Eilat (Israel)—Sharm al-Sheikh (Egypt): 200 kilometres. Eilat—Port Sudan (Sudan): 1167 kilometres. Eilat—Hodeida (Yemen)—1,833 kilometres. The increasingly uncertain conditions between these four ports on the Red Sea are of great concern to numerous players in world maritime trade. Namely, since November 2023, when the Yemeni Houthis (on the photo, “Ansar Allah” movement) launched armed operations against certain civilian shipping on the approaches to the strategic passage of Bab el Mandeb in the south of the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, that direction towards the Suez Canal has largely become an “avoidance zone”. Before the terrorist attack of Hamas in Israel on October 7, 2023 and the subsequent conflict in Gaza, an average of 75 ships passed through the Suez Canal per day, today only about thirty.
In the meantime, 64 percent of maritime container transport that was before the Houthi armed offensive (first against “ships linked to Israel” and, because of “solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza”), is rerouted from the former Bab el Mandeb-Suez Canal route, to the much longer and more expensive route around the Cape of Good Hope. On that 10-14 day longer route, global shipping carriers spend a million US dollars a day more, just for the extra fuel.
The “circumvention” of the Red Sea, meanwhile, has caused fabulous damage to global supply chains, over a trillion dollars this year alone, as the lion’s share of firms listed on Wall Street (481S&P500) face the risks of extended shipping timelines.
The Houthis—the Red Sea crisis is getting even more complex these days.
Especially since the Houthis announced “sanctions” against 13 leading American petro-actors, including ExxonMobil and Chevron, at the end of September. At the same time, they announced that in the “new phase of resistance” they will act against the sanctioned “according to the principle of confrontation”. British “Lloyd’s” soon after, noted that “the increasingly sophisticated targeting of the Houthis points to expert external support” (https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154991/Houthi-sanctions-could-add-risk-assessment-complexity)
Whose support, is of interest to numerous observers.
Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports mention new arms supply channels for the Houthis via Port Sudan https://www.newarab.com/news/yemens-houthis-turn-sudan-new-arms-smuggling-routes).
Whether the armed advance of the Houthis on the targets on the Red Sea (and perhaps, beyond) could be ended after the round negotiations between Israel and Hamas is uncertain.
On Tuesday, October 7, the Houthis—in the midst of ongoing negotiations in Sharm al-Sheikh—launched four drones loaded with explosives, which were shot down by Israeli air defence near Eilat.
On the same day, the US Commerce Department added a dozen Chinese companies to its restricted trade list for their alleged role in facilitating the purchase and use of US components and technology found in armed drones allegedly used by Hamas and the Houthis.
The “trap” on the Red Sea seems to be expanding. The merchant marine could be the likely collateral damage there.
