{"id":2083,"date":"2026-04-24T18:51:04","date_gmt":"2026-04-24T18:51:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/?p=2083"},"modified":"2026-04-24T18:51:42","modified_gmt":"2026-04-24T18:51:42","slug":"posle-ormuza-i-bab-el-mandeb-pred-dve-pomorske-blokade","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/2026\/04\/24\/after-hormuz-and-bab-el-mandeb-before-two-naval-blockades\/","title":{"rendered":"After Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb before two naval blockades"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>While the Iranians and the Americans measure their strength by blocking navigation in the direction of the Persian Gulf, the Yemeni Houthis and the official Mogadishu threaten new &#8220;ramps&#8221; on the southern approach to the Red Sea<\/p>\n<p>*<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_2084\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-2084\" style=\"width: 264px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-2084 size-full\" title=\"Photo: Wikimedia\" src=\"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/BL-ARABIA-BAB-EL-MANDEB-24-4-26.png\" alt=\"Foto: Wikimedia\" width=\"264\" height=\"200\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-2084\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Photo: Wikimedia<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>The Houthis, but also Somalia?!<\/p>\n<p>These days, the global merchant navy is facing the apparent threat that, despite the ongoing war drama around the Strait of Hormuz, it could&nbsp; very soon encounter a new, double &#8220;ramp&#8221; on the southern approach to the Red Sea.<\/p>\n<p>Namely, from the far southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni rebel movement &#8220;Ansar Allah&#8221; has been widely announcing its readiness since mid-April not only to resume operations against certain shipping that is headed through the globally strategic sea passage Bab el-Mandeb (&#8220;Gate of Tears&#8221; in Arabic), but also to start collecting &#8220;tolls&#8221;, similar to the Iranians in the case of the Hormuz Passage. (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.lloydslist.com\/LL1156996\/Houthis-have-discussed-implementing-Red-Sea-tolls-says-UK-security-firm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.lloydslist.com\/LL1156996\/Houthis-have-discussed-implementing-Red-Sea-tolls-says-UK-security-firm<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>How important the Bab el Mandeb (about 100 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide, separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the Horn of Africa) is for the world economy is evidenced by the fact that in 2023, about 26,000 ships passed through the Suez Canal according to the report of the Suez Canal Authority. (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/live-news\/20260326-bab-al-mandeb-strait-another-key-shipping-route-under-threat\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/live-news\/20260326-bab-al-mandeb-strait-another-key-shipping-route-under-threat<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Alas, that number was almost halved last year to around 12,700, due to the armed actions of the Houthis. Meanwhile, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that 12 percent of the world&#8217;s petro-cargo passed through Bab el-Mandeb in the first half of 2023, before the Houthis launched attacks that fall (in solidarity with the Palestinians).<\/p>\n<p>Opportunities along the Bab el Mandeb have recently become more complicated from the shores of the Horn of Africa. Namely, Abdullah Warfa , Somalia&#8217;s ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union (AU), announced on April 19<sup>th<\/sup> &nbsp;the readiness of the official Mogadishu to prohibit the passage of Bab el-Mandeb to &#8220;ships connected to Israel&#8221;, and that was due to the decision of the official Tel Aviv to recognize Somaliland (in December last year), and exchange ambassadors with that territory. (<a href=\"https:\/\/en.mehrnews.com\/news\/243907\/Somalia-closes-Bab-al-Mandab-Strait-to-Israeli-shipping\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/en.mehrnews.com\/news\/243907\/Somalia-closes-Bab-al-Mandab-Strait-to-Israeli-shipping<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Otherwise, Somaliland is not internationally recognized as a sovereign state, despite the declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991 (Israel was the first country to recognize the sovereignty of Somaliland). Under international law, Somaliland remains part of Somalia and has no place in the United Nations.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;External interference could lead to countermeasures, such as restricting access to the key Bab el-Mandeb sea route,&#8221; Somalia&#8217;s ambassador, Warfa , added in a letter to Ethiopia and the AU.<\/p>\n<p>Now, how many vessels and trained officers the Somali Navy has at its disposal to possibly start, and from what altitudes, to enforce the ban on navigation of &#8220;vessels connected to Israel&#8221; is uncertain. Somalia signed a defence agreement with Turkey in 2024. As of mid-2025, about 500 Turkish soldiers have been deployed in Somalia, as well as a certain amount of army arsenal (<a href=\"https:\/\/adf-magazine.com\/2026\/02\/somalia-gets-t-129-attack-helicopters\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/adf-magazine.com\/2026\/02\/somalia-gets-t-129-attack-helicopters\/<\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>If the war arena from the Persian Gulf spills over to the open sea between the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, then the ongoing Iranian-American blockade of the Hormuz Pass will get a dangerous &#8220;companion&#8221; at the height of Bab el-Mandeb.<\/p>\n<p>The world&#8217;s merchant marine has a new, big problem, this time on the western rims of the Indian Ocean?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>While the Iranians and the Americans measure their strength by blocking navigation in the direction of the Persian Gulf, the Yemeni Houthis and the official Mogadishu threaten new &#8220;ramps&#8221; on the southern approach to the Red Sea * Photo: Wikimedia The Houthis, but also Somalia?! These days, the global merchant navy is facing the apparent [&#8230;]\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2084,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[109],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2083","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arabia-new-global-diplomacy-hub-in-action"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2083","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2083"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2083\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2087,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2083\/revisions\/2087"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2084"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2083"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2083"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.vujic-geopolitika.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2083"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}