Persian Gulf , initiated on February 28^th  by the Israeli-US attack on Iran with the key motive being that Tehran should never have nuclear weapons.

As things stand now, the further course of the conflict in the Persian Gulf is uncertain.

Especially after Trump’s latest decision that “the most devastating sanctions in history” will soon be imposed on Iran (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/20/trump-threatens-crush-iran-economy-war-hormuz). Also because, of the latter messages from Tehran that the introduction of such American measures is a “declaration of war” to all countries. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/8/22/iran-war-live-trump-says-tehran-not-ready-to-make-right-deal-to-end-war). On that line,  Iran signals that it will retaliate fiercely in that case. (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-war-devastating-response-us-threat-toughest-economic-hit-rcna593697).

Those plans by Washington and Tehran raise a series of dilemmas. For example: could the US soon start landing troops on its “new territory”? Or, how could than Iran continue to assess its “new territory” on the shores of the Pacific?

Something else is also a puzzle.

Namely, there are a handful of unresolved territorial disputes in the world, both on land and in the World Sea. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_territorial_disputes).

What happens if some other countries soon start thinking of declaring as “their new territory” some piece of Earth (land or islands…), or some waters (parts of rivers, seas…) that would mean a lot to them now? Who could possibly be the arbiter in such cases?

Be that as it may, in the immediate maritime hinterland of the war conflict in the Persian Gulf on the Indian Ocean, there is the strategic Chagos Archipelago and within it Diego Garcia island (on the photo) with vital US military installations.

Great Britain and Mauritius on the one hand, and the Maldives on the other, cannot agree on who is to claims sovereignty over the Chagos Islands…

The listing of these locations is not accidental. Namely, it comes after today’s threat by US President Donald Trump that the US could bomb Oman if  it “gets in the way” regarding the Hormuz case.

“If Oman gets in the way ( regarding controlling the Strait of Hormuz), we will bomb the shit out of them ,” President Trump said. (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260817-trump-threatens-to-bomb-oman-if-it-gets-in-the-way-of-us-iran-negotiations/).

Trump’s first military threat to a country on the Arabian Peninsula, since the outbreak of the conflict between the USA and Israel against Iran at the end of February, followed the news that official Tehran and Muscat, after three months of negotiations, reached a mutual agreement on the “zoning” of the waterway of the Strait of Hormuz (https://en.yenisafak.com/world/iran-oman-reach-deal-on-hormuz-shipping-route-map-3721945).

As recently as last Friday, the US president announced that he would declare the Strait of Hormuz US territory when “we soon defeat Iran” (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/aug/14/trump-threat-strait-hormuz-us-territory).

A sharp reaction from Tehran followed (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-rejects-delusions-trump-strait-hormuz-us-territory-rcna592666), but the official Muscat did not comment on the matter. It remains unclear whether the Strait of Hormuz as American territory would include both shores of that strait, or only the Iranian one?

Meanwhile, after Trump’s threat to bomb Oman, one question could be asked.

Which locations within Oman, otherwise the only country besides Iran, on the shores of the Strait of Hormuz, could be targeted by a possible US bombing, and which would be spared? Official Muscat has not yet reacted regarding Trump’s latest threat to the sultanate. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant threatened Oman with sanctions in April if it cooperates with Tehran on the arrangement of the Hormuz Strait. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/28/us-treasury-threatens-oman-with-sanctions-over-hormuz-strait)

If Muscat takes the “bomb threat” seriously, US’ entry into the naval-diplomatic arena of Hormuz, may be further hampered.

Israelis in Berbera, Americans in Bosaso: control of the southern approaches to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea is on the actors’ radar even beyond the Yemeni Houthis

*

Two Saudi petro-tankers: Wafa and Daisy, were yesterday (August 5^th ) the target of ballistic strikes by the pro-Iranian Houthis at two distant locations: Rebel movement “Ansar Allah” targeted the first mega-ship in the northern part of the Red Sea, and the second in the Gulf of Aden area not far from the strategic Bab el-Mandeb sea passage, claiming that “the hits were precise”. (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/houthis-claim-they-hit-2nd-saudi-oil-tanker-in-a-day/4019517).

 General Yahya Saree, the spokesman of the Yemeni Houthis, presented these armed incidents as their “geographic expansion of the field of action”. (https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/08/05/880307.htm).

We could ask: Is there an escalation of tensions around the Red Sea, perhaps the Horn of Africa too, at a time when it seems that the drama surrounding the Pass of Hormuz seems to be subsiding? (https://www.ft.com/content/e0b10cad-3e46-4a6d-9227-eba6fe11c676?syn-25a6b1a6=1).

The answer is uncertain for now, but the number of new actors on the African coast near Bab el Mandeb is starting to grow of recently (https://www.vujic-geopolitika.com/2026/01/11/izrael-novi-akter-na-rogu-afrike/).

As for the Houthis, when they announced a naval blockade of Saudi Red Sea ports on July 20^th , the focus of their first strikes was the Saudi port Yanbu on the Red Sea. Houthi attack on the Daisy—in the extreme northwest of the Indian Ocean, far from the port of Yanbu, raises the question: What could be the motive for the Houthis to launch an armed initiative against the naval and land “Saudi targets” right now? (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/08/04/yemens-houthis-claim-drone-strike-on-saudi-target-at-najran-airport/).

In the fall of 2023, the Houthis started their armed offensive against “ships connected to Israel”, and in the name of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. At that time, Saudi blockade of Hodeidah, a key Houthi-controlled Yemeni port—which they have this time cited as the focus of their July 20 “blockade”—was also pretty impenetrable (“legacy “since the fierce clashes in the middle of the last decade).

Whatever were the Houthi motives, then and now, Bab-el-Mandeb stands nowadays as a focal point of potential confrontation between numerous regional and global interests.

In this context, news arrives that the US military delegation headed by Major General Claude Tudor signed an agreement with the local administration of the Puntland region in Somalia on Sunday, August 2^nd , on the expansion of the US military presence in the port of Bosaso (on the photo)  in the Gulf of Aden. (https://ground.news/article/us-expands-strategic-foothold-on-somalias-coast-as-yemen-conflict-simmers).

With the aim of improving operations against terrorism, as well as helping to protect maritime security in the region.

After that, the war in the Persian Gulf, initiated by the actions of Israel and the US against Iran on February 28^th , was extended to the Red Sea region, with successive strikes by Saudi Arabian aviation on the Yemeni port of Hodeida. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/24/saudis-strike-yemens-houthi-held-hodeida-rebel-media).  That was followed by Houthi missile strikes on Saudi Aramco’s oil installations near the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea and the city ofYazan.

Along the way, the “Encelia” tanker was hit by an unidentified missile 130 kilometres southwest of the city of Al Shuqaiq in the Yazan region, not far from the border with Yemen. Whether and how much the armed conflict between the official Riyadh and the Yemeni “Ansar Allah” can escalate is uncertain.

What is known is that the Ministry of Defence of Germany, on Thursday, July 23^rd , announced the “relocation” of the minesweeper “Fulda” and the supply ship “Mosel” from the Red Sea region (from the port of Djibouti) to the Eastern Mediterranean (https://www.eurasiareview.com/24072026-germany-withdraws-naval-vessels-from-red-sea-amid-rising-houthi-saudi-tensions/).

The unstable security situation, and the absence of an imminent mission in the region of the Strait of Hormuz were cited as the key reasons for Berlin’s decision to withdraw the two German warships from the tense zone near the strategic Bab el Mandeb passage (on the photo) on the southern approach to the Red Sea. In that direction moves towards Suez and the Mediterranean, an otherwise significant amount of energy supplies and other goods badly needed by the EU.  

Meanwhile, “Fulda” and “Mosel” arrived in Djibouti only a month ago to join the (now apparently) abandoned “Coalition of the Willing” to demining Hormuz—an initiative of London and Paris joined on paper by forty countries. (https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/06/18/germany-moves-two-ships-to-djibouti-eyeing-multinational-hormuz-mission-this-summer/).

According to the earlier plans of the Europeans, “Fulda” and “Mosel” were supposed to lead the task of finding mines in the Strait of Hormuz within the “Coalition” armada.

How Brussels will understand Berlin’s decision to withdraw two warships from the anchorage in Djibouti right now is very uncertain.

Namely, on July 17^th , the EU and Djibouti concluded a strategic “Agreement on the Status of Forces for Operation Aspides” – by which the Europeans gained new opportunities for further action on the high seas between Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. (https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/news/2026/07/17/countering-bab-el-mandeb-threats-eu-reinforces-red-sea-naval-mission-with-strategic-djibouti-accord/).

“The European Union hereby expresses its strategic interest in maintaining security, and acting in a security role under the auspices of the Aspides and Atalanta missions here in the northwest of the Indian Ocean,” General Sean Clancy, Chief of the EU Military Committee, during a ceremony in Djibouti on July 17. By the way, the EU anti-pirates mission “Atalanta” has been in that region of the Indian Ocean since 20008, while “Aspides” was created in February 2024.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas came out in Djibouti with a proposal that “the ships that were promised to the Coalition of the Willing (for the demining of Hormuz), could, while they are now just waiting for that mission, be deployed here (to the EU Aspides mission”), since the Coalition of the Willing is not yet functional.”

Berlin seems to have some plans for “Fulda” and “Mosel” in the eastern Mediterranean…

While Washington and Tehran show signs of readiness to resume peace talks, it is uncertain whether Yemen’s Houthis and Riyadh are interested in mutual dialogue

Whether the US military can simultaneously act against Iran in the Persian Gulf. and the Yemeni Houthis near Bab el Mandeb on the southern approach to the Red Sea, and with what results, time will tell.

As things stand now, US President Donald Trump announced this week a new series of armed strikes on bridges and power plants in Iran in retaliation for any ship that the Iranian National Guard continues to target in the area of ​​the Strait of Hormuz. https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/donald-trump-says-us-will-destroy-bridge-or-power-plant-for-each-iranian-attack-in-strait-of-hormuz/cid/2171284

At the same time, US leader announced readiness to “take care” in the event that the Yemeni Houthis from the extreme southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, implement their recent decision to blockade ports of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea.

“In case something like that happens, we will take care of it. We have already done that with the Houthis before.” https://www.ft.com/content/90facd68-4df7-40c2-9383-e989a02fbe51?syn-25a6b1a6=1

In the meantime, without a single Houthi missile being fired, the world oil market and key maritime carriers of barrels yesterday already “blinked” to the warning of the Yemeni rebel movement “Ansar Allah that all ships that dock at Saudi ports on the Red Sea will henceforth be considered a “direct target”.

As of yesterday, the price of a “Brent” barrel jumped above 95 US dollars (the highest since June 11), mostly because of the Houthi threat. Already today, the same barrel of  brent  goes today for 98 US dollars…

At the same time, at least three mega-tankers loaded with Saudi oil in the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, for customers in Asia, suddenly changed their direction of movement: instead of heading south towards Bab el Mandeb and the Indian Ocean, they sailed yesterday towards Suez and the Mediterranean Sea via Asia (at least 30 days longer journey). https://en.yenisafak.com/world/oil-tankers-change-course-in-red-sea-after-houthi-blockade-threats-3721152.

As of today, the Houthis targeted and hit two Saudi tankers, while a large fire broke out on one of them. https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/saudi-tanker-on-fire-after-being-hit-by-projectile-as-houthis-strike-in-red-sea/2-1-2019914

The global petro market braces new challenges, with the latest Houthi threat in the face of a possible deadlock in the supply of barrels from the Saudi Arabia.

Namely, due to the tense blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (Iranians) and the blockade of Iranian ports (Americans), the leading Gulf oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, significantly redirected its export of barrels through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu port on the Red Sea. The latest Houthi threat to civilian shipping directed to Saudi petro-anchorages on the Red Sea, and possibly the leading Sunni monarchy’s petro-installation, opens new dilemmas on the oil market, that are not only related to supply risks.

For example, if US President Donald Trump’s signals about the progress of peace negotiations with the Iranians, since the outbreak of the conflict on February 28 until now, have had a noticeable effect on the fluctuations of barrel prices on the world market, what needs to happen to eliminate the new “geopolitical trigger” of oil price growth, this time around Bab el Mandeb?

Peaceful diplomatic dialogue between Riyadh and the Houthis, or something else?

The new militarization of the Horn of Africa, Bab el Mandeb, a state along the shores of the Red Sea seems inevitable…

Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman, has been a “thorn in Washington’s side” for some time. Perhaps, starting with al-Busaidi’s decision to fly to the US capital without prior notice, immediately after the US-Iran round of negotiations at the Sultanate ambassador’s residence in Switzerland on February 27^th  to meet with JD Vance, the US vice president. (https://wanaen.com/oman-fms-unannounced-washington-visit-focuses-on-iran-talks/).

By the way, it was the day before the start of the armed conflict between Israel and the USA against Iran.

“A peace deal is within reach… if we just give diplomacy the space it needs to get there. If the ultimate goal is to make sure Iran can’t have a nuclear bomb forever, I think we’ve solved that problem through these negotiations by agreeing to a very important breakthrough that has never been made before,” Al Busaidi said in an interview with CBS News in Washington. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/peace-within-reach-as-iran-agrees-no-nuclear-material-stockpile-oman-fm)

Shortly after the conflict in the Persian Gulf began, Al Busaidi believed that the US “has lost control of its foreign policy, entering a war that is not its own” (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260319-oman-fm-us-has-lost-control-of-foreign-policy-entered-war-that-is-not-its-own/).

Then, at the end of June, al-Busaidi lamented that Oman and its neighbours in the Gulf had engaged in “a war that should never have happened”. (https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/06/29/ormuz-oman-et-ses-voisins-du-golfe-emergent-d-une-guerre-qui-n-aurait-jamais-du-avoir-lieu_6716898_3210.html?).

These days, the head of Oman’s diplomacy called on all the countries on the shores of the Persian Gulf to shift their diplomatic focus towards the future.

(https://tribune.com.pk/story/2618221/oman-fm-calls-iran-war-a-catastrophe-says-exposes-flaws-in-gulf-security-doctrine.)

But how do you get to the future, in a region where these days there is more and more shooting, and where the other day the Iranians also targeted the military stations of Oman – neighbour on the opposite side of the Strait of Hormuz? (https://iranwire.com/en/news/155076-irgc-strikes-targets-in-oman-blasting-key-mediators-territory/).

Here too, Oman adheres to the legendary diplomatic neutrality established by Sultan Qaboos ibn Said el Said (1940-2020).

(https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/sultan-qaboos-and-modern-oman-19702020/friend-to-all-enemy-to-none-omans-quiet-diplomacy-since-1970/C97F3F52B1FCA66CB0C1).

“A friend to all, an enemy to none”—was the axiom of Sultan Qaboos.

From that angle, one could understand today’s announcement by “Oman Air”—that from September, it is introducing a twice-weekly direct airline—Moscow—Salalah (on the photo) , a mega-port in the south of Oman, otherwise the birthplace of Sultan Qaboos, and the address of one of the active US military bases in the Sultanate. (https://www.muscatdaily.com/2026/07/18/salalah-to-welcome-new-flights-from-russia-kazakhstan/).

The ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran are not limited to only 60 days, which could lead to an extension of the period of exemption from Iran’s petro-sanctions.

China is the only country that continues to buy Iranian oil, others have remained cautious, due to the uncertainty surrounding the possible re-imposition of sanctions by Washington on Tehran, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant (pictured) said this week, describing the emerging situation in the global oil market, following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (M o U) between the US and Iran on June 17. (https://iranwire.com/en/news/154378-us-treasury-secretary-china-is-the-only-buyer-of-iranian-oil/).

The M o U otherwise contains a provision—”Authorization for the production, delivery and sale of crude oil, petrochemicals and petroleum products of Iranian origin until August 21, 2026″ (https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/936206/download?inline).

Meanwhile, China has been the leading buyer of Iranian oil for years (https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-fact-sheet-short-primer-relationship), where Beijing and Tehran long established petro-buying and selling in yuan.

Now, when Bessent says that “Iran could start invoicing oil sales in US dollars as part of ongoing negotiations with Washington” (https://shafaq.com/en/World/US-Treasury-Iran-could-trade-oil-in-dollars)- why is “China the only one”? That is, why have the others “remained cautious” to venture into that newly offered, at first glance short-term business…?

The US Treasury Secretary is actually very precise in his announcement about the possibility of “dollarization” of Iranian oil. Namely, Scott Bessent explicitly states that such a possibility exists “within the ongoing negotiations with Washington”. But nowhere does it say that these negotiations will last only 60 days. The M o U states very clearly that this initial time frame is “expandable”. That is “extensions” are possible…

How realistic is it to expect that the ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran could continue even after the first 60 days, so that the “removal of Iranian petro sanctions” might last even longer? The answer seems to be still uncertain. (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260702-us-iran-expected-to-hold-direct-talks-in-doha-in-3rd-week-of-july-sources/).

In that arena, the “dollarization” of Iranian oil could be a magnet of importance for both Washington and Tehran. “The dominance of the dollar is essential… all we are doing is pushing the dollar… it has never stopped being the centre of the global currency system, but we are strengthening it,” Bessent pointed out in an interview with the CNBC network. (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/24/cnbc-transcript-us-treasury-secretary-scott-bessent-speaks-with-cnbcs-joe-kernen-on-squawk-box-today.html).

It seems that Iranian oil could have a place and a role in the mission of further strengthening the US dollar? Such an “assignment” then would probably not be limited to only 60 days.

The first visit of the Sultan of Oman to France since 1989 secured Paris a strategic position in the treacherous arena of the Strait of Hormuz. Namely, French President Emmanuel Macron reached a “historic agreement” with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq on the upcoming demining of the Hormuz Strait  (along with a number of other agreements on the future, announced broad military-economic cooperation between Paris and Muscat). https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/europe/2026/06/29/sultan-of-oman-meets-macron-in-paris-to-support-demining-and-safe-passage-of-strait-of-hormuz/

France thus became the first Western country whose naval experts will continue to publicly dive in the Strait of Hormuz in search of mines laid… since the outbreak of the conflict between the US and Israel against Iran at the end of February this year.

What can Washington and Tehran think about this agreement between Paris and Muscat? At the end of May, US President Donald Trump warned Oman not to appear too much in the picture around Hormuz, while Washington is conducting painful negotiations with Tehran. “Oman has to behave like everyone else, otherwise we will have to blow them up,” Trump threatened Muscat at the time. (https://english.news.cn/20260528/bd6d14f1465d49d2a6317c17cd2a8fd3/c.html).

A lot of turbulent water has passed through the Strait of Hormuz since the end of May: as recently as today in Muscat, Ana Escrogima, the American ambassador to Oman, met with Sayyid Theyazin, Oman’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs, to discuss “ways to further strengthen in various domains, including economy and investments.” (https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1192045/oman/oman-us-discuss-economic-investment-cooperation).

Demining is not mentioned as a topic there.

Almost simultaneously, Tehran revealed that Iranian and Omani officials held the first meeting of the “Joint Committee for Hormuz”. https://www.azernews.az/region/260385.html.  Whether the Iranians and the Omanis discussed mines in the Hormuz Strait at that meeting (in the official news, the date was not specified) was not announced.

What is certain is that the French and the Omanis have already discussed the mines in the Strait of Hormuz.

“No country will be allowed to deal with the demining of the Hormuz Pass: it is the job of Iran alone”, Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned tonight.

Meanwhile, how many mines are there in the Hormuz Strait?

The head of the UN Maritime Agency (IOM), Arsenio Rodríguez, recently estimated that 80 mines were placed inside the – until before this conflict passable – “traffic separation zone” in the central belt of the Strait of Hormuz. https://ground.news/article/iran-strait-of-ormuz-will-have-about-80-mines

Anyone who has maps of laid mines—if they originate from one country, could be indispensable to anyone dealing with the demining of the Strait of Hormuz, and the normalization of civilian navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As things stand now, and after a masterful diplomatic manoeuvre by Paris, the French are already preparing for the public elimination of mines in the Strait of Hormuz…

In the complicated, currently—seemingly stalled, negotiations between the US and Iran, the two fabulous sums of money (US$250-300 billion) seem close.

Namely, at the end of May and seemingly out of nowhere, in compiling the list of potential actions that could take place between the US and Iran, after the end of the conflict, a sum of 300 billion US dollars appeared (https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/artc-new-details-negotiations-300-billion-fund-for-iran-and-a-halt-to-fighting-in-lebanon-report).

Washington was very careful to connect that money with the future “international investment fund” under the leadership of the Americans. The Iranian side called the talks about 300 billion dollars a talks about the  “reconstruction program” .(https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-us-agreement-plan.html).

It is not yet known what the priorities of that “international investment fund for Iran” could  be.  Nor did the Iranians come out with a list of preferred priorities in the case of the mentioned 300 billion dollars.

Although, the direction of possible action of the “Fund”, that is, the “Program” could perhaps already be guessed.

Namely, as early as 2023, Khojasteh Mehr, the head of the National Oil Company of Iran (NIOC), estimated at the Hongqiao International Economic Forum in Shanghai that Iran is considering attracting around 250 billion US dollars of investment in the development of the domestic petro-industry by 2031 (https://ana.ir/en/news/4190/official-iran-ready-for-attracting-250-billion-dollars-investment-in-oil-sector).

As recently as February 19 of this year (nine days before the outbreak of the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf), Hamid Ghanbari, the deputy director of economic diplomacy at Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the US and Iran could jointly invest in oil and gas projects as part of the ongoing nuclear deal under negotiation, signaling Tehran’s willingness to reach an agreement and avoid military conflict. https://caspianpost.com/iran/iran-proposes-joint-oil-investment-with-u-s-ahead-of-nuclear-negotiations).

“For the sake of the durability of the agreement, it is necessary for the US to benefit in areas with high and fast economic returns,” Ganbar assessed. “The country must be ready for all scenarios,” Ganbari added, “and at the same time seriously conduct negotiations.” Among the potential areas of cooperation, in addition to oil and gas, Ganbari mentioned mining, urban development and the purchase of aircraft.

Here, perhaps the direction in which, seemingly unimaginable today, relations between Washington and Tehran could develop in the future.

It was probably not a coincidence that US President Donald Trump said the other day that a peace agreement with Iran could be even better than a military victory. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/trump-expects-us-iran-deal-to-extend-ceasefire-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-over-the-next-week-report/3953666).

*

The US military-naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is “largely still in place,” US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said in Singapore on Saturday, without specifying exactly what that “largely” covers. (https://thehill.com/policy/international/5902453-pete-hegseth-iran-war-naval-blockade-strait-of-hormuz/).

As things stand on the ground, the US military-naval blockade of Iranian ports, imposed on April 13^th , these days does not seem to be focused on the port of Jask on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. By the way, the port of Jask, about 95 miles east of Hormuz, is Iran’s only port on the Indian Ocean. Since mid-April, news has been appearing that Iran is delivering barrels through the Golestan-Jask oil pipeline (on the map) to that strategic port in Hormozghan province, for export to customers in Asia. (https://iranwire.com/en/news/152621-oil-loading-begins-at-jask-to-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz/).

Iranian oil, the Iranian oil pipeline, the Iranian port of Jask… until yesterday (May 31^st ) it seemed like a solo action by a rather isolated actor in the Persian Gulf region.

And then, on Sunday, two ferries each loaded with eight imported cars arrived in the port of Jusk from the direction of Oman. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/insight/iran-opens-jask-port-to-vehicle-imports-despite-us-blockade/gm-GM8D706D9E?gemSnapshotKey=GM8D706D9E-snapshot-1&uxmode=ruby.

The test—shipping in front of the eyes of the US Navy?! Some observers assessed that “Iran is defying the US blockade with the first shipment of vehicles through the port of Jask”.

The viewing angle can be different.

For example, that official Muscat, when it comes to cooperation with Tehran, has a different opinion in the Persian Gulf region. By the way Tehran and Muscat these days conduct frequent consultations on issues of importance for the regulation of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which does not meet Washington’s excessive understanding. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/27/donald-trump-oman-threat-strait-hormuz

It is not known to many that as early as in 1968.  Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Sutan Qaboos, ruler of Oman, jointly proposed the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Strait of Hormuz (TSS). (https://houseofsaud.com/oman-never-signed-that-was-the-point/).

That joint Pahlavi-Qaboos initiative was accepted in the same year by the UN agency IMO (International Maritime Organization based in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia). The long-ago agreement between the two former rulers of Iran and Oman—TSS has been officially in force since 1975 until today.

From there, it may be understandable why Oman, the other day, refused to join the proposal of the five remaining members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to condemn Iran at the International Maritime Agency for “unilaterally assuming the authority of sovereign administration”.

“Whatever your opinion is about Iran, this war is not their making ,” said Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi (https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-not-their-making-omani-foreign-minister-says-iran).

Hence probably the” car-ferry” to Jusk.